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Abstract
In recent years there has been increasing interest in the role of small business in the 
economy and in the labour market. The thesis asks a number of key questions about the 
role of both workplace size and company size as determinants of individual wages. Is 
current research on individual wage determination compromised by ignoring variation 
by employer size? Do both workplace size and company size influence wages? Findings 
suggest that the process of wage determination is quite different between the Small 
Business sector, an Extensive sector with small workplaces operated by large companies 
and an Intensive sector with large workplaces. In part higher wages in large workplaces 
are associated with the structure of product markets as well as tenure with the current 
employer. Within the Small Business sector low income groups are more disadvantaged 
than their counterparts in large companies and/or workplaces.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Although the incidence of higher average wages in large firms is a well 
established empirical finding, reasons for this remain a puzzle; one which has been 
largely ignored in the Australian literature. A variety of theoretical models are capable 
of explaining this phenomenon ranging from explanations based on unobserved 
heterogeneity in worker quality or working conditions to explanations which encompass 
non-competitive product markets and rent sharing. With the availability of micro data 
sets in recent years there has been increasing interest in distinguishing between 
explanations which support different interpretations of how labour markets work.
It is particularly interesting to investigate the relationship between size and 
wages in the Australian context where there is a unique institutional environment. In 
particular there has traditionally been a high degree of centralised wage setting, legally 
binding minimum wage awards, and occupation or industry based unions. An extensive 
literature has developed around the question of whether the Australian system 
compresses wage differentials compared to more decentralised environments such as in 
the United States. Evidence suggests that the occupational and industry wage structure 
in Australia shows a similar pattern to that exhibited in the United States and United 
Kingdom but with some studies suggesting compression of the distribution compared to 
the United States. 1
This thesis builds on recent literature from the United States which has made 
the empirical distinction between workplace size and company size and found that both 
measures of size are significant wage determinants. 2 An important motivation for 
distinguishing empirically between workplace and company size is suggestions in the 
literature that they matter for different reasons. The suggestions for how workplace size
1 See Hughes (1973) and Norris (1980).
2
Workplace size is measured as the number of workers in a particular location and company size is 
measured as the number of workers in all locations of a company within national boundaries. U.S. 
evidence using both measures is provided by Evans and Leighton (1989), Pearce (1990), Oi (1991), 
Mellow (1983), Brown and Medoff (1989), Kruse (1992), and Hodson (1983).
2and company size are relevant in different ways have not been subjected to careful 
empirical analysis.
Two new sources of data offer an opportunity to pursue this topic in the 
Australian context. We have matched a measure of company size reported by the 
employer to individual worker information from a household survey. The 1988-1989 
Issues in Multicultural Australia (IMA) survey has information on wages, a range of 
individual characteristics, workplace size, and the name of their employer. A follow up 
survey of the employing companies collected the company size measure and we have 
augmented this with additional observations drawn from the 24th edition of The 
Business Who's Who of Australia (1990) which has information collected annually from 
companies.
A second data source which has information on both measures of size is the 
1989-1990 Australian Workplace Industrial Relations survey (AWIRS). The AWIRS 
data has information measured at the workplace level and is limited by a lack of 
information on individual characteristics of workers. An additional limitation is the 
exclusion of workplaces with fewer than 20 employees from the sample but the survey 
includes useful information on union activity, on-the-job training, and product market 
structure.
We use a well established econometric methodology with the estimation of 
equations relating wages to human capital and demographic variables to obtain 
estimates of the wage structure. To abstract from any effect of a concentration of part- 
time and casual workers in small workplaces and companies, we restrict the analysis to 
full time, private sector, wage and salary earners, excluding the self employed.3 The 
conventional approach to exploring the influence of workplace and company size is to 
augment such regressions with measures of size.
As well as presenting the first Australian evidence on the relationship between 
wages and company size, the thesis makes a contribution to the literature by extending
3
Although the increasing incidence of part time and casual work is an important issue for Australian 
wage outcomes, the aim here is to ask whether employer size is important and investigate some potential 
explanations; something which has not been done with Australian data. The effect of size will differ 
between part time and full time workers with factors such as human capital accumulation and monitoring 
costs being more important for full time workers.
3the conventional methodology to allow estimates of the wage structure to vary with 
workplace and company size. This has implications for current Australian research 
which has assumed that the impacts of wage determinants are stable across different 
sized workplaces and companies.
In addition, to take into account separate effects of workplace size and 
company size, the sample is disaggregated into three sectors: a Small Business sector 
where both the workplace and the company are small; an Extensive sector where 
workplaces are small but companies are large; and an Intensive sector where both the 
workplace and the company are large. This represents an additional level of 
disaggregation from any analysis in the current literature. Pairwise comparisons across 
sectors show the change in coefficients associated with an increase in company size 
(holding workplace size constant) and associated with an increase in workplace size 
(holding company size constant). The questions then are: for small workplaces, does 
being part of a larger company influence the wage structure?; and, among large 
companies does workplace size influence the wage structure?
The thesis also presents the first Australian evidence on the relationship 
between size-wage differentials and the degree of competition in product markets. The 
idea that employees can capture a share of economic rents earned by firms has a long 
tradition in the literature and a rent sharing explanation for size-wage differentials has 
been frequently suggested in the literature. Few studies have explored this proposition 
empirically and those that have do not distinguish between the workplace and the 
company.
The primary objective of the thesis is to document and interpret the size-wage 
relationship in the Australian context, rather than to test between any narrowly defined 
models. Throughout the thesis four key questions are asked: (i) Are the results using 
both measures of size comparable to the existing evidence? (ii) What does the analysis 
imply for current estimates of the wage structure which have largely ignored the 
influence of size? (iii) What interpretation of the size wage relationship does the 
analysis imply? and (iv) What can the distinction between workplace size and company 
size add to our understanding of the size-wage relationship? Some background on these 
issues is provided in the remainder of this chapter.
41.1 Are Australian Results using Both Measures of Size Consistent with Existing 
Evidence?
Current research using both measures of size comes from the U.S. literature 
however, comparisons are problematic given different years and samples covered and 
different industry and size distributions between the two countries. Nevertheless, asking 
whether in the Australian context the size-wage relationship is similar to overseas 
evidence can add to the debate about the influence of labour market institutions.
The Australian environment has traditionally been characterised by compulsory 
arbitration of disputes by the Industrial Relations Commission, legally binding 
minimum wage awards covering union and non union workers, and a tradition of 
occupation or industry based unions. Recently there have been moves to decentralise the 
industrial relations system and implement wage bargaining at the enterprise level 
(Hancock and Rawson, 1993). However, the data used in the thesis relate to the years 
1988 to 1990 which follow a six year period of centralised wage setting.
The period leading up to 1988 included the introduction in 1983 of the Accord 
agreement between the Australian Council of Trade Unions and The Federal 
Government which committed unions to a degree of wage restraint. On accepting 
national wage adjustments unions were required to commit to pursuing no extra claims. 
In 1987 some flexibility was introduced with the two tier system with wage adjustments 
above the national wage case associated with productivity improvements.
Despite variation in the degree of centralisation of wage setting, there has 
always been scope for over-award payments at the industry, company, or workplace 
level over specific conditions and supplements to awards. It has also been argued that 
there is room for wage flexibility despite the Commission's guide-lines and the no extra 
claims agreement. Watts and Mitchell (1990) and Brown et al (1984) suggest a possible 
mechanism for wage premiums in large firms by arguing that high earning workers, 
particularly in internal labour markets, are generally more able to obtain wage gains 
without contravening the guide-lines of the commission for example by reclassifying to 
higher earning grades. Brown et al (1984) further argue that "Employers devote
5considerable energy to manipulating internal pay structures so as to avoid the disruption 
of established pay differentials (and thus notions of 'fairness') and to stimulate effort and 
skill acquisition." The point being that large firms may have more flexibility to adjust 
wages while complying with the guide-lines and no extra claims conditions.
The regulatory environment may also be important in shaping the size-wage 
relationship with some tax and labour market regulations applying differentially to small 
and large companies. For example, small businesses are exempt from payroll tax (see 
Bureau of Industry Economics 1987).
1.2 Biases in Current Estimates of the Wage Structure
Exploring the relationships between wages and both workplace and company 
size allows an assessment of whether current estimates of the wage structure are biased 
by not taking account of size.
The human capital wage equation has been widely used to examine the wage 
structure in Australia. In particular there are many studies investigating wage 
differentials by gender, qualifications, union status, immigrant status, and industry. The 
focus in the empirical results will be on these variables and whether coefficients are 
sensitive to controlling for workplace size and/or company size.
To date, only measures of workplace size have been available in Australian 
data and these have been used to estimate separate wage intercepts by size with little 
analysis of reasons for the significant impact on wages. The significance of workplace 
size coefficients has been interpreted as evidence of a "firm" size effect. For example, 
Chapman and Iredale (1990) interpret the coefficient on workplace size as suggesting 
"...men in very large firms earned about 18 per cent per hour more than men in small 
firms..." (p28).
Studies have shown wage differentials by workplace size which are similar to 
overseas evidence. Table 1.1 presents estimates of size wage differentials from several 
countries. These are not strictly comparable due to differences in samples, time periods
6and variables used. Nevertheless, all studies show that size wage differentials exist after 
controlling for individual characteristics of workers. Estimates generally fall in the 10 to 
30 per cent range regardless of different institutional wage setting environments across 
countries.
Table 1.1
Percentage Wage Differentials Associated with Large Workplaces 
and Companies Compared to Small1
Country Data Large W Large C Study
U.K. 1983 25 Green et al( 1992)
1989 36
Australia 1973 15 Hatton & Chapman(1989)
1989 18 Chapman & Iredale(1990)
1989 13 Miller( 1993)
West 1978 8 Schmidt(1991)
Germany2
Canada 1986 24 Morissette(1990)
U.S.
14 8 Mellow(1982)
Notes:
1. Large companies and workplaces are defined as either more than 300, 500, or 
1000 workers. Small are defined as either less than 20 or 25 workers. A variety of 
controls for individual worker and job characteristics were used in the studies.
2. It is not clear whether results from Schmidt(1991) refer to company or workplace
size since the term "firm" size was used throughout.____________________________
According to Australian Bureau of Statistics data average earnings vary 
substantially by company size as shown in Table 1.2 for the 1989 year. Compared to 
companies with fewer than 20 employees wages increase by 6 per cent where there are 
up to 50 employees, peaking in the 500 to 1000 employee group at 23 per cent above the 
wage in small companies. In the 1000+ category the wage premium is 21 per cent.
7Table 1.2
Average Weekly Earnings by Company Size1 1989
_____ (Full time non-managerial private sector employees)_____
No. Employees
Weekly
Earnings
% compared 
to smallest
<20 4 4 0 .40
20-49 4 69 .20 6.5
50-99 4 92 .70 11.9
100-499 522 .60 18.7
500-999 542 .60 23.2
1000+ 532 .50 20.9
1. Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics Catalogue 6306. Company size 
refers to the "enterprise" which is defined as a single operating unit within the 
state or territory.
A problem with using only one measure of size is that estimates of wage 
differentials by workplace size can be expected to partially reflect company size effects, 
given some correlation between the two measures.4
1.3 Interpreting the Size-Wage Relationship
The observed positive correlation between firm size and wages is potentially 
explained as compensating differentials for unobserved variation in working conditions 
or the quality of employees. Size-wage differentials are then consistent with competitive 
markets and consistent with the same process of wage determination in small and large 
firms.
We argue that while such explanations based on unobservable heterogeneity 
may be valid they miss an important part of the story and lead to a narrow interpretation 
of size-wage differentials as arising essentially from our inability to measure all 
heterogeneity. It is more instructive to ask what characteristics of small and large firms 
determine variation in working conditions and employee quality. Transaction costs and 
the organisation of production are potential sources of such variation and while these are 
consistent with competitive markets they imply a different process of wage
4 See Miller E. (1978) for a discussion of reasons for such correlation and evidence from the U.S. In this 
sample, the Spearman rank correlation coefficient between workplace size and company size as 
categorical variables is .537.
8determination between small and large firms. Explanations based on variation in 
monitoring costs and specific human capital investments suggest that the wage structure 
will vary with firm size rather than there being a fixed wage premium for all employees.
Extending the conventional methodology of estimating separate intercepts by 
size to estimating different slopes by size can add to our understanding of the nature of 
the size-wage relationship.
Alternatively the positive size-wage relationship can be seen as the outcome of 
a process of rent sharing in response to unionisation or managerial discretion given non­
competitive product markets. Is the wage structure an efficient response to specific skills 
and imperfect information or is it a response to the institutional environment and unions 
without offsetting productivity benefits?
We also examine interaction between product market structure and size-wage 
effects with a view to assessing whether it is constructive to interpret the size-wage 
relationship as the outcome of a wage bargaining process. This is particularly interesting 
because it is the bargaining process that will be influenced by the centralisation of wage 
setting.
In looking for evidence that wage determination can be seen as a rent sharing 
process, it is presumed that product market power exists, is persistent because of 
barriers to entry, and can be measured empirically. Rent sharing does not necessarily 
imply non profit maximising firms. In the presence of significant bargaining or turnover 
costs a positive correlation between ability-to-pay and wages can be cost minimising. 
However, there is some Australian evidence that large management-controlled firms 
with market power may pursue goals other than profit maximisation and be operating at 
higher than minimum costs, so called X-inefficiency.s
The empirical analysis allows us to address three questions relevant for how the 
size-wage relationship is interpreted. Does the Australian evidence suggest that the size- 
wage relationship is a universal phenomenon unaffected by the institutional
Studies using data from the 1970's have shown a negative correlation between profitability and industry 
concentration and between profitability and company size and a positive correlation between market 
dominance (near monopoly) and firms of large absolute size (see Caves 1987 p6).
9environment? What does variation in slopes suggest about wage determination in 
different sized workplaces/companies? Is there any evidence of rent sharing in large 
workplaces or companies?
1.4 Distinguishing Between The Workplace and The Company
Throughout the thesis we will be asking which measure of size is dominant and 
whether they influence the average wage or the wage structure in different ways. No 
theory has been developed which explicitly separates the relationships between 
workplace size and wages and between company size and wages however some 
speculations have been put forward in the literature. The propositions that have gained 
the most credence in the literature are that monitoring costs will vary with workplace 
size and that rent sharing will vary with company size (the profit centre). But it has also 
been suggested that while company size is relevant for ability-to-pay it is workplace size 
that increases employee bargaining power (Hodson 1983).
We are particularly interested in assessing whether there is evidence of rent 
sharing in large workplaces or companies. By estimating separate equations for the 
Small Business (small company), Extensive (large company, small workplace), and 
Intensive (large workplace) sectors we can establish whether such effects will be related 
to company size in itself or workplace size in itself.
The issue is whether company size effects and workplace size effects are 
different phenomena in the process of wage determination or whether they are one and 
the same thing.
1.5 Structure of The Thesis and Main Findings
The next chapter reviews theoretical models of wage determination, their 
application to explaining size wage differentials, and empirical evidence.
10
Chapter 3 introduces the data and empirical method and presents estimates of 
size-wage-differentials using the conventional methodology of allowing for a separate 
wage intercept, but constraining other coefficients to be the same across different size 
categories. Using both the individual level data (IMA) and the workplace level data 
(AWIRS) we find workplace size effects comparable with U.S. evidence but the 
relationship between wages and company size differs. Although the magnitude of 
company size effects is comparable the shape of the relationship is quite different to 
U.S. evidence. There is a non-linear pattern of company size effects where all 
companies with more than 20 employees Australia wide pay a wage premium of a 
similar magnitude (10 to 19 per cent). It appears that Company size wage differentials 
are only significant because very small companies pay low wages not because very large 
companies pay high wages which is different to the U.S. evidence where the largest 
companies pay the highest wage.
We also find in chapter three that allowing for different intercepts by size has 
no significant effect on other coefficients. It would be easy to infer from this that current 
estimates of the wage structure are not compromised by excluding workplace size or 
company size from the analysis. However, when a less restrictive functional form is 
used in chapter 4 the story is different.
In chapter 4 we extend the methodology to allow the wage structure to differ 
between the Small Business, Extensive, and Intensive sectors. We reject the hypothesis 
that coefficients are jointly equal across sectors and hence cast doubt on current research 
which imposes this restriction. The effect of wage determinants such as experience, 
tenure, gender, and industry group, vary across small and large workplaces and 
companies. It is not valid to assume that these variables will have a common effect on 
wages in all firms and biases will result from data such as AWIRS which underrepresent 
small workplaces.
In chapter 5 we examine interaction between product market structure and the 
wage effects of company and workplace size using the 1989 Australian Workplace 
Industrial Relations survey (AWIRS) data. We raise the complicating issues of 
imperfect empirical measures, and a variety of sources of ability-to-pay some of which 
are related to size and some of which are related to market structure. Interaction effects
11
are complex but we show that the direction of the effect of market structure on size- 
wage differentials can be negative if size and market structure are alternative indicators 
of ability-to-pay and positive if size is an indicator of bargaining power. This allows us 
to say that the data are consistent with the proposition that large companies are 
associated with greater ability-to-pay and large workplaces are associated with greater 
employee ability to extract a share of rents.
12
Chapter 2
The Size-Wage Relationship In Theory
2.1 Introduction
The survey in this chapter covers a variety of theoretical models which are 
capable of explaining higher wages in larger firms. The literature to date has tended to 
focus on distinguishing between explanations with differing implications for 
understanding how labour markets work. These range from explanations based on 
unobserved differences in worker quality or working conditions, to explanations which 
encompass non-competitive product markets and rent sharing. It is however easier to 
distinguish between explanations in theory than empirically given that they are 
interrelated and often predict similar empirical relationships for observed variables.
Views have been put forward in the literature as to the relevance of workplace 
size and company size within alternative models, however the distinction between the 
workplace and the company has not been incorporated into explicit theories of wage 
determination. As a consequence, the chapter starts by reviewing the relationship 
between firm size and wages in alternative theoretical models. With this foundation laid 
it will then be easier to consider the nature of multi-plant companies and views about 
distinct effects of workplace size and company size on wages.
The primary objective of the thesis is to document and interpret the size-wage 
relationship rather than to test between any narrowly defined models and the structure of 
the chapter is shaped by this objective. We present four broad theoretical approaches 
each of which encompasses a family of narrowly defined models of wage determination. 
They are outlined progressing from a simplified to a more complex representation of the 
difference between small and large firms.
Starting with the assumption of competitive markets and zero transaction costs 
it is argued in the next section that models of compensating differentials or sorting by 
worker quality give ambiguous predictions for size-wage differentials. It is just as easy
13
to predict higher wages in small firms as in large. This is not to say that unobserved 
heterogeneity in working conditions and employee quality are not associated in any way 
with size-wage differentials, but in isolation from other factors their effects are 
ambiguous. The interpretation of size-wage differentials as simply arising from 
unobserved heterogeneity is questioned. It is more instructive to ask what characteristics 
of small and large firms give rise to variation in working conditions and employee 
quality. Transaction costs, the organisation of production, and non-competitive product 
markets are three possibilities considered in subsequent sections.
Transaction costs are introduced in section 2.3 firstly as a broad framework 
following the work of Williamson where transaction costs provide an efficiency 
rationale for the existence of both large firms and internal labour market structures. 
Because of the general nature of this literature, empirical predictions for wage outcomes 
in internal labour markets have not been rigorously formulated. Within this literature 
however, the two main factors which will increase transaction costs are productivity 
uncertainty and specific investments and direct wage outcomes have been formulated on 
these factors in the efficiency wage and specific human capital literatures. These are 
reviewed in sub-sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3.
A third category presented in section 2.4 considers variation in the organisation 
of production between small and large firms. Oi (1983a, 1983b), Black and Garen 
(1991), and others have discussed the role of technology and in effect treat the 
organisation of production, working conditions and recruitment policies as endogenous 
variables jointly determined with wages to minimise the sum of production and 
transaction costs. Although working conditions and employee quality in part determine 
the wage, this approach gives a different interpretation of why large firms pay higher 
wages.
Non-competitive product markets are introduced in section 2.5. One potential 
explanation for higher wages in larger firms comes from rent sharing models where 
wage determination is seen as a bargaining process with outcomes dependent on the 
firm's ability-to-pay and the relative bargaining power of the firm and employees.
14
The remainder of the chapter leads into the empirical work of the thesis. 
Section 2.6 considers how the empirical distinction between the workplace and the 
company can be interpreted with regards to theoretical models. A summary of the theory 
and empirical questions to be asked in the following chapters is presented in section 2.7.
2.2 The Size-Wage Relationship As Unobservable Heterogeneity
Given perfectly competitive markets and zero transaction costs, the observed 
positive correlation between firm size and wages is potentially explained as 
compensating differentials for unobserved variation in working conditions or the quality 
of employees. This implies no real differences in the process of wage determination in 
small and large firms.
The underlying theoretical models are outlined in this section. However it is 
argued that they can as easily predict higher wages in small firms as in large. These 
models in themselves, assuming exogenous effort and technology, do not satisfactorily 
explain size-wage differentials. Although the models presented in this section are highly 
simplified the underlying ideas have been used in the literature to argue that the 
observed size-wage differentials arise essentially from our inability to measure all 
heterogeneity in working conditions and employee quality. But whether this 
heterogeneity is treated as exogenous or endogenous changes the interpretation of the 
size-wage relationship. We shall see later in the chapter that heterogeneity in the 
organisation of production or transaction costs can predict variation in working 
conditions and employee quality which will flow through to higher wages in large firms 
(Oi 1983a, Black and Garen 1991, Fairris and Alston 1992).
2.2.1 Working Conditions
In a simplified version of the model outlined by Rosen (1986), the following 
assumptions are made:
15
1. There is an exogenous distribution of cost minimising technologies (and 
associated working conditions) across firms.
2. There is a distribution of worker preferences for working conditions.
3. Perfect information and mobility.
4. There is no trade-off among non-wage conditions so that compensation for 
working conditions is in the form of wage adjustments.
Given these assumptions, firms face a trade-off between directing resources to 
improving conditions and paying a higher wage to attract sufficient employees. Workers 
face a trade-off between wages and any disutility associated with working conditions. 
Given a direct trade off between wages and working conditions, the model predicts a 
positive correlation between size and wages in the event that size is associated with 
working conditions that represent a disutility and the distribution of preferences is such 
that there are sufficient workers averse to such conditions.
Workers who are less averse to large firm working conditions are more likely 
to be matched to large firms and where there is a distribution of preferences, the 
compensating payment required for the marginal worker will be higher as firm size 
increases (Stafford, 1980). This implies higher average wages in large firms which will 
be reflected in regression results as higher wage intercepts. There are no direct 
predictions for the impact of other wage determinants (slopes) to vary with size or for 
product market structure to influence the size-wage relationship.1
Undesirable working conditions which have been associated with size include 
greater division of labour into less interesting tasks, increased bureaucracy with 
impersonal modes of control, more team work associated with less room for individual 
initiative, more capital intensive with associated shift work or faster work pace to more 
fully utilise the capital stock (Stafford 1980, Oi 1991, Idson 1990).2
1 Slopes will only vary if the distribution of preferences varies with human capital or demographic 
variables. For example if more females prefer rigid working conditions than males there will be more 
females in large firms and their compensating wage will be lower than males in large firms. But there is no 
reason to anticipate such effects. Product market structure may be important if working conditions are 
endogenous and large firms with greater ability-to-pay provide better working conditions for the same
wage but this is then a rent sharing.
2 However, this is only one explanation among many for a positive relationship between capital intensity 
and wages. For example, with capital skill complementarities, productivity will be higher in capital
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There are however difficulties for testing the theory which suggest that 
empirical results will not be conclusive. First, if working conditions are a normal good, 
the model predicts that workers with higher earnings capacity will tend to be in jobs 
with better conditions (Rosen 1986 p671). More able workers would then be receiving a 
higher wage at every level of working conditions. Cross-sectional estimates will be 
biased without controlling for interaction between working conditions and measures of 
productivity (Smith 1979).
Second, the basic model assumes perfect information and perfect mobility. 
Where there are constraints on these, the model can only represent long run tendencies 
with changes in conditions reflected in changes in wages over time (Rosen 1986 p643). 
The positive relationship between conditions and wages predicted by the model is an 
equilibrium position which may not hold in any cross-sectional analysis.
The most important limitation of the basic model, at least for explaining size- 
wage differentials, is the assumption of no trade-off among working conditions. 
Employment agreements encompass a range of wage and non-wage conditions and there 
may be trade-offs among working conditions which leave the wage rate unaffected 
(Hamermesh 1980). Where large firms offer more non-wage fringe benefits, greater 
promotion opportunities, and job security, these may offset any direct compensating 
wage.* 3 Other advantages of size may be, larger social networks and more on-the-job 
training through a series of jobs (Stafford p333).
Whether large firms are indeed associated with adverse working conditions is 
an unresolved question in the literature. Empirical evidence on the relationship between 
employer size and measures of employee job satisfaction is mixed. Kwoka (1980) and 
Kruse (1992) find no systematic relationship between workplace size and job 
satisfaction either before or after controlling for wages, working conditions, and 
individual characteristics. Idson (1990) however, finds a negative relationship between 
workplace size and measures of job satisfaction and more importantly finds that this
intensive employment, and hence wages will be higher, independent of compensating payments. (See
Hamermesh 1980)
3 Evidence shows a higher incidence of fringe benefits in large companies which implies that estimates of 
size effects on wages will understate the effects on total compensation. This is evidenced in Mellow 
(1982).
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negative relationship can largely be accounted for by variables reflecting more inflexible 
conditions in large workplaces.4
Empirical evidence has not supported a compensating differentials explanation 
for size-wage differentials. Brown and Medoff (1989) find the positive effect of 
workplace size on wages is not reduced after controlling for measures of working 
conditions such as hours, shiftwork, choice about overtime, dangerous conditions, and 
pace of work. Kruse (1992) include more detailed controls for working conditions and 
find that the positive effect of workplace size on wages is reduced by approximately one 
third. The author notes however, that the conditions of work which significantly change 
the size wage relationship have coefficients with signs opposite to that predicted by the 
model. For example, higher wages were associated with greater promotion 
opportunities, when a negative correlation would be expected if wages compensate for 
lower advancement opportunities. Green, Machin, and Manning (1992) also find after 
including measures of working conditions that their "...estimated coefficients are 
generally insignificant and when they are not they often have a sign opposite to that 
predicted by compensating differentials" (plO).
2.2.2 Sorting by Ability
Size-wage differentials may be due to variation in employee ability, not 
measured in education, experience, or demographic variables. The hypothesis is that if 
workers with differing abilities were allocated randomly between a small firm sector and 
a large firm sector there would be no average differentials in productivity and wages 
between the sectors. If workers with higher ability systematically select the large firm 
sector higher wages will be a result of this sorting process rather than any real 
differences between small and large firms.
Sorting can be on the basis of expected wages or expected wages net of any 
disutility associated with working conditions. If ability is equally valuable in either
4 The Quality of Employment Survey used by Idson showed that larger workplaces tended to have less 
employee discretion with respect to decisions about the "nature and scheduling of work". The negative 
relationship between workplace size and measures of job satisfaction was significantly reduced or 
eliminated after controlling for the rigidity of working conditions.
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sector hierarchical sorting occurs where those with greater ability are systematically 
allocated to one sector. If different types of ability are rewarded in each sector 
comparative advantage sorting occurs where workers are systematically allocated to the 
sector in which their particular ability and earnings are higher.
In a simplified sorting model based on Roy (1951), there is a distribution of 
ability among workers who choose between large and small firm sectors according to 
their productivity and earnings in each. Assuming no differences in working conditions 
and a hierarchy of abilities (independent of the sector of employment) the more able will 
choose the sector with the greater productivity variance. With a random allocation the 
average ability and wage in each sector would be equivalent. The high ability workers 
would then be made better off by moving to the high variance sector where they are at 
the top of a wider distribution. Sorting will thus increase average productivity and hence 
the wage in this sector compared to the low variance sector.
If there are two kinds of sector specific ability and workers sort according to 
comparative advantage, average productivity and wages will also be higher in the high 
variance sector. This occurs because those who choose one sector are the least 
productive in the other sector which implies higher average productivity in both sectors. 
Compared to a random allocation, each sector will have less of the least productive 
workers and more of the most productive, the greatest increase in productivity will then 
occur where the tails of the distribution are furthest from the mean (see Robinson 1989).
To explain higher wages in large firms, the model depends crucially on a 
greater variance of productivity in large firms, given either hierarchical or comparative 
advantage sorting. Size wage differentials can be explained if jobs in large firms are 
such that there is a greater difference in productivity between the more able and the less 
able, than in small firms. But this conflicts with the view that large firms rely more on 
team work, have less flexible work practices, and more bureaucratic modes of control as 
discussed in the previous section. Furthermore, Garen (1985) outlines a model which 
predicts a greater variance in small firms when small and large firms are differentiated 
by the cost of obtaining accurate information on individual ability. There is no evidence 
that the variance will be higher in large firms.
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Non-wage considerations will also influence sorting. Workers sort according to 
wages net of any disutility associated with working conditions. Several authors deal 
with this complication by suggesting that preferences will be correlated with ability. For 
example, Evans and Leighton (1989) suggest that workers with a preference for stability 
will choose large firms since these firms are themselves more stable with lower 
probability of closure and less variable growth rates. Furthermore, hierarchical sorting 
can be inferred "...to the extent that ability and instability are negatively correlated, 
unstable workers and therefore small-firm workers may have lower wages in 
equilibrium" (p309).
However any arguments about a correlation between unobservable preferences 
and ability are necessarily speculative and some authors argue that the direction of 
sorting by preferences and ability will work in the opposite direction. Idson and Feaster 
(1990) suggest that workers with a preference for independent work will choose small 
firms. An hierarchical sorting pattern is inferred if these workers with more individual 
"drive" are "...on average, more dynamic, innovative workers" (pill).
Evidence on this explanation for size-wage differentials is mixed, partly 
because of limitations in the available methods of controlling for unobservable factors. 
Brown and Medoff (1989) and Evans and Leighton (1989) use longitudinal data and 
control for unobserved heterogeneity which is specific to the worker (but constant over 
time and across employer sizes) by differencing the data. In both studies the differenced 
data generate lower estimates of size-wage differentials (by between 5 and 60 per cent) 
which implies that compensating payments for unobservable ability can explain some 
part of the wage differentials.
Idson and Feaster (1990) use the Heckman (1979) inverse mills ratio method to 
correct for selection bias. Selectivity corrected estimates are interpreted as differentials 
which would exist if workers were allocated randomly and the authors find that these 
are higher than OLS estimates. Compared to the smallest company size category, 
estimated differentials of between 6.3 and 39 per cent increase to between 37 and 135 
per cent. This implies that employees in small companies have higher earning capacity 
than expected, and wage differentials attributable to company size would be higher if 
workers were allocated randomly to employer sizes.
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The theoretical arguments and empirical evidence on working conditions and 
sorting by ability are not convincing. It is difficult to argue a priori that higher quality 
workers will be systematically employed by large firms and receive a wage premium 
compensating for unfavourable working conditions. A more instructive question is why 
large firms would have more unfavourable conditions and demand higher quality 
workers. Is there some underlying differences between small and large firms which 
might determine this? In the following sections we shall see that variation in transaction 
costs and technologies are important.
2.3 Transaction Costs and Internal Labour Markets
In this section the role of transaction costs in wage determination across 
different sized firms is emphasised. A broad framework following the work of 
O.E.Williamson is outlined first. Costs of search, bargaining, and monitoring depend 
upon productivity uncertainty, specific investments and reputation effects; factors which 
are argued to vary with firm size. In this framework firm size is endogenous with 
internal management structures influencing the coordination of production. This 
provides an efficiency rationale for the existence of internal labour market structures 
which will tend to be associated with large firms.
Because of the general nature of this literature, empirical predictions for wage 
outcomes in internal labour markets have not been rigorously formulated. However, the 
two main factors which will increase transaction costs are productivity uncertainty and 
specific investments. Predictions for wage outcomes, assuming that contracts can be 
complete, have been formulated in the efficiency wage and specific human capital 
literatures. These are reviewed in sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3.
2.3.1 Internal Labour Markets
The notion that transaction costs can been seen as determinants of the size of 
firms and internal organisational structures stems from the work of Coase (1937) and
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Williamson (1975,1986). Coase (1937) argued that costs of transacting via market 
exchanges will give rise to the existence of firms to minimise these costs. In principle, 
the analysis allows firm size to be determined as well as the boundary between firms 
and markets. In contrast to conventional neoclassical economics where firm size is 
determined by economies of scale or scope it is argued that in the absence of transaction 
costs, large scale production could be organised via market contracts even in the 
presence of economies of scale (Ricketts 1987 pp206-211).5
Williamson has extended the analysis of Coase by outlining behavioural 
assumptions which give rise to transaction costs, and factors which affect the magnitude 
of transaction costs. The behavioural assumptions used are bounded rationality and 
opportunism. Bounded rationality allows for rational or maximising motives but with 
limits on capacity to cope with the quantity or complexity of information that may be 
required to make optimal decisions. Opportunism refers to self-interested behaviour 
which involves forms of deceit ranging from blatant lying to selective withholding of 
information. (Williamson, 1986, p i75).
Applied to the labour market, firms "internalise" their labour market 
transactions where internal costs of maintaining efficient information, bargaining, and 
enforcement systems are lower than the cost of transacting via markets. Internal labour 
markets are associated with characteristics such as long term employment and job 
security, job hierarchies with wages attached to jobs rather than workers, recruitment of 
new workers restricted to a subset of entry jobs usually at lower levels of the hierarchy, 
on-the-job training and promotion of internal workers to higher level jobs sometimes on 
the basis of seniority rather than ability, and rules and procedures governing the 
relationship between the firm and employees.
These structures offer several ways of reducing transaction costs. With wages 
attached to jobs, individual bargaining over wages is reduced and hence the incentive to 
opportunistic bargaining. Restricting entry to lower levels and promoting internal 
workers acts as an incentive device where individual productivity is only recognised
5 There are limits to the size of firms where transaction costs of internal organisation increase with the 
number of transactions because of higher costs of maintaining efficient internal information, bargaining, 
and enforcement systems.
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over time. If other firms with comparable employment opportunities also have entry 
restricted to lower levels this implies an investment in jobs on the part of workers (see 
Williamson et. al. 1975).
Productivity uncertainty and specific human capital will increase the number of 
internal transactions (firm size) and the likelihood of internal labour market structures. 
Hence internal labour markets are associated with large firms. There will be exceptions 
to this, and employment agreements in small firms may in effect look the same as in 
internal labour markets if high ability workers are recognised more easily and individual 
contracts designed to retain and promote these workers. The difference in internal labour 
markets is that standard contracts are specified ex ante and workers allocated to 
positions rather than contracts designed to fit the individual.
The prediction of internal labour market structures relies on the assumption that 
contracts are incomplete because of uncertainty as to possible future contingencies, such 
as rent-seeking opportunities or ex post realised productivities. If the probability of 
opportunistic behaviour is known ex ante, an employment agreement could be specified 
before investment to minimise ex post bargaining costs for example by adjusting 
relative shares of the investment. This is ruled out by Williamson with the assumption 
of bounded rationality.
If all possible contingencies cannot be foreseen, contracts will be incomplete. 
Arbitration and grievance procedures will be established to deal with unforeseen 
contingencies. Wage determination is then a complex process but models which assume 
that contracts can be complete give explicit predictions for wage outcomes in the 
presence of productivity uncertainty and specific human capital.
2.3.2 Imperfect Information and Efficiency Wages
Efficiency wage models focus on imperfect information about productivity and 
on wages as a mechanism for increasing effort. It can be profitable for employers to pay 
above reservation wages if the higher cost is offset by consequent higher productivity.
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The direction of causality distinguishes these models from others where productivity 
determines the wage.
Four versions of the models have been identified in the literature, each with a 
different source of the wage/productivity relationship. (See Akerlof and Yellen (1986), 
Carmichael (1990)). Shirking and adverse selection models are covered here. In the 
shirking models higher wages increase productivity through greater work effort. In 
selection models, higher wages attract a pool of applicants with higher average 
productivity. Both of these have been proposed as explanations for size wage 
differentials.
Other versions of efficiency wage models consider turnover costs and loyalty to 
the firm as sources of the wage productivity relationship. These are not covered here 
because their relevance for explaining differences by firm size are limited. In the 
turnover cost models, average worker productivity is increased when wages reduce 
turnover, given some cost of turnover. In these models, wage profiles are constrained to 
be flat with the wage everywhere above the alternative wage (see Salop 1986). Turnover 
costs arising from specific training are better dealt with in human capital models where 
the firm is allowed to shift some of the investment to workers with upward sloping 
profiles. If turnover costs arise from fixed hiring and firing costs, there is no obvious 
reason to expect these costs to be greater per worker in larger firms.
In models which consider loyalty to the firm, the wage/productivity relationship 
is modelled as a "partial gift exchange" of worker loyalty for higher wages based on 
work group norms of a fair days pay for a fair days work (Akerlof 1986). But again, it is 
not obvious that workers in larger firms would be more responsive to a "gift" of higher 
wages.6 Hence only shirking and adverse selection models will be considered.
Only direct effects of monitoring costs on wages are considered in this section. 
Monitoring costs will also vary with the organisation of production which can be an 
alternative mechanism for reducing the costs. This is considered in section 2.4.
6 Concerns about fairness in wage setting may however be important where firms have greater ability-to- 
pay, for example from product market rents, and either employee wage demands increase as a result or 
higher employee morale is preferred by managers. The direction of causality is different to efficiency 
wage models and this possibility is discussed in section 2.5 on rent sharing.
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Shirking models
In the Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) shirking model individual firms raise wages to 
increase the cost to workers of being dismissed. There is a return to continuing 
employment for the worker in terms of wages above the expected alternative wage. 
When all firms raise wages, unemployment increases which reduces expected 
alternative wages. Equilibrium is attained when the cost of dismissal (wages relative to 
alternative) is sufficient to deter shirking. The argument that the probability of being 
caught shirking will be lower for larger firms has been used to explain size wage 
differentials (Bulow and Summers 1986). Where monitoring per worker is more 
difficult in larger firms because of larger work groups, a higher wage will be required to 
deter shirking.
One criticism of shirking models is that entrance fees or up front bonds are 
predicted, but not observed (see Carmichael 1990). A more efficient (pareto-superior) 
equilibrium exists where unemployed workers pay entrance fees or bonds to obtain the 
high wage jobs. The same incentive not to shirk is needed since the bond is a sunk cost 
and hence does not affect the effort decision. Equilibrium is then when the size of bonds 
is such that unemployed workers are indifferent between working and not. Shapiro 
and Stiglitz argue that bonds do not arise due to imperfect capital markets and because 
firms have an incentive to appropriate bonds by dismissing workers if the firm earns no 
surplus from continuing employment. Lazear (1981) argues that deferred compensation 
is an alternative incentive device which acts as an implicit bond. Wages are set to trade­
off the reduction in shirking from a steeper profile against the increased incentive for 
firms to default. Upward sloping profiles are an alternative to up front bonds where 
workers pay in the form of lower initial wages as long as reputation effects are sufficient 
to deter the firm from cheating.
Parsons (1986) argues that reputation effects are greater for larger firms than 
both small firms and workers (p801). Information affecting the reputation of a large firm 
is more readily available since the firm contracts with a larger number of labour market 
participants. This implies that upward sloping wage profiles are more likely to be 
observed in large firms, as an alternative to a fixed efficiency wage, and are more likely
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to be steeper. Evidence that larger employers offer steeper wage profiles is then 
consistent with these employers deterring shirking through wage policies.
There have been few attempts to test the monitoring cost explanation for size 
wage differentials, with mixed results. Brown and Medoff (1989) hypothesize that larger 
firms with greater monitoring difficulties will rely less on judgemental merit pay 
systems and more on piece rate systems.7 They find that larger workplaces are more 
likely to use piece rate and less likely to use merit pay systems and infer that this is 
consistent with a monitoring cost explanation.
However, they also test the hypothesis that among piece-rate workers, where 
monitoring difficulties are low, there should be no size wage differentials. But the 
differentials were found to be no lower for piece rate workers which does not support 
the monitoring cost hypothesis. Kruse (1992) used measures of frequency of monitoring 
from a sample of workplaces, and found an inverse relationship between frequency of 
monitoring and wages which is consistent with efficiency wages. But workplace size 
wage differentials were not affected by controlling for the frequency of monitoring. A 
problem with such empirical tests (noted by Kruse) is that the reverse causality may be 
applicable for example if more productive workers require less monitoring.
Adverse Selection models
In these efficiency wage models imperfect information about the productivity 
of applicants is overcome with higher wage offers to attract higher quality workers, 
given a positive correlation between productivity and reservation wages.8 The 
information problem at the time of hiring may be common to small and large firms,
7 Brown and Medoff use data from a survey of U.S. manufacturing workplaces, which distinguishes 
between three methods of payment. Incentive pay systems and standard time-rated pay systems are 
classified by the authors as piece-rate systems in the sense that performance rating is non-judgemental. 
These are distinguished from merit related pay systems which are judgemental rating schemes. However, 
it could be argued that although large firms with greater monitoring difficulties may be more likely to use 
non-judgemental payment systems such as hours worked, this will not include piece rate systems based on 
productivity. These may be more likely in small firms with less difficulty monitoring productivity.
8 For this to explain size-wage differentials it requires some reason for large firms to demand better 
workers or for large firms to have a greater cost of evaluating productivity. But large firms may be more 
efficient at recruitment or attract better applicants through reputation effects.
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however, Weiss and Landau (1985) show that wages can increase with firm size in these 
models due to a greater labour requirement relative to size of the hiring pool.
The following assumptions are made in the Weiss / Landau model:
1. Firms do not know the productivity of applicants but can determine whether 
they meet a minimum hiring standard.
2. Potential applicants know their own productivity as well as the wage and hiring 
standards of all firms. Their reservation wages will increase with productivity.
3. All workers within firms (in the same occupations) receive the same wage. 
This assumption is justified on the grounds of difficulties measuring 
productivity, morale problems from wage variation, or union pressures. (Weiss 
and Landau p485).
4. A given increase in a firm's labour requirement results in a less than 
proportional increase in size of the available hiring pool. Hence the number of 
applicants per vacancy is lower for larger firms.
The firm then chooses a minimum hiring standard and a wage, where the hiring 
standard determines productivity of the least productive applicant, and the wage 
determines productivity of the best applicant. There is a cost of widening the range of 
productivities to hire within. Since the same wage is paid to all workers within a firm, 
increasing the offered wage increases the wage of all workers not just new recruits. 
Also, lowering the hiring standard means that new recruits, who will be less productive, 
are paid at same rate as existing workers. The firm chooses the range to hire within in 
order to minimise total labour cost, subject to a given effective labour requirement being 
met, taking account of the cost of hiring a wider range of worker abilities.
The model predicts higher wages for larger firms where there is a greater labour 
requirement relative to size of the hiring pool.9 It doesn't pay to increase size of the 
hiring pool geographically, relative to other hiring firms, since "Distant workers who are
9 Weiss and Landau also show that, in this model, there will be an interval of the smallest firms where 
wages fall with size. When there are significant fixed costs per worker, for the smallest firms, the need to 
cover fixed costs by attracting more productive workers will be more important than in large firms where 
the need to attract sufficient workers will be the important factor. Hence, wages will initially fall with size 
then increase. However, this is a limiting condition and the size at which wages start to rise may be close 
to zero.
27
attracted to the firm are ones for whom the difference between the wage offer and their 
reservation wage (for local employment) outweighs the commuting or moving costs", 
that is, less productive applicants (p482).10
Brown and Medoff (1989) suggest that, because the important factor is size of 
the firm relative to the hiring pool (hence applicants per vacancy), size wage 
differentials will be weaker in metropolitan areas and in occupations with national 
hiring markets. However, they found no evidence to support this.
Garen (1985) develops a different selection model which includes an 
alternative indicator of ability in the form of education endowments. This is an 
efficiency wage model in the sense that wages will be higher in large firms to attract 
more productive workers, however the addition of education as a source of information 
leads to a prediction of different wage structures. Assuming that screening is less 
accurate in large firms education will provide a better indicator of productivity relative 
to the firms assessment and returns to education will be higher in large firms than in 
small. On the other hand, in small firms, returns to individual ability will be higher since 
screening is more accurate.
Summary of Efficiency Wage Models
Efficiency wages may be paid by large firms if, because of their size, 
monitoring costs are higher. To deter shirking a fixed wage premium may be paid in the 
presence of barriers to outsiders bidding for jobs such as imperfect capital markets or 
the risk of the firm appropriating bonds. If there is a sufficient cost to the firm of 
acquiring a reputation for cheating, deferred compensation can be used so that high 
future earnings reduce the likelihood of shirking.
To attract a given effective labour supply from the local hiring pool, large firms 
may pay a fixed wage premium because of less applicants per vacancy and because
10 The average productivity of workers in large firms compared to those in small is ambiguous in the 
model. Larger firms may reduce hiring standard as well as increasing the wage. Although the more 
productive workers will choose large firms with higher wages, reducing the hiring standard will mean 
workers who just meet that standard will be hired as well. The average quality of workers in large firms 
may then be the same as for smaller firms.
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lowering hiring standards implies a cost if all employees are paid the same wage. If 
firms use education as an alternative indicator of productivity (rather than reservation 
wages), education will be rewarded more in large firms whereas small firms will reward 
individual ability more.
Thus if large firms have an active wage policy to increase effort or attract better 
workers in the presence of monitoring and screening costs, this can show up in 
regression results as higher wage intercepts or steeper tenure wage profiles or higher 
returns to education.
There is some debate about whether product market structure will influence the 
level of efficiency wages. In the basic shirking model, the wage is set at the point where 
further wage increases would result in less than proportional increases in effective 
labour supply. There is no predicted relationship between other factors in production 
and the wage. Lang and Kahn (1990) argue that any factor which raises the value of 
marginal product also raises the optimal efficiency wage. Firms with market power, for 
a given labour supply, will have a higher value of marginal product, and hence a greater 
incentive to increase effective labour supply via an efficiency wage.
2.3.3 Specific Human Capital Investments
Another important factor which increases transaction costs is asset specificity. 
In Williamson's terms firm specific human capital increases the risk of opportunistic 
bargaining on the part of workers. The direct effect on wages is developed in human 
capital theory associated with the work of Becker (1964), Oi (1962), and Hashimoto 
(1981).
If on-the-job training is specific to the firm, wages and productivity within the 
training firm will be higher than in alternative employment, once training is acquired. 
Observed wage differentials may reflect differences in stocks of specific human capital 
which are not controlled for by measures of education and general labour market
experience.
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In the basic model, it is assumed that productivity is lower during training than 
in alternative employment, whether within the same firm or elsewhere. This implies a 
cost to both firms and workers of undertaking training with returns being in the form of 
increases in productivity and wages over time. The important point in the case of 
specific training is that the investment gives rise to turnover costs for both the firm and 
the worker since skills are not transferable between firms.
Neither firms nor workers will bear the total costs of training. Sharing of the 
investment occurs because both the firm and the worker are uncertain as to the post­
investment turnover behaviour of the other party (Becker 1964). If the probability of 
workers quitting is high, more of the cost and return to investment will accrue to 
workers to reduce their turnover and tenure wage profiles will be steeper with lower 
initial wages. Firms will have a larger share of the investment if the probability of 
layoffs is higher than that of quits and tenure earnings profiles will be flatter. The model 
then predicts an inverse relationship between starting wages and the slope of tenure 
wage profiles.
Hashimoto (1981) and Hashimoto and Yu (1980) relate this to transaction costs 
by arguing that the incentive to fix wages prior to training, is the reduction in post 
training opportunistic bargaining costs. But this fixed wage results in some non-optimal 
quits and layoffs which will be influenced by the sharing arrangement.
To predict a higher net present value of earnings compared to a job without 
training the model requires that average tenure is longer and outsiders do not bid down 
starting wages (Groshen 1991). If there were no barriers to bidding down starting wages, 
costs and returns from investment will be equalised and overall earnings no higher than 
in alternative employment. Barriers such as minimum wage laws, capital market 
imperfections, or reluctance of older workers to pass on training where entrants bid 
down wages, will prevent this.
Oi (1991) argues that larger employers will make "...larger investments in 
specific human capital due to their longer life expectancies and their propensity to adopt 
specialized idiosyncratic methods of production." (p6). There is some evidence that the 
stability of companies is an important factor driving the size wage relationship. Mayo
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and Murray (1991) find that the effect of size on wages disappears when the predicted 
risk of failure is controlled for.
The relationship between investments in firm specific training and product 
market power may also be important. If larger investments are driven by the life 
expectancy of firms I suggest that the life expectancy of firms could be determined by 
market power rather than size per se. The presence of market power will increase the 
slope of tenure wage profiles due to a higher level of training. This effect may be 
reinforced if market power reduces the probability of lay-off which will increase the 
employees share of the investment.
There is mixed evidence on tenure wage profiles in different sized workplaces 
and companies. Groshen (1991), Brown and Medoff (1989), and Pearce (1990), find that 
wage growth with tenure increases with workplace and company size. Oi (1991) 
however finds no significant difference in profiles. All studies report that starting wages 
increase with size which is inconsistent with the predicted trade-off between starting 
wages and wage growth. Although steeper profiles may be evident in larger workplaces 
and companies there is a wage premium coming from a different source if starting 
wages are higher.
2.3.4 Summary of Transaction Costs and The Size-Wage Relationship
Transaction costs arising from imperfect information and specific investments 
have the effect of either large firms paying a fixed wage premium or steeper tenure wage 
profiles. The net present value of earnings in large firm employment will be higher if 
there are barriers to outsiders bidding for jobs. But in addition to direct wage effects 
internal labour market structures with standardised bargaining and enforcement rules 
will arise where contracts cannot be complete. The nature of the employment 
relationship changes from one where contracts are designed for individuals to one where 
all employees are covered by the same rules and individual characteristics are less 
important for wage outcomes.
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2.4 The Organisation of Production
It is not just bargaining and enforcement structures which can change in 
response to transaction costs, several authors have argued that the organisation of 
production and/or recruitment policies offer alternative mechanisms for reducing 
transaction costs. Variation between small and large firms in working conditions and 
employee quality is then predicted from variation in transaction costs.
Black and Garen (1991) suggest that setting minimum performance standards 
below which workers will be dismissed is an alternative mechanism for firms to 
influence effort rather than paying efficiency wages. Increasing performance standards 
will increase effort since the probability of dismissal would be higher, but a 
compensating wage would need to be paid to maintain equivalent worker utility relative 
to alternatives which have lower effort requirements. Alternatively the firm can raise the 
wage to increase effort without changing the performance standard. This would be an 
efficiency wage since, given the same probability of dismissal, worker utility is 
increased with the higher wage. Hence, the authors argue that some part of any 
efficiency wages to reduce monitoring costs can involve a compensating payment for 
working conditions.11
Oi (1983a, 1983b) similarly argues that the organisation of production will 
differ in response to greater monitoring costs in large firms but considers more aspects 
of the organisation of production and the type of product in characterising the difference 
between small and large firms.12 Evidence is cited in Oi (1983a) that large firms will 
tend to produce standardised goods in large volumes with specific technologies, and will 
be more capital intensive, have more rigid working conditions and demand better 
workers and higher effort intensity.
11 Fairris and Alston (1992) distinguish empirically between compensating differentials and efficiency 
wages by estimating simultaneous wage and effort intensity equations. They concluded that the direction 
of causality was more evident from wages to higher effort which supports the efficiency wage hypothesis 
rather than compensating differentials.
12 Monitoring costs are treated differently by Oi in a model with endogenous firm size and capital 
intensity. Assumes a distribution of entrepreneurial ability, with higher ability implying higher marginal 
product of production. If assume the time required to monitor workers is constant, more able managers 
have higher per worker monitoring cost in terms of foregone production.
32
Oi develops a model with endogenous firm size and capital intensity based on 
an exogenous distribution of entrepreneurial ability. Higher ability managers co-ordinate 
larger teams of workers hence larger firms. With the assumption that the time required 
to monitor workers is constant, more able managers have a higher per worker 
monitoring cost in terms of foregone production. A higher capital intensity is then 
predicted in large firms.
Dunne (1994) provides evidence that the use of advanced technologies 
increases with workplace size but is independent of age of the workplace. Greater 
capital intensity in large workplaces and companies is evidenced in Barron, Black, and 
Lowenstein (1987) and Idson and Feaster (1990).
When variation in the organisation of production is considered higher wages in 
large firms can reflect a compensating payments as in the basic compensating 
differentials and sorting models that we started with in section 2.2. But interpretation of 
the size wage relationship is now quite different. The wage differentials stem from 
differences between small and large firms in the nature of production and in transaction 
costs associated with imperfect information and specific investments. This is quite 
different to the interpretation that wage differentials do not exist net of heterogeneity in 
working conditions and employee quality.
There is a direction of causality issue however, since firms may be more capital 
intensive in response to having to pay higher wages (to compete via productivity or in 
response to employee bargaining power or monitoring costs) or alternatively higher 
wages may be paid because of the greater capital intensity. It could also be argued that 
wages are higher in large firms because of capital skill complementarities increase 
productivity. However, Morissette (1993) argues that in itself this explanation cannot 
explain size effects without some incentive to pay higher wages "...even though higher 
productivity allows firms to pay higher wages, it does not force them to do so..."
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2.5 Non-Competitive Product Markets and Rent Sharing
The idea that employees can capture a share of economic rents earned by firms 
has a long tradition in the literature and has been formalised in models of union-firm 
bargaining.13 The important variables in these models are the firm's ability-to-pay and 
the relative bargaining power of the union and the firm.
In a basic bargaining model the parties are assumed to weigh up the costs and 
benefits of agreeing on a wage or continuing to hold out. Profits and wages are jointly 
determined.14 The range of possible wage outcomes is bounded above and below by the 
fallback position of each party, that is the level of utility/profit associated with 
alternative options during disputes or in the event that bargaining breaks down. Within 
these bounds the wage outcome is determined by the bargaining strength of the parties 
given their risk attitude. The solution is represented as a Nash bargain which maximises 
the joint product of each parties utility:
Max: (p-p*)1'3 (u - U*)a
u = Union utility function
p = The firm's profit function
u*, p* = Union's (Firm's) fall back position
a = Union bargaining strength
1-a = The firm's bargaining strength
If the firm cannot earn any more than a break even profit (p = p*), there is 
nothing to bargain over and employees will be paid their reservation wage. As the firm's 
ability to earn rents increases it is possible to pay a higher wage and still break even. 
Thus (p - p ) is the firms ability-to-pay. Where this is higher, the upper bound of 
possible wages is higher and given the same bargaining strength parameters the wage
13 See Weiss (1966) Slichter (1950) and Segal (1964) for early studies and Mishel (1986) and Kwoka 
(1983) for more recent empirical evidence.
14 See Oswald (1985) for a review of union-firm bargaining models and Dowrick (1989) for an analysis 
which explicitly incorporates product market structure.
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will be higher. The wage outcome is then determined by the relative bargaining strength 
of the union and the firm, the size of rents and the fall back position of each party in the 
event of disagreement.15
For firms to earn rents in the product market they must be able to exert some 
market power which is related to market share, the degree of price collusion, and the 
existence of barriers to entry and exit. Higher ability-to-pay wages above the going rate 
can also come from cost advantages arising from economies of scale or a lower cost of 
capital.
There is some evidence that large firms face a lower cost of non-labour inputs 
including discounts on material inputs through bulk buying or vertical integration and 
low interest rates (see Fitzroy 1991, Bureau of Industry Economics 1992). Such cost 
advantages allow a trade-off between labour and non-labour costs or alternatively they 
can be viewed as barriers to entry.
For rent sharing to occur there must be some employee bargaining power. 
Bargaining power of employees is higher where they are able to impose a higher cost of 
disagreement on the firm. This can be related to higher capital labour ratios or greater 
unionisation in large firms where it is less costly to organise.
There is evidence that union membership and union activity is greater in large 
workplaces and companies (Grimes 1994). Evidence from the United States suggests 
that large firms use more advanced (newer) technologies (Dunne 1994), and are more 
capital intensive (Barron et al 1987, Idson and Feaster 1990).
But rent sharing may occur independent of unionisation or capital intensity 
where satisfaction enters managerial utility functions and company performance enters 
employee utility functions such that, as "...one side's reward increases, both parties see it 
as equitable that the other side's should increase" (Carruth and Oswald 1989 p.164). 
This may be more likely in large firms where there is a separation of ownership and
15 Models of union-firm bargaining vary according to whether bargaining is assumed to cover only the 
wage or both the wage and the number of jobs. The effect of union bargaining on employment levels 
differs between the models. However, all versions predict a positive correlation between rents per 
employee and wages. Arguments which are specific to enterprise based unions rather than industry based 
(for example union threat effects on non-union wages), are largely ignored in this discussion since these 
are likely to be less important in the Australian context.
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control, and a greater reliance on teamwork and employee cooperation. But could also 
occur in small firms in the event that bargaining power is endogenous and the presence 
of market power increases employees wage demands.
This is distinct from efficiency wage models where the direction of causality is 
reversed such that paying a fair wage increases morale and productivity. In these models 
the payment of such an efficiency wage is more likely to occur where monitoring costs 
are higher in large firms but not more likely to occur where there is market power. Why 
would firms with market power choose a high wage high productivity strategy more 
than firms facing competition? Weiss (1966), and Slichter (1950), argue the reverse.
The relationship between investments in firm specific training and employer 
size is also important. As argued in section 2.3.3, the presence of market power may 
increase the slope of tenure wage profiles due to a higher level of training where the 
firm's expected lifespan is longer. If market power reduces the probability of layoff this 
would increase expected fall back utility of employees and hence increase their relative 
bargaining power and share of the returns to investment.16
A common approach to empirical tests of the rent sharing model is to estimate 
separate union and market power effects on wages and additional interaction effects. 
Where unionisation is a proxy for employee bargaining power, and market power is a 
proxy for ability-to-pay, the model predicts a positive interaction effect. That is, the 
union wage gap will be higher where there is also market power.17
However, an interesting issue arises when employer size is introduced as an 
additional variable. When employer size is considered it can be an indicator of higher
16 Specific training also increases turnover costs and hence bargaining power so that if contracts are 
incomplete and post training bargaining occurs the wage-training relationship may be affected. However, 
turnover costs increase for both parties and the net effect is indeterminate.
17 It has however been argued that market power will reduce union returns. Weiss (1966) and Kwoka 
(1983) argue that where market power is low unions will be more important, but where market power is 
high and wages are already higher than elsewhere, unions are not able to further increase wages. Reasons 
offered as to why wages would already be high in the absence of union bargaining power include union 
threat effects being higher where there is market power and unions being a source of market power. 
Studies are cited by Kwoka which generally find a zero or negative interaction effect between measures of 
industry concentration ratios and unionisation. That is, the union wage gap tends to be lower within 
concentrated industries. Stewart (1990) suggests that these results arise because the industry concentration 
ratio is not an appropriate measure of market power since it does not take account of market share. 
Stewart uses the British Workplace Industrial Relations Survey data and finds a positive relationship 
between the union wage gap and market power measured as many or few competitors in the market.
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ability-to-pay and/or employee bargaining power. Given imperfect empirical measures 
of market power, the wage effects of size and market power will interact in different 
ways depending on whether size in an alternative indicator of ability-to-pay or an 
indicator of employee ability to extract a share of rents. In chapter 5 we outline 
empirical predictions for interaction effects under different scenarios before analysing 
the data.
Empirical evidence on rent sharing as an explanation for size wage differentials 
is limited. Of interest to the present study is the finding in Stewart (1990) of a negative 
interaction effect between workplace size and having few competitors in the product 
market. Size-wage differentials are only significant where workplaces face many 
competitors. This is interpreted as suggesting that either workplace size is a substitute 
for market power or an additional indicator of market power (Stewart 1990). In contrast, 
Mellow (1982) finds a positive interaction effect between large company size (1000+ 
employees) and industry concentration ratios. These studies have interacted market 
power variables with only one or other measure of size not both as we do in chapter 5.
2.6 Distinguishing Between The Workplace and The Company
No theory has been developed which explicitly separates the relationships 
between workplace size and wages and between company size and wages although some 
speculations have been put forward in the empirical literature.
A number of authors have argued that workplace size is more relevant for 
working conditions than company size.18 Stafford (1980) adds that company size can be 
relevant where "...in practice, details of work practices are often specified as part of the 
firm's policy to provide a uniform product...". If in multi-plant firms, workplace level 
policies are decided centrally, then company size may affect wages.
There has been no discussion of the relative importance of workplace size and 
company size in the sorting process. However if worker knowledge depends on the 
reputation of employers in the market, it could be argued that company size will be more
18 See Brown and Medoff (1989), Hodson (1983), Oi (1991)
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important where information is associated with the name of the company. However part 
of the information available will be the size of workplaces operated by companies.
Where it is size of the firm relative to the hiring pool that matters, Weiss and 
Landau (1985) argue that workplace size is relevant rather than company size, except 
where companies hire the same occupations across workplaces within the same 
geographical area, or where occupations have a wider geographic labour market e.g. 
professionals.
The propositions that have gained the most credence in the literature are that 
monitoring costs will vary with workplace size and that rent sharing will vary with 
company size. Several authors have argued that monitoring costs are more likely to 
increase with workplace size rather than company size, assuming that monitoring of 
workers (other than workplace managers) is carried out within the workplace (Brown 
and Medoff (1989), Morissette (1993)). However, if the reputation of employers is 
attached to the company rather than particular workplaces, and the credibility of 
deferred compensation offers increases with company size, monitoring costs may 
motivate steeper wage profiles in larger companies given the same workplace size.
Several authors have suggested that product market power and ability-to-pay 
will vary with company size rather than workplace size if the company is the profit 
centre (See Mellow 1982, Morissette 1993). This implies that the potential for rent 
sharing effects on wages will show up as higher wages by company size and not 
workplace size. However, Hodson (1983) has suggested that company size is relevant 
for ability-to-pay and workplace size is relevant for bargaining power.
In the empirical chapters We will be asking whether the data is consistent with 
monitoring costs increasing with company size, ability-to-pay increasing with company 
size, and bargaining power increasing with workplace size. However, relating these 
theoretical speculations to empirical relationships is problematic because of variation in 
the autonomy of workplaces from parent companies.
The work of Williamson (1986) and Chandler (1977) suggests that large 
companies may adopt a management structure based around separate semi-autonomous
38
operating divisions rather than a single hierarchy structure. Such M-form structures will 
delegate operational responsibility to divisions with differentiated products or markets.
Williamson's hypothesis is that for large companies such structures will 
economise on transaction costs compared to single hierarchy structures. The level of 
autonomy will depend on interdependencies between the workplace and the company 
and product diversity. If large workplaces are operating as semi-autonomous 
management units they may be more like companies than like other workplaces.
The nature of the relationship between the company and the workplace is 
important. The literature on multi-plant companies is limited, however, the exhaustive 
study in Scherer (1975) suggests that the existence of multi-plant operation will depend 
on a combination of technological and transaction cost considerations.
The number of workplaces within a company and the geographical spread will 
depend on factors such as transport costs, inventory costs, and scale economies. Scherer 
also considers how economies from shared resources can make a workplace which is 
part of a larger organisation able to compete with a local single site company. Shared 
resources can include skilled employees, information, advertising, reputation, or 
technologies. This is important in the context of our empirical work where we treat 
small workplaces which are part of large companies as a separate sector in chapters 4 
and 5.
2.7 Summary and Anticipation of Empirical Work
We have surveyed four broad theoretical approaches each of which 
encompasses a family of narrowly defined models of wage determination. Four 
propositions (not necessarily mutually exclusive) about the nature of the size wage 
relationship are suggested:
1. wage differentials by employer size do not exist apart from our inability to 
measure all heterogeneity in working conditions and employee ability,
2. large firms are paying wages above the going rate and have an internal labour 
market structure as part of a profit maximising strategy in the presence of 
transaction costs,
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3. large firms tend to produce standardised goods with specific technologies, and 
in response to transaction costs, are more capital intensive, with more rigid 
working conditions and demand better workers and higher effort intensity.
4. large firms earning rents from non-competitive product markets share part of 
these rents with their employees who have higher bargaining power.
What distinguishes the first proposition is that firms of different sizes pay 
identical workers in identical jobs the same wage whereas in the other approaches 
identical workers will receive differing wages. The second proposition suggests a trade­
off between transaction costs assumed to be greater in large firms and either wages 
directly or internal labour market structures. In the third proposition there is a trade-off 
between the standardisation of production and transaction costs and wage differentials 
follow from technological heterogeneity. In the fourth proposition product market power 
and bargaining between managers and employees drives wage differentials.
The empirical work to follow focuses on whether intercepts or slopes vary with 
size and whether product market structure affects the size-wage relationship. A 
summary of predictions for wage intercepts, slopes, and the possibility of product 
market effects, from the four broad categories is presented in table 2.1.
All except deferred compensation and specific human capital models predict a 
higher wage intercept in large workplaces and/or companies. But only in the models 
based on transaction costs, the organisation of production, and non-competitive product 
markets, are there anticipated variation in slope coefficients with size.
The literature provides several reasons to expect greater returns to tenure in 
larger firms. Oi (1991) focuses on firm specific training, arguing that expected returns to 
investment increase with firm size as a result of larger firms having a longer life 
expectancy. Similar predictions for wage tenure profiles come from a variant of 
efficiency wage models, where monitoring costs are argued to be higher in large firms 
and deferred compensation is used to deter shirking, (see Bulow and Summers 1986, 
and Lazear 1981).19
19 An alternative interpretation of upward sloping tenure wage profiles comes from job matching models 
where wages increase with time on the job, apart from any productivity increases, if better job matches 
survive longer, (Mincer and Jovanovic 1981, Topel 1991). If larger workplaces or companies produce 
better quality matches the profiles will be steeper. There is no established theory on why this would be the 
case, however, it is possible that large companies are more efficient at recruitment.
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In addition, a firm's reputation in the labour market will also influence the slope 
of tenure wage profiles. Where the firm's offer of higher future earnings is more 
credible, workers will be more willing to defer compensation, given some probability of 
layoff. This includes workers undertaking a larger share in financing firm specific 
investments in the form of lower initial wages. If reputation effects are greater for large 
firms, for example if information on these firms is more readily available, (Parsons 1986 
p801), then tenure wage profiles will be steeper given the same training levels or 
monitoring costs.
There is also reason to expect that demographic characteristics will be less 
important for wage outcomes due to the institutional environment within large 
companies and workplaces. For example, if larger firms tend to have internal labour 
market structures with wages attached to jobs rather than workers, (Wächter and Wright 
1990), and if work group morale is more important for productivity than individual 
performance (Akerlof 1986). Also if large companies are more concerned with 
reputation in the labour market and are more subject to scrutiny from unions this could 
compress wage differentials across demographic characteristics.
Returns to education may also be higher in large firms if this variable acts as a 
proxy for specific investments, for example where firms are more willing to undertake 
investments when workers have demonstrated a capacity to be trained (Mincer and 
Jovanovic 1981). Also, Garen (1985) argues that returns to education will be higher in 
large firms where education acts as a signal of ability, valued more by large firms which 
face a greater cost of evaluating individual productivity.
Within a rent sharing framework the union wage gap is expected to vary. 
Returns to training may also vary in the event that market power increases specific 
investments. But within a rent sharing model the direction of variation with size for 
these variables depends upon whether size is a proxy for ability-to-pay or bargaining 
power. As will be discussed further in chapter 5.
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Table 2.1
Summary of Empirical Predictions
Intercept coeffs. Product Relevant
in Large which Market Measure of
firms vary effects Size:
1. Unobservables:
Working higher only if no Workplace
Conditions preferences 
vary with 
human 
capital or
Sorting demographic
Companyhigher variables no
2. Transaction Costs:
Specific Workplace
Human
Capital
Lower training
tenure
yes or
Company
Efficiency
Wages
(Shirking)
lower if 
deferred 
payments 
higher if 
fixed wage
tenure
no Workplace
(Adverse
Selection)
higher education no Either
ILMs higher human
capital
demographic
yes
3. Organisation of Production:
Standardised higher human yes Workplace
Production capital
Processes demographic
4. Non-competitive Product Markets:
Rent training yes Workplace
Sharing higher union or Company
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2.8 Conclusion
We have built up a picture of differences between small and large firms in 
terms of transaction costs, the organisation of production, and wage bargaining. 
Although we do not intend to test between any narrowly defined models of wages 
determination, interpretation of results will be with respect to the theoretical framework 
outlined in this chapter.
In chapter 4 we examine variation in slope coefficients across the Small 
Business, Extensive, and Intensive sectors. In chapter 5 we introduce product market 
structure into the analysis. But first in the next chapter we incorporate company size into 
a standard analysis and compare the results with existing evidence.
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Chapter 3
Incorporating Both Workplace and Company Size into a Conventional Analysis
of Wage Determination
3.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces the empirical method and data, and presents an initial 
assessment of the importance of workplace and company size for the analysis of 
individual wage determination in Australia. The current literature has not considered the 
sensitivity of estimates to controlling for workplace size, nor has there been any 
opportunity to assess the importance of company size.
Two empirical questions are addressed: (i) are both workplace and company 
size significant in Australian wage equations? and, (ii) are workplace size and/or 
company size related to variation in wages normally attributed to other determinants?
The primary data source used is the 1988 Issues in Multicultural Australia 
(IMA) survey which has a measure of company size reported by employers which is 
matched to individual worker information. This data offers the first opportunity to 
address the above questions, in the Australian context.
To enable a comparison with the current literature the methodology applied in 
this chapter assumes that the relationship between size and wages can be captured as an 
average wage premium, constant across worker and job characteristics. This approach 
will hide the true form of the relationship if, as some theoretical models suggest, returns 
to tenure, and possibly the total wage structure, vary with employer size. The validity of 
constraining the wage structure to be the same across different sized employers is tested 
in the next chapter.
A further assumption affecting the interpretation of results is that employer size 
is uncorrelated with unobservable job characteristics or worker ability. Estimates of 
size-wage differentials in this chapter thus represent average effects conditional on the 
given allocation of workers to jobs and the given distribution of job characteristics
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across different sized employers. However, it has already been argued that the literature 
has not established a clear relationship between employer size and adverse working 
conditions or non-random sorting by ability.
The empirical method and data are outlined in the next two sections. Following 
this, regression results are presented in section 3.4 and the robustness of coefficients to 
controlling for size is assessed. Coefficients are generally robust to the inclusion of size. 
There is some change in estimates of returns to tenure, university qualifications and 
union membership but it is not statistically significant. Estimates of other aspects of the 
wage structure such as the gender wage differential, are unchanged.
The pattern of wage differentials by workplace and company size is presented 
in section 3.5. When workplace size alone is considered, wages increase monotonically 
with size, a result consistent with previous Australian and overseas evidence. 
Controlling for company size as well however, suggests that workplace size only 
influences wages within larger companies. Furthermore, the relationship between 
average wages and company size exhibits a non-linear pattern. Compared to companies 
with up to twenty employees all medium sized and large companies pay a wage 
premium of a similar magnitude. Wages do not increase with company size above this 
threshold of twenty employees, but very small companies are associated with low 
wages.
A second data source which includes measures of both workplace size and 
company size is the 1989-1990 Australian Workplace Industrial Relations survey 
(AWIRS). The unit of analysis in the AWIRS data is the workplace rather than the 
individual, hence the capacity to control for employee characteristics is limited. 
Nevertheless, similar overall patterns in the size-wage relationship are documented in 
section 3.6.
In both Australian data sets the relationship between company size and wages 
is unlike previous evidence from the United States. Section 3.7 discusses how the 
different results may be reconciled.
3.2 Empirical Method and Australian Literature
The methodological framework commonly used to investigate wage 
differentials is to estimate reduced form wage equations with a functional form derived 
from human capital theory. The derivation, following Mincer and Polachek (1974) is 
outlined in Appendix 3A.
An advantage of this approach is that the effect of employer size on wages can 
be isolated, with controls for human capital variables and other individual characteristics 
normally found to be important in wage determination. The functional form used relates 
the natural logarithm of the wage of individual i to a set of human capital variables and 
other personal characteristics (Xi). To allow for non-linearities in the size wage 
relationship, without imposing a particular functional form, dummy variables 
representing different size categories are used for both measures of size.1
Thus:
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ln(wage)j = Xjß0 + WSß] + CSß2 + £j
Where, WS is a vector of dummy variables indicating size of the workplace, CS is a 
vector of dummy variables indicating size of the company, the ß are vectors of 
coefficients to be estimated, and e, is an error term.
1 In the IMA data, workplace size is recorded in five size categories rather than a continuous measure. An 
alternative specification involves constructing a continuous variable with each size group being assigned 
the population mean within that category. This method is used by Brown and Medoff (1989) using U.S. 
data but is not used here since population estimates of the distribution of workplace sizes are not 
available. The smallest unit of measurement available in Australian Bureau of Statistics publications is 
that of establishment, but this is defined as single operating establishments which may cover more than 
one location and hence does not correspond to workplace size. Company size is available as a continuous 
measure in the IMA data, but has a significant effect on wages only when a fourth order polynomial 
specification is used. As such, using a continuous measure does not save on the number of parameters to 
estimate.
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This functional form allows for a different intercept in each size group. With 
the smallest size category excluded, the proportional effect on the wage of being in the 
jth size category, compared to the smallest, is calculated as eßj -1.
A limitation of this approach is the reduced form nature of the equation, 
reflecting the net effects of optimising decisions by employers and workers. As such it is 
not possible to identify the separate effects of demand or supply side factors. However, 
including employer size measures can be seen as an attempt to incorporate employer 
decisions into the analysis in a more apparent manner. If the positive size wage 
relationship is driven by employer decisions, it can be seen as a reflection of demand 
side factors in the absence of self-selection on the part of workers or worker investment 
decisions.
The human capital wage equation has been widely used to examine the wage 
structure in Australia. In particular there are many studies investigating wage 
differentials by gender, qualifications, union status, immigrant status, and industry. The 
focus in the empirical results will be on these variables and whether coefficients are 
sensitive to controlling for workplace size and/or company size.
The literature reports varying estimates of wage structures, depending on the 
data and control variables used. The methodology usually followed is to estimate 
separate wage equations for sub groups of workers. This approach has shown that the 
wage structure differs between: males and females; non-English speaking background 
(NESB) immigrants and other workers; and union and non union members, (see 
Chapman and Mulvey 1986, Chapman and Iredale 1989, Miller and Mulvey 1993, 
Miller 1993). In particular, returns to human capital investment through education, 
experience or tenure are shown to vary across these sub-samples with lower returns for 
NESB immigrants and females.
Studies of gender wage differentials have shown that on average males tend to 
earn between 12 and 15 per cent per hour more than females, (see Chapman and Mulvey 
1986, Gregory and Daly 1991, Miller 1993). Most studies of union effects on wages 
have shown average wage premiums for union members of between 5 and 10 per cent,
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with only two studies reporting no significant union wage premium, (see Miller and 
Mulvey (1993) for a review of this literature).
The literature on wage outcomes for immigrants compared to Australian born 
workers has shown that systematically lower earnings are confined to non English 
speaking background (NESB) immigrants rather than those from English speaking 
countries. Estimated wage differentials for Australian born compared to NESB workers 
are generally in the range of 12 to 20 per cent. In addition the literature has shown that 
this wage differential is more pronounced for workers with higher levels of education 
(Kidd 1993, Chapman and Iredale 1990).
Estimates of returns to years of education or post school qualifications vary 
widely according to the functional form used. Nevertheless, some established results are 
that earnings increase with years of education, and returns to post school qualifications 
are highest for university qualifications, and returns to trade qualifications are higher 
than returns to other qualifications such as certificates and diplomas (see Miller 1993, 
Kidd 1993).
Where workplace size has been available, it has been included in wage 
equations as an additional exogenous variable, with little analysis of either the influence 
on other coefficients2 or reasons for its significant impact on wages. The significance of 
workplace size coefficients has been interpreted as evidence of a "firm" size effect. For 
example, Chapman and Iredale (1990) interpret the coefficient on workplace size as 
suggesting "...men in very large firms earned about 18 per cent per hour more than men 
in small firms..." (p28). But the concept of "firm" size is imprecise if characteristics of 
the workplace and the company influence wages in different ways.
Table 3.1 reports some Australian estimates of workplace size wage 
differentials. Compared to the smallest workplaces, all studies find that wages are 
significantly higher on average in workplaces with more than 20 or 25 employees,
The only reference to this issue that I am aware of in the literature is a comment by Miller and Mulvey 
(1993) who note, in their survey of the literature, that there are "...theoretical considerations which suggest 
that unionism and firm size may be related so it is important to take account of this relationship where data 
permits" (p323). Sensitivity of estimated union wage effects to controlling for workplace size is 
demonstrated in Hatton and Chapman (1989).
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generally increasing monotonically, with the largest wage gains in workplaces with 
more than 100 employees.
Table 3.1
Australian Estimates of Workplace Size Wage Differentials
Study Data
Size
Group
Percentage 
Wage Differential
Males Females1
Hatton & Chapman 1973 Social Mobility <5 0
(1989) Survey 5-24 15.0
Full time males 25-99 23.1
30-65 Years 100-299 15.6
300+ 22.7
Chapman & Iredale 1988 IMA Survey <20 0 0
(1990) All wage and 21-50 6.7 -0.9
salary earners 51-100 10.0 -8.8
101-500 19.5 -8.4
501 + 18.6 12.6
Miller 1973 Social Mobility <5 0 0
(1993) Survey 5-24 13.9 8.9
30-69 Years 25-99 21.9 13.5
100+ 22.3 7.6
1989 How Workers Get <10 0 0
Their Training 10-19 6.6 -0.9
Survey 20-99 12.4 5.8
30-64 Years 100+ 20.8 12.7
Notes:
1. In all cases separate equations are estimated for male and female subsamples. Results from Chapman 
and Iredale are reported for the Australian born sample only.____________________________________
An issue of interest, addressed in the empirical results, is whether previous 
estimates of wage differentials by workplace size are partially reflecting company size 
effects, given some correlation between the two measures.3
The distinction between workplace and company size also allows an 
investigation of whether the relationship between each measure of size and wages is 
independent of the other measure. Instead of separate company and workplace size 
categories, interaction terms are included in the wage equation:
3 See Miller E. (1978) for a discussion of reasons for such correlation and evidence from the U.S. In this 
sample, the Spearman rank correlation coefficient between workplace size and company size as 
categorical variables is .537.
ln(wage)[ = X;ß0 + WSj*CSk8jk + £,
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where, 8jk is the change in ln(wage) associated with different combinations of workplace 
and company size compared to the excluded category. This controls in part for 
correlation between the two measures.
3.3 Data and Variables
The IMA survey provides information on wages and a range of characteristics 
of individual workers. Workplace size is recorded in five categories from a question 
which asked "how many people are employed at the place where you work?". Workers 
were also asked for the name of their employer, and additional information on these 
companies is now available from various sources.
The information on company size was collected from a follow up survey of the 
employing companies which asked "how many employees worked for the company 
throughout Australia?". Less than half of the observations in IMA have a measure of 
company size from the follow up survey, partly due to some workers not reporting the 
name of their employer and partly due to a low response rate to the follow up survey.4 
Additional observations (100) have been obtained from the 24th edition of The Business 
Who's Who of Australia (1990) which has information collected annually from 
companies by Riddell Publishing Pty Ltd. Both sources of data ultimately come from the 
companies themselves.
The concept of the "company" may have been interpreted in different ways by 
respondents to the survey. However, the company size variable appears to be measured
4 Of the sample of 1460 private sector wage and salary earners 664 have a measure of company size from 
the follow up survey of employers. For nearly 10 per cent of the observations from the employer survey, 
company size is lower than the reported workplace size category. Some of the inconsistencies appear to be 
due to misinterpretation of the question with some large companies (according to the Business Who's 
Who) recorded as having less than 10 employees. Twelve of these have been replaced. Others are fairly 
close and the inconsistencies are probably due to estimates of workplace and company size being obtained 
from different sources (workers and employers). Ten of these, where company size was less than 5 below 
the lower bound of workplace size, have been changed to correspond to the workplace size category.
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at the subsidiary level for many companies, particularly the larger companies, with 
different values for subsidiary and parent companies. It is expected then, that this 
measure of company size corresponds fairly closely to the concept of the company as a 
profit centre rather than a corporate group.
The sample is restricted to non-agricultural, private sector workplaces, and to 
full time workers, where, full time is defined as having worked at least 30 hours in the 
survey week or having normal weekly earnings of at least $120 (see Appendix 3B). 
Table 3.2 lists the number of observations (workers) and the number of employing 
companies within different size categories. The categories used for workplace size are 
dictated by how the data is recorded. The company size categories are chosen to 
correspond to these, with an additional open ended category of 1000+ to concur with 
categories used in previous U.S. studies.
Table 3.2
Sample Distribution by Size
C om pany Size < = 20
W orkplace S ize  
21-50  51-100 101-500 5 0 7 + A ll W o rk p la c e s  %
<=20 59 59 9.2
2 1 -5 0 22 28 50 7.8
5 1 -1 0 0 10 12 22 44 6.9
1 0 1 -5 0 0 26 18 27 48 119 18.5
5 0 1 -1 0 0 0 6 8 6 36 21 77 12.0
1001 + 47 31 29 63 123 293 45.6
A ll c o m p a n ie s 170 97 84 147 144 642
% 26.5 15.1 13.1 22.9 22.4 100.0
These distributions have a lower proportion of workers in small workplaces 
compared to other Australian cross section surveys (see Miller 1993) essentially because
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observations which do not have a measure of company size are excluded from the 
sample and more than half of these nonrespondents are in the smallest workplaces. 
Small companies also appear to be underrepresented.* 5
The under-representation of small workplaces and companies does not in itself 
create a problem. However, within small workplaces the average wage is lower for these 
nonrespondents, ($369 compared to $455 for respondents) whereas in all other 
workplace size categories the average wage of nonrespondents is slightly higher. Where 
workers at the lower end of the wage distribution are excluded from the small workplace 
sample (and probably the small company sample), this will bias downwards estimates of 
size wage differentials as a reflection of the total population in the event that the low 
wages of these workers is related to workplace size after controlling for other 
characteristics.
Several coefficients are significantly different for the excluded observations, 
however, for the purposes of this chapter, the main conclusions are not changed, (see 
Appendix 3B).6 Where there are any differences in empirical results, when 
nonrespondents are included in the sample, these are noted with the results presented in 
this chapter.
A second potential bias from excluding company size nonrespondents arises if 
coefficients on independent variables vary across different sized employers. Then the 
functional form used in this chapter will bias those coefficients as a reflection of the 
total population. For example, overseas evidence suggests that returns to human capital 
characteristics vary with size; in particular returns to tenure with the current employer 
tend to be higher in large workplaces and companies. This suggests that returns to tenure
See Table B4 in Appendix 3B where employment distributions by company size are compared with
U.S. survey data. Also Australian Bureau of Statistics estimates suggest that for the 1988-1989 year, 33
per cent of workers were in companies with fewer than 20 employees which is considerable higher than
the 9 per cent in this sample. However, ABS estimates will overstate employment in small companies
since size is measured as the number of employees within the State/Territory and not necessarily Australia 
wide. See ABS catalogue 1321.
6 Appendix 3B (section 3), shows that, coefficients on workplace size, tenure, union membership, and 
some industry groups differ significantly between the included and excluded observations. However, 
analysing the effect of workplace size alone, and including company size nonrespondents in the sample, 
gives results not qualitatively different from those presented in section 3.4.
52
may be biased upwards because small workplace workers are underrepresented. The 
next chapter will control for this by allowing coefficients to vary.
The dependent variable is weekly wages. A possible problem is that the data 
records normal gross weekly wages whereas hours worked is reported as hours actually 
worked in the previous week, hence there is no accurate measure of normal hourly 
wages.7 Hours worked is included as an independent variable. A full definition of other 
variables included in the wage equation is given in Appendix 3A.
Human capital characteristics are represented by years of primary and 
secondary schooling (school); university, trade, or certificate/other qualifications 
attained in Australia (respectively, auni, atrade, acert); post school qualifications of 
immigrants attained overseas (respectively, osuni, ostrade, oscert); years of potential 
labour market experience after completing education (exp), and experience squared 
(exp2) to allow for depreciation of general labour market skills. Additionally, years of 
tenure with the current employer (tenure), and tenure squared (tenure2) are included to 
allow different returns to investment in human capital on-the-job.
The interpretation of tenure coefficients can vary. In human capital theory the 
coefficient on experience measures the return to general training (holding tenure 
constant), whereas returns to time on the current job (holding general experience 
constant) reflects firm specific investments financed by workers in the form of low 
initial wages (Mincer and Jovanovic 1981). However, job matching and deferred 
compensation models offer alternative interpretations. Wages will increase with time on 
the job, apart from any productivity increases, if better job matches survive longer, 
(Mincer and Jovanovic 1981, Topel 1991), or if deferred compensation is used as a 
discipline device to deter shirking, (Lazear 1981).
A limitation of this specification is that some explanatory variables may not be 
exogenous. In particular, it is generally recognised that expected earnings is a 
determinant of tenure. Including tenure in the wage equation introduces a possible
7 Another possible problem is that weekly wages are recorded in 14 intervals in the data. The reported R 
squared statistics will be slightly higher than if a continuous variable were used since there is less 
variation in wages to be explained. Also, Stewart (1983) shows that OLS estimates will be inconsistent 
using a dependent variable which is grouped in this way. However, section 4 in Appendix 3B uses an 
alternative estimation technique to control for this and shows that coefficients are not different.
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simultaneity bias, however, attempts to control for this in the literature have generally 
shown that the bias is small, (see Topel 1991, and Chapman and Tan 1980). 
Furthermore, there is no reason to expect the bias to differ between small and large 
workplaces or companies.
Other variables are included for gender (female), marital status (married), 
union membership (union), immigrant (immig), and residence in a large urban area 
(lurban). Although there are not unambiguous theoretical reasons for including all of 
these, they are normally found to influence wages. Marital status is usually interpreted 
as reflecting variation in the stability of workers or commitment to jobs, through either 
employer perceptions or greater financial responsibility of married workers (Korenman 
and Neumark 1991). Urban residence can reflect compensating differentials for regional 
amenities or variation in local labour market conditions. Immigrant status can reflect 
disadvantages of this group through language or information problems (Wooden 1990). 
These are included since the objective here is to estimate the effects of size which exist 
over and above wage differentials associated with other factors.
Many studies also include occupation and industry variables. However, 
occupational attainment may be endogenous where workers with higher earnings 
capacity are selected into better paying occupations. The same point can apply to 
industry. Rather than complicating the analysis by treating occupational attainment, 
industry affiliation, and wage outcomes simultaneously, results are presented for wage 
equations both including and excluding occupation and industry since the 
straightforward goal at this stage is to test for sensitivity of coefficients to controlling 
for employer size.
There is also a reason to expect some interaction between size effects and 
industry effects. Industry and size are both employer characteristics, with the same 
potential explanations for wage differentials, such as working conditions, monitoring 
costs, or rent sharing.7 If industry and employer size reflect variation in the same wage 
determination factors, part of the wage variation across industries should be explained 
by controlling for size and vice versa.
7 See Groshen (1991) and Krueger and Summers (1988) for a review of explanations for industry effects, 
and Borland and Suen (1990) and Chapman and Miller (1983) for Australian evidence.
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Summary statistics are presented in Table 3.2. Characteristics of the sample 
show a higher union membership rate, higher average tenure, and a higher concentration 
in manufacturing industries, than in other Australian data sets, (see Borland and Suen 
1990, Miller 1993, and Chapman and Mulvey 1986). This is associated with the higher 
concentration of workers in large workplaces and companies. When nonrespondents on 
company size are included, the sample characteristics are broadly comparable with other 
data sets (see Appendix 3B, Table B2).
Table 3.3
Statistical Characteristics of the IMA Data
(means, standard deviations in parentheses for continuous variables; 
percentage of sample for binary variables)
n=642
Wage (Weekly) 449.74 (193.78)
Hours 44.06 ( 8 . 8 )
Human Capital Variables: Industry: (per cent)
school (years) 11.53 (1.90) Other 6.85
acert (p er cen t) 12.15 Light Manufacturing 19.00
atrade (p er cen t) 13.08 Heavy Manufacturing 31.78
auni (p er cen t) 11.06 Construction 4.83
oscert (per cen t) 7.63 Wholesale 8.57
OStrade (p er cen t) 9.19 Retail 9.50
osuni (p e r c e n t) 5.92 Finance 11.84
experience (years) 15.57 (11.05) Community Services 3.43
tenure (years) 5.17 (6.69) Recreation/Personal 4.21
Other Characteristics: (per cent) Workplace size: (per cent)
female 25.08 WS<=20 26.48
married 64.95 WS21-50 15.11
immigrant 58.10 WS51-100 13.08
union member 49.70 W S101-500 22.90
Large urban area 82.55 WS500+ 22.43
Occupation: (per cent) Company Size: (per cent)
managers 7.48 CS<=20 9.19
professional 9.66 CS21-50 7.79
para-professional 4.21 CS51-100 6.85
trades 21.65 CS101-500 18.54
clerical 13.24 CS501-1000 11.99
sales 9.35 CS1001+ 45.64
machine operators 13.40
labourers 21.03
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Some potentially important interactions between independent variables are 
ignored with this specification. Due to a small sample size, the analysis throughout the 
thesis uses the sample pooled across: immigrant and non-immigrant, union and non­
union, and male and female sub-samples. Coefficients on all variables should be 
interpreted as representing average effects on wages.
Non English speaking background (NESB) Immigrants are overrepresented in 
the IMA survey. A downward bias in some coefficients is expected given previous 
evidence that coefficients on education, experience, and union membership tend to be 
lower for NESB immigrants than for the population, (Kidd 1993, Chapman and Iredale 
1993). However, as shown in Appendix 3B, the direction of change in coefficients, 
when employer size is included in wage equations, is the same for immigrants and non­
immigrants. Furthermore, estimates of average size wage differentials are not 
significantly different between the two groups.
The sample shows only limited increases in raw average wages by workplace 
and company size as seen in Table 3.4. A non-linear pattern of wage variation is shown 
for both measures of size. Considering workplace size first, average wages are lower for 
workplaces with between 21 and 100 employees, compared to the smallest workplaces, 
but higher in workplaces with more than 500 employees. The only significant 
differential is for hourly wages in the largest workplaces which are 15.8 percent higher 
than the smallest and significantly higher than all other size groups (at the 5 per cent 
level).
However, the pattern of raw wage differentials by workplace size is specific to 
this sample. Table B3, in appendix 3B, shows that when nonrespondents on company 
size are included in the sample, average weekly and hourly wages are significantly 
higher in workplaces with more than 100 and more than 500 employees by between 11 
and 26 per cent.
Table 3.4
Average Wages by Workplace and Company size
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Size
Average 
Weekly Wage
%
Change
Average 
Hourly Wage
%
Change
WS<=20 455.59 0 9.92 0
WS21-50 422.01 -7.37 9.62 -3.02
WS51-100 425.30 -6.65 9.71 -2.12
WS101-500 434.29 -4.68 9.95 0.30
WS500+ 491.60 7.90 11.49 15.83
CS<=20 448.47 0 9.48 0
CS21-50 430.00 -4.12 9.64 1.69
CS51-100 464.20 3.51 10.15 7.07
CS101-500 430.46 -4.02 9.78 3.16
CS501-1000 472.08 5.26 10.72 13.08
CS1001+ 453.16 1.05 10.50 10.76
Hourly wages show some increase with company size but the differences are 
not statistically significant. Although average hourly wages are higher in companies 
with more than 500 and 1000 employees, by 13 and 10 per cent respectively, the lack of 
significance suggests a great deal of variation within each size category. However, 
observing raw averages by size makes no allowance for variation in worker 
characteristics across different sized workplaces and companies. The regression results 
presented in section 3.5 will show significant size wage differentials, after holding 
individual characteristics constant. But first we will consider whether workplace or 
company size are related to variation in wages normally attributed to other wage 
determinants.
3.4 The Wage Structure Before and After Controlling for Size
The first issue to be addressed is the relationship between measures of size and 
other wage determinants. Do estimates vary with the inclusion of workplace and/or 
company size? Do workplace and company size have separate and different impacts on 
other coefficients? First, results are presented from a basic equation including human 
capital variables and other worker characteristics, then with occupation and industry
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variables added to the equation. Section 3.5 will then examine the structure of size wage 
differentials.
3.4.1 Basic Equation
Table 3.5. reports regression results with and without workplace and company 
size variables. The excluded categories are male, single, unqualified, Australian born, 
and non union members. Hence, the constant represents the predicted base In (wage) for 
this reference group, with no human capital endowments. Estimates without controlling 
for size are reported in the first column. The predicted wage for the reference group with 
10 years schooling, no experience, working 40 hours per week, and in a large urban area 
is $300.61 per week in 1989 dollars.
Coefficient signs and magnitudes generally accord with a priori expectations. 
Education has a positive and significant effect on wages. Experience and tenure have 
significant positive effects on wages, but at a decreasing rate. The results also suggest a 
positive wage premium for married workers and workers in large urban areas, and lower 
wages for females and immigrants on average.
The negative union coefficient is inconsistent with other Australian evidence 
which generally shows positive or insignificant union wage premiums. This is a result 
specific to this sample.8 As noted in the previous section results for the union coefficient 
can not be readily generalised beyond the sample used here.
The coefficients which show some change when measures of size are included, 
are those on the auni, tenure, and union variables, implying some correlation between 
these characteristics and employer size. Union members tend to be concentrated in 
workplaces and companies larger than 500. Union membership covers 63 per cent of 
employees in large workplaces and 61 per cent in large companies compared to 46 per 
cent and 34 per cent in small. Average tenure is 4 years in smaller workplaces and
8 The union coefficient is positive and significant for the sample of excluded observations which do not 
have a measure of company size, and is positive but insignificant for the non-immigrant sample. This 
suggests that the sample analysed is unusual, however, appendix 3B shows that apart from the union 
coefficient other results are not substantially changed when the nonrespondents are included.
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companies compared to 6 to 7 years in workplaces and companies larger than 500. 
However, there are higher concentrations of workers with university qualifications in 
both small and large workplaces and companies; fewer qualified workers are in medium 
size groups.
Table 3.5
Regression Results
(t-ratios in parentheses)
Without Size With WS With CS With WS and CS
Human Capital
school .0116 (1.55) .0123 (1.66) .0114 (1.53) .0120 (1.61)
acert .147 (4.17) .145 (4.13) .152 (4.32) .147 (4.17)
atrade .0388 (1.01) .0419 (1.10) .0411 0.07) .0450 (1.18)
auni .323 (6.62) .299 (6.13) .311 (6.40) .298 (6.10)
oscert .0408 (0.83) .0387 (0.80) .0399 (0.82) .0409 (0.84)
ostrade .0217 (0.48) .0256 (0.58) .0206 (0.46) .0225 (0.50)
osuni .337 (6.26) .331 (6.22) .333 (6.19) .330 (6.16)
experience .0255 (6.22) .0259 (6.38) .0261 (6.42) .0264 (6.49)
experience2 -.000485 (5.44) -.000485 (5.50) -.000492 (5.57) -.000493(5.59)
tenure .0165 (3.07) .0148 (2.78) .0143 (2.68) .0140 (2.61)
tenure2 -.000404 (2.00) -.000396(1.98) -.000367(1.82) -.000380(1.89)
Other
female -.173 (5.80) -.171 (5.78) -.183 (6.16) -.176 (5.91)
married .0841 (2.78) .0759 (2.53) .0757 (2.51) .0711 (2.36)
immigrant -.0912 (3.04) -.106 (3.54) -.101 (3.38) -.110 (3.67)
union m em ber -.0982 (3.84) -.122 (4.62) -.128 (4.82) -.131 (4.86)
hours .0129 (9.11) .0136 (9.62) .0136 (9.55) .0139 (9.77)
Lurban area .0808 (2.39) .0936 (2.79) .0868 (2.58) .0940 (2.80)
Size
WS21-50 .0209 (0.54) -.0105 (0.25)
WS51-100 .0264 (0.64) -.0061 (0.13)
WS101-500 .0587 (1.65) .0203 (0.50)
WS500+ .144 (3.97) .0966 (2.30)
CS21-50 .0791 (1.36) .0882 (1.41)
CS51-100 .0830 (1.37) .0929 (1.39)
CS 101-500 .0980 (1.98) .0969 (1.75)
CS501-1000 .145 (2.68) .116 (1.89)
CS1001+ .164 (3.57) .126 (2.41)
constant 4.993 (43.11) 4.920 (42.16) 4.871 (40.11) 4.848 (39.94)
R2 .4258 .4385 .4354 .4393
e'e 56.3544 54.7535 54.9667 54.2331
WS F(4) 4.53 2.08
CS F(5) •• 3.13 1.18
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However, the changes in coefficients, controlling for either or both measures of 
size, are not statistically significant. They are also quite small as illustrated in Table 3.6 
which reports the percentage change in wages with one unit changes in selected 
independent variables.
The coefficient on Australian university qualifications falls when either 
workplace or company size are included, and when both are included. Expressed as a 
percentage wage differential compared to unqualified workers, this represents a fall 
from 38.2 per cent to 34.8 per cent when workplace size is included, from 38.2 per cent 
to 36.5 per cent when company size is included, and to 34.7 per cent when both are 
included. Other post school qualifications are essentially unaffected.
The tenure coefficient falls by 10 per cent with just workplace size, 13 per cent 
with just company size, and by 15 per cent with both included. The tenure wage profile 
also peaks two years earlier after controlling for size. Returns to tenure may be biased 
upwards without controlling for workplace size and even with workplace size included 
may still be biased upward without company size.
Table 3.6
Percentage Changes in Wages with Changes in Individual Characteristics
Without Size With WS With CS With WS and CS
Auni 38.2 34.8 36.5 34.7
Experience 1.09 1.14 1.13 1.16
Peak (years) (26.3) (26.7) (26.5) (26.7)
Tenure 1.24 1.08 1.07 1.02
Peak (years) (20.4) (18.7) (19.6) (18.4)
Female -15.9 -15.7 -16.7 -16.2
Immigrant -8.7 -10.1 -9.6 -10.4
Union member -9.4 -11.5 -12.0 -12.2
Notes:
Marginal effects of Experience and Tenure are evaluated at the respective sample means of 15 
and 5 years.______________________________________________________________________
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The finding that union members earn lower wages relative to non union 
members when workplace size is included concurs with some previous evidence.9 The 
union non-union wage differential changes when either workplace size or company size 
are included but with virtually no further change when the additional measure of size is 
included.
This suggests that any interaction between union membership and size is 
related to factors common to both measures of size, for example, it may be driven by 
membership density which is likely to vary with both measures as opposed to working 
conditions specific to the workplace, (see Grimes 1994 pp.83-84). However, the union 
effects here are complicated by sampling issues and should not be generalised beyond 
the sample used here.
Overall, the results suggest that, in the sample used here, coefficients are quite 
robust to the inclusion of size measures. Indeed for some such as the gender wage 
differential the estimate does not change at all. The implication for Australian research 
of this kind is that, although estimates of the wage effect of university qualifications, 
tenure, and union membership may be biased upwards if employer size is not controlled 
for, this bias will not be significant.
However, the functional form used here is restrictive and it is not appropriate to 
conclude that ignoring size will have no effect on other estimates. When coefficients are 
allowed to vary across different sized employers in the next chapter, it will be shown 
that ignoring variation in estimates across different sized workplaces and companies is 
problematic.
3.4.2 Controlling for Occupation and Industry
Table 3.7 reports regression results with occupation and industry variables 
included in the equation. The excluded categories are labourers and "light" 
manufacturing industries (as defined in appendix 3A), and coefficients can be
9 See Hatton and Chapman (1989), Miller and Mulvey (1993), and footnote 2 on page 40.
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interpreted as reflecting the wage structure given the same broad occupation and 
industry group.
Table 3.7
Regression Results 
Including Occupation and Industry
Without Size With WS With CS With WS and CS
Human Capita
school .0101 (1.42) .0108 (1.54) .0101 (1.43) .0104 (1.49)
acert .0714 (2.06) .0684 (2.00) .0727 (2.12) .0642 (1.87)
atrade .0256 (0.65) .0262 (0.67) .0215 (0.55) .0253 (0.65)
auni .185 (3.61) .158 (3.08) .169 (3.30) .149 (2.91)
oscert .00692 (0.14) .00306 (0.06) .00218 (0.04) .0026 (0.05)
ostrade .0489 (1.15) .0515 (1.22) .0431 (1-02) .0447 (1.06)
osuni .223 (4.24) .216 (4.16) .213 (4.06) .206 (3.95)
exp .0226 (5.79) .0229 (5.92) .0225 (5.82) .0229 (5.94)
exp2 -.000419 (4.94) -.000419 (4.98) -.000414 (4.93) -.000419 (5.00)
tenure .0149 (2.95) .0135 (2.71) .0134 (2.68) .0131 (2.62)
tenure2 -.000416 (2.19) -.000412 (2.19) -.000386 (2.05) -.000400 (2.14)
Other
female -.147 (4.92) -.148 (4.98) -.151 (5.06) -.148 (4.96)
married .0709 (2.48) .0637 (2.25) .0617 (2.17) .0566 (1.99)
immig -.0506 (1.73) -.0590 (2.04) -.0584 (2.01) -.0634 (2.19)
union -.0334 (1.29) -.0579 (2.18) -.0612 (2.30) -.0619 (2.29)
hours .0107 (7.74) .0114 (8.28) .0113 (8.20) .0116 (8.48)
Lurban .0618 (1.93) .0749 (2.35) .0687 (2.16) .0770 (2.43)
Occupation
mana .393 (6.95) .395 (7.06) .407 (7.23) .409 (7.27)
prof .333 (6.44) .328 (6.40) .336 (6.48) .345 (6.63)
para .337 (5.28) .335 (5.29) .328 (5.16) .336 (5.30)
trad .0576 (1.53) .0647 (1.74) .0693 (1.85) .0749 (2.01)
der .107 (2.43) .108 (2.48) .0992 (2.25) .109 (2.48)
sale .198 (4.06) .206 (4.28) .197 (4.06) .207 (4.28)
oper .0447 (1.12) .0482 (1.22) .0463 (1.17) .0507 (1.29)
Industry
Other .150 (2.88) .139 (2.68) .141 (2.71) .136 (2.61)
Man:H .0772 (2.31) .0601 (1.80) .0682 (2.04) .0601 (1.79)
Constr .171 (2.90) .201 (3.42) .220 (3.71) .228 (3.85)
Whols .0115 (0.24) .0307 (0.64) .0259 (0.54) .0348 (0.73)
Retail -.0578 (1.18) -.0505 (1.04) -.0618 (1.26) -.0498 (1.01)
Finan .0788 (1.71) .0909 (1.97) .0725 (1.56) .0833 (1.78)
ComS -.0659 (0.94) -.0415 (0.59) -.0471 (0.67) -.0316 (0.45)
Recre .0199 (0.31) .00600 (0.09) .0152 (0.24) .00516 (0.08)
Size
WS21-50 .0246 (0.68) -.0156 (0.40)
WS51-100 .0321 (0.83) -.0175 (0.41)
WS 101-500 .0671 (1.97) .0135 (0.35)
WS500+ .146 (4.13) .0992 (2.46)
CS21-50 .0816 (1.49) .0973 (1.66)
CS51-100 .123 (2.15) .144 (2.28)
CS 101-500 .117 (2.50) .128 (2.45)
CS501-1000 .195 (3.78) .175 (3.00)
CS1001+ .164 (3.69) .132 (2.64)
const 4.961 ( 43.11) 4.880 (42.11) 4.826 (40.06) 4.790 (39.79)
r ’2 .5029 .5150 .5134 .5188
Industry F(8) 3.66 3.52 3.96 3.75
WS F(4) 4.81 2.69
CS F(5) 3.62 1.93
62
The occupation and industry coefficients are jointly significant and individually 
significant for most occupations and some industries. All coefficients are lower (in 
absolute value), with occupation and industry included. However, the same coefficients 
change when size measures are included and the change is of the same magnitude. The 
coefficient on university qualifications fall four percentage points, returns to tenure fall 
by .16 percentage points, and the union coefficient changes by 2 to 3 percentage points.
Table 3.8 gives industry wage differentials expressed as percentages. In column 
one, only the "Other", Heavy Manufacturing, and Construction industries show wages 
significantly higher than the light manufacturing group.
Table 3.8
Percentage Industry Wage Differentials
(1)
Without Size
(2)
With WS
(3)
With CS
(4)
With WS and CS
Industry:
Other 16.2* 14.9* 15.1* 14.6*
Man:H 8.0* 6.2 7.1* 6.2
Constr 18.6* 22.3* 24.6* 25.6*
Whols 1.2 3.1 2.6 3.5
Retail -5.6 -4.9 -6.0 -4.9
Finan 8.2 9.5* 7.5 8.7
ComS -6.4 -4.1 -4.6 -3.1
Recre 2.0 0.6 1.5 0.5
Some industry wage relativities change when size is included. The coefficients 
for "other" and heavy manufacturing10 fall by two percentage points when size is 
included, but the coefficient for construction increases by seven percentage points.
10 "Other" includes Mining, Electricity / Gas, Transport / storage, construction, and Communications 
industries; heavy manufacturing (Man:H) includes chemical, metal, transport, and machinery products.
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Although for the construction industry this is a substantial change, it is not statistically 
significant. Coefficients for the Community Services industry (ComS) suggest higher 
relative wages in this group after controlling for size.
It is surprising to note that the joint significance of industry effects is not 
sensitive to controlling for size", although some relativities change. The implication is 
that either, industry and size are not picking up variation in the same wage 
determination factors, or that these factors vary across industries independent of 
company and workplace size.
3.4.3 Summary of Results
In summary, the results here suggest that, estimates of the wage structure will 
be fairly robust to controlling for either or both measures of employer size. Although 
coefficients on university qualifications, tenure, and union membership, may be biased 
upwards if employer size is not controlled for, and some industry wage relativities may 
be biased, these biases are not significant in the sample used here. Because these 
changes in coefficients are not significant, even though some are substantial, no clear 
insights emerge from the distinction between workplace and company size from the 
results.
One implication of the results is that not controlling for workplace size and/or 
company size does not compromise current estimates of the wage structure. However, it 
is not appropriate at this stage to conclude that ignoring size will not affect results. 
Although the functional form used in this chapter is a common approach to investigating 
the size wage relationship the next chapter, using a less restrictive functional form, will 
show the importance of controlling for size in any analysis of wage determination.
Incorporating a measure of company size into an analysis of wage 
determination has not previously been possible with Australian data. Several new results 
regarding the size wage relationship are outlined in the next section.
11 F statistics for joint significance of industry dummies are 3.66, 3.52, 3.96, and 3.75 for columns (1) to 
(4) respectively.
3.5 The Structure of Size Wage Differentials
Incorporating company size into the analysis allows new questions to be asked 
about the Australian size wage relationship. Are both workplace size and company size 
significant wage determinants? Are the wage effects of workplace size and company 
size independent?
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3.5.1 Are both workplace size and company size significant wage determinants?
Size wage differentials (expressed as percentages) are reported in Table 3.9. 
The estimates in column one show that wages are higher with each successive increase 
in workplace size, a result consistent with other studies. On average, wages tend to be 
6.9 per cent higher in workplaces with 101 to 500 employees and 15.7 per cent higher in 
the largest workplaces.
These are somewhat lower than previous Australian estimates, which is likely 
to be the result of selection bias in this sample when company size nonrespondents are 
excluded. When these observations are included in the sample the equivalent estimates 
of workplace size effects are 4.9, 8.5*, 11.4*, and 18.9* per cent, (see Table B8 in 
Appendix 3B).
Table 3.9
Percentage Size Wage Differentials
(t-ratios in parentheses)
including: WSj
(1)
csk
(2)
WSj and CSk 
(3)
Workplace size:
21-50 2.49 (0.68) -1.55 (0.40)
51-100 3.27 (0.83) -0.17 (0.41)
101-500 6.94 (1-97) 1.36 (0.35)
500+ 15.73 (4.13) 10.43 (2.46)
Company size
21-50 8.50 (1.49) 10.22 (1.66)
51-100 13.10 (2.15) 15.51 (2.28)
101-500 12.43 (2.50) 13.66 (2.45)
501-1000 21.58 (3.78) 19.10 (3.00)
1001 + 17.77 (3.69) 14.13 (2.64)
Note:
Taken from regression results with occupation and industry variables included. (See 
Table 3.7). Size coefficients are not sensitive to the exclusion of these variables.
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An important finding for previous research is that when company size is 
controlled for, workplace size coefficients are up to 5 percentage points lower and not 
significant for all but the largest workplaces. Given the same company size, only the 
largest workplaces pay more than the smallest, with an average wage gain of 10 per 
cent. Previous Australian estimates of workplace size wage differentials are thus likely 
to be partially reflecting the influence of company size on wages. In addition, the 
finding that both workplace and company size have significant impacts on wages 
suggests that the interpretation of previous results as an effect of "firm" size is not 
correct.
The company size wage differentials in column two are jointly significant. The 
estimates suggest a non-linear pattern in the company size wage relationship. Compared 
to the smallest companies, wages are higher by 12 to 13 per cent where there are 
between 50 and 500 employees. This wage differential increases to 21 per cent for 
companies in the 501 to 1000 range. This is the only size category which has a wage 
differential significantly higher than the 8.5 per cent in the 21 to 50 category 
(F(l,604)=4.71) suggesting that this size group may be the highest paying. In the largest 
companies (1001+) the wage differential falls to 18 per cent but is not significantly 
different to the other company size coefficients.
However, when workplace size is also included, it is not possible to reject the 
hypothesis that all company size coefficients are equal. On average, all companies with 
more than 20 employees Australia wide pay wages between 10 and 19 per cent higher 
than the smallest companies. It appears that Company size wage differentials are only 
significant because very small companies pay low wages not because very large 
companies pay high wages.
3.5.2 Are the wage effects of workplace size and company size independent?
The above results are assuming that the relationships between wages and each 
measure of size are independent but this may not be the case. The results could be
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driven by correlation between workplace and company size and to control in part for 
this, workplace and company size interaction terms are included in the equation instead 
of separate size variables. The estimates, in Table 3.10, show wage differentials 
associated with each combined size group compared to small businesses with up to 20 
employees.
Two new results emerge from the estimation of interaction terms. First, 
variation in wages by workplace size is only evident among companies with more than 
500 employees. For companies in the 501 to 2500 range there is a significant difference 
between the 13.95 per cent wage premium in workplaces with between 21 and 100 
employees and the 29.98 wage premium for the largest workplaces, (Fj=4.00). For 
companies with more than 2500 employees it is possible to reject the hypothesis that 
coefficients on workplace size are the same (F3=3.69). The point estimates suggest that 
the wage differential, compared to small businesses, increases by 15.9 percentage points 
between the smallest and the largest workplaces.
Table 3.10
Percentage Wage Differentials for Interaction Terms
(t-ratios in parentheses)
Workplace Size
Company size 1-20 21-100 101-500 500+
1-20 .0 0 0 0
n, c 1 5 9 , 59
21-100 1 3 .45 9 .9 6
( 2 .0 5 ) ( 1 .8 1 )
n, c 3 2 , 32 6 2 , 6 2
101-500 1 7 .94 1 1 .9 3 1 2 .4 8
( 2 .4 7 ) ( 1 .9 8 ) ( 2 .0 5 )
n, c 2 6 , 24 4 5 ,4 5 4 8 , 4 4
501-2500 14 .4 3 1 3 .9 5 2 3 .9 5 2 9 .9 8
( 1.8 6 ) ( 1 .9 8 ) ( 3 .7 4 ) ( 4 .5 2 )
n, c 2 1 , 21 3 0 , 25 4 7 ,4 3 4 9 , 4 6
2500+ 8 .41 1 2 .7 6 1 3 .8 2 2 4 .3 1
( 1.2 6 ) ( 2 .0 2 ) ( 2 .2 8 ) (4 . 18 )
n, c 3 2 , 22 4 4 , 30 5 2 , 34 9 5 ,4 1
Notes:
1. n = number of workers (observations), c = number of companies. The number of 
companies does not add to the total shown in Table 3.2 since some large companies appear 
in more than one cell.
67
Second, wages are fairly low in the large company small workplace group. 
Although the estimate suggests that wages are 8 per cent higher than in small 
businesses, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero.
Another point to note is that estimates of the effect of company size concur 
with the inferences drawn from the previous results in Table 3.9 without interaction 
terms. There is no significant variation among coefficients within each column, which 
again suggests that only the smallest companies pay wages significantly lower than all 
other companies.
Where the workplace and the company are in the same size category, wages 
increase monotonically with size with significant variation in these coefficients 
(F2=6.29). However, for categories up to 500 the increase is associated with company 
size since the larger workplaces pay no more on average than small workplaces in this 
company size group. For companies and workplaces in the 500 plus size group, the 
higher wage is associated with both measures of size.
For companies with between 21 and 500 employees, wages are higher by 10 to 
18 per cent and this is related solely to company size. However, in larger companies, 
there are significant increases by workplace size with wages being up to 30 per cent 
higher in large workplaces than in small businesses.
3.5.3 Summary of Results
In summary, when workplace size is considered by itself, the pattern of wage 
differentials is consistent with previous Australian and overseas evidence. However, 
controlling for company size suggests:
(i) Company size wage effects show a non-linear pattern where all companies with more 
than 20 employees Australia wide show a similar wage premium compared to very 
small companies;
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(ii) The positive relationship between workplace size and wages is only evident among 
large companies.
(iii) It is not possible to say that wages in the smallest workplaces of the largest 
companies, are systematically higher than in small businesses.
The above results mean for Australian research that where only measures of 
workplace size are available, the results cannot be interpreted as exclusively reflecting 
characteristics of the workplace.
Employment in small workplaces which are part of large companies tends to 
pay wages lower than all other companies except very small companies.
If workplace size is associated with explanations such as working conditions 
and monitoring costs, there only appears to be significant variation among workplaces 
which are part of large companies.
The pattern of company size wage differentials is not consistent with the 
proposition that this measure of size is exclusively picking up variation in rent sharing if 
the largest companies have the greatest ability-to-pay and their employees have more 
bargaining power. However, the results could be interpreted as indicating that more 
bargaining occurs at the workplace level as company size increases. It may be that a 
significant proportion of the largest workplaces operate as semi-autonomous 
management units.
The pattern of company size wage differentials differs from previous U.S. 
evidence, an issue to be discussed in section 3.7. It is possible that the result is specific 
to the IMA data due to selection bias in the sample.
If the excluded observations (which are concentrated in small workplaces and 
have a lower average wage) were employed in medium sized companies, the pattern of 
company size effects could look quite different with these included.12 However, there is
12 A means of partially assessing this possibility is to estimate Size coefficients using the total sample 
with a dummy variable included to indicate nonrespondents. This exercise shows the same non linear 
pattern of company size coefficients and the same pattern of size interaction coefficients. It also shows 
that wages for the company size nonrespondents are very close to wages for in the smallest workplaces 
and companies. See Appendix 3B.
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some evidence from the Australian Workplace Industrial Relations survey (AWIRS) that 
the results are not specific to the IMA data.
3.6 Size Wage Effects in the AWIRS Data
A second data source which distinguishes between workplace and company 
size is the 1989-1990 Australian Workplace Industrial Relations survey (AWIRS). The 
AWIRS data is limited by a lack of information on individual characteristics of workers 
and the exclusion of workplaces with fewer than 20 employees. However, measures of 
both workplace and company size are available and can be used to compare the overall 
pattern of the size wage relationship.
For this comparison, the independent variables used and the sample are 
restricted to those which are available in both the AWIRS and IMA data. Definitions of 
variables and samples, and a comparison of wage equations, are contained in Appendix 
3C. The categories used for company size are as recorded in the AWIRS data.
Size wage differentials estimated from each data set are reported as percentages 
in Table 3.11. There are several points to note. First, when workplace size is included by 
itself the pattern of wage differentials is the same in both data sets and point estimates 
for the largest workplaces are very close (15.95 per cent and 14.72 per cent).
Second, results with the IMA data vary from those reported earlier in Table 3.9 
in that the wage effect of workplace size is larger in magnitude than any company size 
effects. This appears to be due to the smallest company size category being <100.13 
When this is disaggregated in the IMA data, it is only companies smaller than 21 that 
have systematically lower wages than other company size groups. The implication is 
that AWIRS will bias upwards workplace size effects relative to company size effects.
Third, when company size is included by itself, there are significant 
differentials from the AWIRS data but not the IMA data. The higher company size
13 These have been re-estimated with the less than 100 company size category disaggregated into three: 
for single plant companies, company size is set to correspond to workplace size (<50 and 50 - 99); and a 
"don't know" category for multi plant companies smaller than 100. The result is not different.
70
effects in AWIRS are not likely to be due to the exclusion of the smallest workplaces 
from the sample since the same exclusion in the IMA sample reduces company size 
coefficients compared to those reported previously in Table 3.9. It is also difficult to 
argue that this is the result of not controlling for individual characteristics of workers 
since company size effects from the IMA data are not sensitive to controlling for these 
characteristics, (see Appendix 3B). If size of the company is more relevant for the wages 
of managers than other occupations the higher company size effects in AWIRS may be 
explained by the data having a higher proportion of observations for managers, (17 per 
cent compared to 5 per cent in IMA).
Table 3.11
Percentage Wage Differentials by Size in AWIRS and IMA
AWIRS IMA
(n=4650) (n=472)
WS:
51-100 5.03* 4.43* 0.22 0.77
101-500 11.08* 8.71* 4.50 4.57
500+ 15.95* 12.30* 14.72* 14.26*
CS:
100-499 6.83* 3.26** -1.41 -3.86
500-999 12.67* 7.45* 9.20 2.57
1000-4999 12.39* 7.33* 5.65 -1.94
5000-9999 10.13* 5.08* 9.71 1.70
10000-19999 9.74* 5.63* 8.27 -1.46
20000+ 4.22** -0.28 0.73 -6.04
, indicate significance at 1 and 5 per cent respectively.
1. The AWIRS survey excludes workplaces with fewer than 20 employees and the IMA sample is 
restricted to the same.
2. AWIRS control variables included for proportion of females, teenagers, over 50 years, NESB, New
employees, Tenure>10 years, and union membership, as well as hours, industry, and occupation. 
Variables for these characteristics are used for the IMA estimates. See appendix 3C for definitions, and a 
comparison of the full regression results.__________________________________________________________
Some similarity between the two data sources is also seen in estimates of size 
interaction terms. It is clear from Table 3.12 that wages are low in large company small 
workplace groups.
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Table 3.12
% Wage differentials in combined workplace company size groups (AWIRS)
Workplace Size
Company size 21-50 51-100 101-500
<100 .0000 8.08
(4 .67)
n 573 397
100-499 7.15 9.10 13.56
(3 .07) (5.05) (8.20)
n 163 366 605
500-999 17.45 13.00 18.42 18.86
(5 .10) (4.15) (9.16) (6.78)
n 74 87 313 132
1000-4999 8.83 10.20 18.67 24.38
(3 .36) (4.03) (9.53) (10 .52)
n 123 142 366 255
5000-9999 7.90 6.83 16.05 21.17
(2 .18) (1.55) (6.21) (7 .46)
n 59 37 156 132
10000+ 1.11 9.26 12.81 16.04
(0 .34) (3.46) (5.83) (5 .66)
n 73 130 340 127
n = number of observations.
Although there are differences in the relative importance of company and 
workplace size, the non-monotonic pattern of company size effects is common to two 
data sets. There are no previous Australian estimates of company size wage effects to 
compare these results with. However, evidence from U.S. studies differs somewhat, and 
the next section attempts to reconcile the differences.
3.7. Are Australian Companies Different?
The finding that workplace size effects are only significant within larger 
companies is consistent with U.S. results (Evans and Leighton 1989, Pearce 1990, and 
Oi 1991). But, the result that wages do not increase with company size above the 
threshold of 20 employees is not. Table 3.12 summarises results from several U.S. 
studies.
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The results show that, in all studies, wages are highest in the largest companies. 
This result is common to three data sets for the years 1974, 1979, and 1980 (Mellow 
1983, Brown and Medoff 1989, Kruse 1992)
Table 3.13
Studies With Company and Workplace Size1
Percentage Wage Differential compared to small workplaces and companies: 
Mellow (1983) Evans & Leighton (1989)2
1979 Current Popn. Survey (CPS) 1983 CPS 1981 National Longitudinal
(All wage earners) (Males 18-65 Years) Survey (Males 29-39 Years)
W ork p lace S ize:(W S)
WS25-99 1.5 3.8 -4.4
W S100-499 3.6 8.8 4.4
WS500-999 7.0 12.8 5.6
WS1000+ 10.7 18.1 19.8
C om p any S ize:(C S)
CS25-99 0.7 10.8 23.9
CS100-499 4.3 11.8 17.0
CS500-999 4.9 7.1 19.2
CS1000+ 8.2 19.7 25.8
Continuous variables (elasticities): WS CS
Brown & 
Medoff
1979 CPS: (All wage earners) .015 .013
(1989) 1974 Survey of Employer Expenditures .014 .005
Kruse (1992) 1980 Survey of Job Characteristics .031 .014
Notes:
1. All studies controlled for human capital endowments, other worker characteristics, 
occupation, and industry except Evans and Leighton who did not include controls for 
occupation or industry
2. Evans and Leighton's results are for full time white males only.
More recent data sets, from 1981 and 1983 are used by Evans and Leighton 
(1989) who find a U - shaped pattern of company size effects with higher wages in both 
the smallest and largest companies. However, wages were still higher in the largest 
companies than in all other companies. Unlike other studies, the sample was restricted 
to full time white males only and occupation and industry were not controlled for. But 
size coefficients from the IMA data are not sensitive to controlling for occupation and 
industry.
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The different results for company size in the IMA data, might arise from 
characteristics of the data and samples used. Most U.S. data have company size reported 
by workers rather than employers which may imply greater measurement error. 
However, it is difficult to argue that worker reported data would bias company size 
effects downward in U.S. results. The one U.S. data set which did have employer 
reported company size showed the lowest company size coefficients (Brown and 
Medoff pi 051).
Disparity in sample coverage is not likely to explain the differences since U.S. 
studies have used different samples and all show the highest wages in the largest 
companies.
There are many differences between Australia in 1988 and the United States in 
1979, 1980, or 1983 which might explain the results. For example, estimates of the 
wage effects of both company and workplace size vary by industry,14 hence the 
distribution of employment by industry will affect results. A direct comparison of 
industry distributions is not possible because of variation in definitions and categories, 
however, the OECD (1992) report that in both 1979 and 1988 the proportion of 
employees in service industries is greater in the U.S., (33 and 35 per cent compared to 
26 and 29 percent in Australia). The OECD also reports that the proportion in 
manufacturing industries is the same between the two countries. However, in the sample 
used here employees in manufacturing industries are overrepresented compared to the 
Australian population. Light manufacturing, community service, and recreation and 
personal service industries are shown to have the highest wage differentials between 
small and large companies in the next chapter and variation in industry distribution is 
likely to change the aggregate size wage relationship.
The distribution of employment across different sized workplaces and 
companies also differs between the sample used here and U.S. data sets. For example, in 
the IMA sample (including part time employees), 76 per cent of observations are in 
companies with at least 100 employees compared to 58 per cent in the 1979 CPS data 
and 55 per cent in the 1983 CPS data. The Australian Bureau of Statistics estimate that
14 Bailey and Schwenk A.E. (1980) and Mellow (1983) provide U.S. evidence of variation in size 
coefficients by industry and it is also shown in the next chapter.
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45 per cent of employment is in companies with more than 100 employees. This 
suggests that many of the company size nonrespondents, excluded from the sample here, 
would be in companies with fewer than 100 employees. Small companies are also 
underrepresented in the AWIRS data, a likely result of not collecting wage information 
from workplaces with fewer than 20 employees. 79 per cent of the AWIRS observations 
(and 76 per cent of workplaces) are in companies larger than 100.
But why the undersampling of small companies would change the pattern of 
company size effects to one where only the smallest companies are different is not 
obvious. The fact that this pattern shows up in two very different data sets, measured at 
the workplace and the individual level, is strong support for the proposition that the 
company size wage relationship in Australia is different to that in the United Stated.
3.8 Conclusion
This chapter has brought to light new information about the size wage 
relationship in Australia. Although the conventional practice of constraining other 
coefficients to be the same across different sized employers has been followed and the 
sample shows some downward bias in estimates of size wage differentials, some 
implications for the Australian literature emerge from the results.
The analysis has shown little effect on estimates of other coefficients when 
employer size is included in wage equations. Although there is some reduction in 
estimates of returns to university qualifications, tenure, and union membership, these 
effects are statistically insignificant with the sample and restricted functional form used 
in this chapter. Furthermore, other coefficients, such as the gender wage differential, 
show no change at all.
It would be easy to infer from this that current estimates of the wage structure 
are not compromised by not controlling for workplace size and/or company size. 
However, the next chapter, using a less restrictive functional form, will show that it is 
not appropriate to conclude that ignoring size will not affect results. Important variation 
will be shown across different sized employers in estimates of returns to general labour
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market experience and tenure, the gender wage differential, and industry wage 
differentials.
The incorporation of company size into the analysis has shown that both size of 
the workplace and size of the company significantly affect wages. Using only one or 
other measure of size will reflect the combined influence of the company and the 
workplace. For companies with between 21 and 500 employees, wages are higher by 10 
to 18 per cent and this is related solely to company size. However, in larger companies, 
there are significant increases by workplace size with wages being up to 30 per cent 
higher in these large workplaces than in small businesses.
If workplace size is associated with explanations such as working conditions 
and monitoring costs, there only appears to be significant variation among workplaces 
which are part of large companies.
It is perhaps surprising that the company size wage relationship differs from 
previous overseas evidence whereas the workplace size wage relationship is similar. The 
difference is likely to be a result of different time periods considered in U.S. studies and 
different industry and size distributions between the two countries. However, if 
company size effects are exclusively interpreted as reflecting rent sharing, the difference 
may be tentatively interpreted as an effect of different wage setting institutions. The 
institutional system in Australia may compress company size wage differentials 
associated with rent sharing. The result is then consistent with the proposition that very 
small companies are influenced by the institutional environment to a lesser degree and 
the possibility of under-award wages in very small companies.
However, the pattern of company size wage differentials is not consistent with 
the proposition that this measure of size is exclusively picking up variation in rent 
sharing. If the largest companies have the greatest ability-to-pay and their employees 
have more bargaining power you would expect the highest wages. However, the results 
could be interpreted as indicating that more bargaining occurs at the workplace level as 
company size increases. It may be that a significant proportion of the largest workplaces 
operate as semi-autonomous management units.
76
The interpretation of company size wage effects depends on whether they can 
be associated with rent sharing exclusively, i.e. whether some bargaining occurs at the 
workplace level. Chapter 6 will consider this issue by looking at the influence of product 
market conditions on the size wage relationship.
A further result of interest is that wages are on average fairly low for workers 
employed in small workplaces which are part of large companies. This may be simply 
due to different worker characteristics or the industry. This result will be considered 
further in the next chapter where a less restrictive functional form is used and separate 
coefficients are estimated for the large company/small workplace group.
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Chapter 4
Variation in the Wage Structure by Workplace and Company Size:
A Three Sector Model
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the methodology is extended to allow the wage structure to vary 
with employer size. This empirical exercise raises issues of importance for both the 
Australian literature on wage determination, and for any interpretation of the role that 
employer size plays in wage determination.
To take into account separate effects of workplace size and company size, the 
sample is disaggregated into three sectors: a Small Business sector where both the 
workplace and the company are small; an Extensive sector where workplaces are small 
but companies are large; and an Intensive sector where both the workplace and the 
company are large.
This represents an additional level of disaggregation from any analysis in the 
current literature. Variation in the wage structure by either workplace or company size 
has been examined with overseas data, but the large company small workplace sector 
has not been studied separately. An advantage of this further disaggregation is that the 
separate influences of workplace and company size can be explored. Pairwise 
comparisons across sectors show the change in coefficients associated with an increase 
in company size (holding workplace size constant) and associated with an increase in 
workplace size (holding company size constant). In addition, examining the wage 
structure and worker characteristics in the Extensive sector can offer some insight into 
the source of the low wage intercept for this group seen in the previous chapter.
Several new results are of interest to Australian researchers. In contrast to the 
results in Chapter 3, it is found that employer size has a significant influence on other 
coefficients. Some aspects of the wage structure vary noticeably with employer size: the 
estimated gender wage gap in small companies is apparently double that in large
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companies; industry wage differentials are only evident among small companies; and 
wage differentials for marital status or urban residence are only evident among small 
workplaces. The results also show that workers with typical characteristics of low 
earners are disadvantaged to a greater degree in small businesses compared to their 
counterparts in larger companies or workplaces. In addition, differences in returns to 
tenure and experience between sectors are consistent with the notion that retention of 
workers with the same employer is more important for wage outcomes in large 
workplaces. Efforts to explain persistent wage differentials will benefit by considering 
these variations by employer size in future work.
The Australian literature on individual wage determination has, to date, 
assumed that the wage structure is the same across different sized employers. However, 
the theoretical literature and recent empirical results provide strong resons to expect the 
wage structure to vary. These are reviewed in the next section. Section 4.3 describes 
characteristics of the data by sector. Regression results are then presented in section 4.4 
with a discussion of implications for the current Australian literature on wage 
determination. Section 4.55 then considers the implications for our understanding of the 
role of employer size in wage determination.
4.2 Employer Size and the Wage Structure
Reasons to expect the wage structure to vary with size come from both the 
theoretical literature concerning life-cycle wage profiles, and from recent empirical 
evidence. The literature provides several reasons to expect greater returns to tenure in 
larger firms. Oi (1991) focuses on firm specific training, arguing that expected returns to 
investment increase with firm size as a result of larger firms having a longer life 
expectancy. Similar predictions for wage tenure profiles come from a variant of 
efficiency wage models, where monitoring costs are argued to be higher in large firms 
and deferred compensation is used to deter shirking, (see Bulow and Summers 1986, 
and Lazear 1981).'
1 An alternative interpretation of upward sloping tenure wage profiles comes from job matching models 
where wages increase with time on the job, apart from any productivity increases, if better job matches 
survive longer, (Mincer and Jovanovic 1981, Topel 1991). If larger workplaces or companies produce
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In addition, a firm's reputation in the labour market will also influence the slope 
of tenure wage profiles. Where the firm's offer of higher future earnings is more 
credible, workers will be more willing to defer compensation, given some probability of 
layoff. This includes workers undertaking a larger share in financing firm specific 
investments in the form of lower initial wages. If reputation effects are greater for large 
firms, for example if information on these firms is more readily available, (Parsons 1986 
p801), then tenure wage profiles will be steeper given the same training levels or 
monitoring costs.
The relative contribution of each of these factors is difficult to isolate 
empirically. However, suggestions in the literature that workplace size and company 
size influence wages for different reasons offer a novel, although limited, means of 
distinguishing between some explanations. Several authors have argued that monitoring 
costs are more likely to increase with workplace size, assuming that monitoring of 
workers (other than workplace managers) is carried out within the workplace (Brown 
and Medoff 1989, Morissette 1993). If tenure wage profiles are steeper in larger 
workplaces (given the same company size) but not steeper in larger companies (given 
the same workplace size) this is consistent with monitoring difficulties underlying the 
variation in slopes.
On the other hand specific training investments may vary with either measures 
of size. If the level of investment and the sharing arrangement is dependent on the life 
expectancy of the firm, suggestions that product market power and profitability vary 
with company size rather than workplace size, (Morissette 1993, Hodson 1983), would 
imply that slopes vary with company size rather than workplace size. However, given 
some product diversity within companies, and across workplaces, the amount of specific 
training may increase with workplace size. The life expectancy of workplaces may be 
independent of company size to the extent that their distinct product market conditions 
are important hence the slope of wage profiles can be expected to vary with either 
measure of size.
better quality matches the profiles will be steeper. There is no established theory on why this would be the 
case, however, it is possible that large companies are more efficient at recruitment.
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Further, if the reputation of employers is attached to the company rather than 
particular workplaces, and the credibility of deferred compensation offers increases with 
company size, monitoring costs may motivate steeper wage profiles in larger companies 
given the same workplace size.
There is also reason to expect that demographic characteristics will be less 
important for wage outcomes due to the institutional environment within large 
companies and workplaces. For example, if larger firms tend to have internal labour 
market structures with wages attached to jobs rather than workers, (Wächter and Wright 
1990), and if work group morale is more important for productivity than individual 
performance (Akerlof 1986). Also if large companies are more concerned with 
reputation in the labour market and are more subject to scrutiny from unions this could 
compress wage differentials across demographic characteristics.
Returns to education may also be higher in large firms if this variable acts as a 
proxy for specific investments, for example where firms are more willing to undertake 
investments when workers have demonstrated a capacity to be trained (Mincer and 
Jovanovic 1981). Also, Garen (1985) argues that returns to education will be higher in 
large firms where education acts as a signal of ability, valued more by large firms which 
face a greater cost of evaluating individual productivity.
As well as internal structures, the institutional environment external to large 
companies may contribute to lower wage differentials by demographic characteristics in 
large companies. Recent empirical evidence suggests that wage differentials by gender 
and union membership may be lower in large workplaces and/or companies. Overseas 
studies have shown that females and non-union workers gain a larger wage premium 
from employment in large workplaces or companies than males, or union members, (See 
Green et al 1992, Mellow 1982). In addition, Miller (1993) compares the wage structure 
of males and females with Australian data for the years 1973 and 1989. With 1973 data, 
there are significant wage gains with workplace size for males but not for females. In 
contrast, significant wage gains with workplace size are found for both males and 
females using 1989 data. It is suggested that this "...may indicate that the degree of 
implementation of comparative worth has been greater in large firms than in small 
firms." (plO). This is perhaps not surprising given the legislative environment where for
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example affirmative action legislation only applies to companies with more than 100 
employees.
There is evidence from overseas studies that some aspects of the wage structure 
vary with workplace and/or company size. Two studies have used data from the 1979 
United States Current Population Survey. Mellow (1983) disaggregates the sample by 
company size and finds variation in returns to tenure, education, and union membership. 
The marginal return to tenure is higher in large companies. Returns to education are also 
found to be higher in large companies although only "moderately". The estimated 
union/non-union wage gap also varies, being lower in large companies. Idson and 
Feastor (1990), with the same data, report similar results after adjusting estimates for 
selection bias on unobserved worker characteristics.
There is also evidence of variation by workplace size from the United 
Kingdom. Main and Reilly (1993) use 1986 "Social Change and Economic Life 
Initiative" survey data and estimate the wage structure for small (1-99), medium (100- 
499), and large (500+) workplaces, correcting for selection bias. Contrary to the U.S. 
evidence, which refers to company size, the return to education is found to decrease 
with workplace size. A proxy for on-the-job training is included, (a dummy variable 
indicating that the job took at least six months to learn), which is found to be associated 
with a 12 per cent wage premium in large workplaces, but no significant wage effect in 
smaller workplaces. Estimates of regional, and industry wage differentials are also 
reported. Regional wage variation is significant among small workplaces but not for 
medium or large which is interpreted as suggesting that "small firms [workplaces] may 
be more sensitive to local labour market conditions..." (Main and Reilly 1993 p i33). A 
similar result is that industry wage differentials are only significant individually or 
jointly for small workplaces.
These studies have disaggregated by only one measure of size. A limitation of 
this approach is that controlling for only one measure of size is likely to capture effects 
of the other measure given some correlation between them. This is controlled for in this 
chapter by further disaggregating the small workplace sample into the Small Business 
(small company) and Extensive (large company) sectors.
4.3 Empirical Method and Sample Characteristics by Sector
To allow the wage structure to vary by size the sample is disaggregated, and the 
wage equation estimated separately for the Small Business, Extensive, and Intensive 
sectors as follows:
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ln (wage)si = Xsißs + esi
Where, the subscript s refers to the sector, b is a vector of coefficients to be estimated, 
and £j is an error term.
An advantage of this disaggregation by sector is that the separate influences of 
workplace and company size can be explored. Pairwise comparisons across sectors 
show the change in coefficients associated with an increase in company size (holding 
workplace size constant) and associated with an increase in workplace size (holding 
company size constant).
The three sectors to be examined are delineated using a cut off point of 100 
employees between small and large workplaces and companies. It is not obvious that 
firms with up to 100 employees should all be considered "small", particularly for 
workplaces. Given sample size constraints, it is not feasible here to use cut off points 
lower than 100. But this definition of small businesses is consistent with recent studies 
examining small business issues in Australia which define small businesses as 
companies with up to 100 employees (see Bureau of Industry Economics 1992).2
Due to small sample sizes in each sector, some independent variables are 
changed from those used in Chapter 3. The number of workers with post school 
qualifications is not sufficient to allow reliable estimates. Instead, a continuous variable 
for total years of education is used for Australian born workers (educa), interacted with
2 The Australian Bureau of Statistics defines small businesses as companies having up to 100 employees 
for manufacturing industries and up to 20 employees in non-manufacturing industries. Results are not 
different when these cut off points are used.
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immigrant status to allow different returns for immigrants years of education within 
Australia (educma), and immigrants education overseas (educmos) . 3
Some occupation and industry categories are merged. Managerial, professional, 
and para-professional occupations are merged into one white collar occupation group 
(Wcollar). The wholesale and Retail industries are merged into one category (Whol/Ret) 
and Community Service and Recreation and Personal service industries are merged 
(Service).
Summary statistics are presented in Table 4.1 for each sector and for the total 
sample pooled across sectors. Comparing characteristics across samples shows the 
lowest average wage in the Extensive (Exten) sector with the lowest variation. The 
highest average wage is in the Intensive (Inten) sector. The greatest variation in weekly 
wages is in small businesses. But these differences are small.
The most noticeable difference between sectors is in union membership which 
covers 24 per cent (Smallb), 49 per cent (Exten), and 64 per cent (Inten) of workers. 
Also, the average years of experience and tenure increase with both company and 
workplace size, average experience being 3 years higher in the Intensive sector 
compared to small businesses and average tenure being 2.5 years higher.
Other characteristics vary somewhat. The Extensive sector has the highest 
representation of females, as well as more observations in clerical and sales occupations 
and fewer in white collar and trades occupations. There is also a higher concentration of 
observations in finance and service industries. The Intensive sector has more labourers 
and the highest concentration of observations in manufacturing industries and the lowest 
in finance.
Sample size constraints restrict the ability to estimate separate coefficients for 
immigrants within each of the three sectors, apart from the education interaction 
variables. Given previous evidence that coefficients on experience, and union 
membership tend to be lower for NESB immigrants than for the population,4 this over-
3 These are constructed as years of primary and secondary education (age left school - 5) plus years for 
post school qualifications of 6 years (higher degree), 3 years (bachelors degree), 2 years 
(diploma/certificate/trade), and 1 year (other).
4 This is shown in Kidd (1993), Chapman and Iredale (1993).
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representation implies a downward bias in these coefficients. However, there is no 
reason to expect this bias to be systematically different between the three sectors 
examined.
Table 4.1
Statistical Characteristics of the Data
(means, standard deviations in parentheses for continuous variables)
Sector: Small Business Extensive Intensive Pooled
C S < = 1 0 0 ,W S < = 1 0 0 C S > 1 0 0 ,W S < = 1 0 0 C S > 1 0 0 ,W S > 1 0 0
n: 153 198 291 642
Weekly Wage 446.96(209.19) 432.93(174.52) 462.65(197.52) 449.74(193.78)
C o e f f ic ie n t  o f  
V a r ia tio n  (p e r  c e n t) 46.8 40.3 42.7 43.1
Hours 45.71 (10.4) 44.08 (7.8) 43.19 (8.3) 44.06 (8.8)
Human Capital Variables (y e a rs )
Educa 12.62 (2.2) 12.15 (2.2) 12.74 (2.3) 12.52 (2.2)
Educma 2.80 (4.8) 2.40 (4.2) 1.76 (3.8) 2.17 (4.2)
Educmos 10.57 (5.4) 11.30 (4 .9 ) 11.03 (4.9) 11.02 (5.0)
Exp 13.77 (10.6) 15.15 (11.2) 16.81 (11.1) 15.57 (11.05)
Tenure 3.67 (5.3) 4.74 (6.2) 6.26 (7 .5 ) 5.17 (6.69)
Other Characteristics: ( p e r c e n t )
Female 19.6 28.3 25.8 25.1
Married 59.5 62.1 69.8 65.0
Immig 49.0 59.1 62.2 58.1
Union 23.5 49.0 63.9 49.7
Lurban 84.3 85.9 79.4 82.6
Occupation: ( p e r c e n t )  
WCollar 25.5 19.2 20.6 21.3
Trad 27.5 17.7 21.3 21.7
Cler 11.1 17.2 11.7 13.2
Sale 10.5 13.1 6.2 9.4
Oper 9.8 14.1 14.8 13.4
Labo 15.7 18.7 25.4 21.0
Industry: (D e rc e n t)  
Other 16.3 11.1 9.6 11.7
Man:L 17.0 14.1 23.4 19.0
Man:H 24.8 24.2 40.5 31.8
Whol/Ret 24.2 23.2 11.3 18.1
Finance 11.1 18.7 7.6 11.8
Service 6.5 8.6 7.6 7.6
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A second sampling issue arises from the exclusion of 542 observations which 
do not have a measure of company size. The under-representation of small workplaces 
and companies does not in itself create a problem. However, where workers at the lower 
end of the wage distribution are excluded from the Small Business sample (but not from 
other sectors), this may bias comparisons between sectors in the event that coefficients 
are different for the sample of excluded observations. However, only the union 
coefficient appears to be affected by this.5 Nevertheless, some caution should be 
exercised in generalising the results presented here, particularly those relating to the 
union coefficient.
Keeping in mind that the average wage in the Small Business sector is likely to 
be overstated in this sample, it is instructive at this point to compare raw average 
differences to differences estimated from the usual practise of including dummy 
variables in a wage equation, in this case for the sector of employment. Table 4.2 makes 
this comparison for percentage wage differentials between sectors.
Table 4.2
Percentage Wage Differentials by Sector
Raw D ifferentials Estim ated D ifferentia lsa
Controlling for:
Weekly Hourly Hours All independent
Wage Wage only variables^5
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Conmared to Smallb: 
Extensive -3.1 1.1 4.0 6.9*
Intensive 3.5 9.7 10.4* 13.7*
Compared to Exten: 
Intensive 6.9 8.9 7.7* 6.4*
Notes:
a Estimated shift in the wage intercept between sectors calculated from a regression of
ln(wage) on dummy variablesTor the sector of employment, 
b Including human capital variables (educa, educma, educmos, exp, exp2, tenure,
tenure2) and other characteristics (female, married, immigrant, union, lurban). 
c * indicates significant difference at 5 percent level.____________________________________________
The union coefficient varies in the opposite direction between small and large workplaces when 
nonrespondents on company size are included in the sample.
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It is immediately apparent that the raw average wage differentials between 
sectors are not statistically significant. In the Intensive sector Hourly wages are around 9 
per cent higher than either of the other sectors but the lack of statistical significance 
suggests large variances.
A lower average weekly wage in the Extensive sector is contrary to the 
expectation of lower wages in small businesses, however this does not take into account 
variation in worker characteristics between sectors. The estimated differentials (from a 
regression of ln(wage) on only hours and sector dummies) suggests that, on average, 
wages are significantly higher in the Intensive sector. Further, when worker endowments 
are included in the regression, all differentials between sectors are significant. Column 
(iv) shows that, compared to small businesses, wages are significantly higher by 6.9 and 
13.7 per cent in the Extensive and Intensive sectors respectively. Wages in the Intensive 
sector are also 6.4 per cent higher than in the Extensive sector, on average.
Wage differentials between sectors are higher after controlling for hours and 
higher again after controlling for worker characteristics. Size wage differentials between 
observationally similar workers are higher than between the average wage in each sector 
suggesting that workers with higher observed earnings capacity tend to be in small 
businesses. However, the result may be specific to this sample. In addition, these 
estimates, controlling for endowments, follow the usual practice of assuming that the 
wage structure is the same across different sized workplaces and companies, a 
restriction which is tested in the next section.
4.4 Regression Results
Variation in coefficients across sectors is described in this section, firstly from 
estimates of basic equations including human capital variables and other worker 
characteristics, then with occupation and industry variables added to the equations. The 
focus is on assessing implications for current estimates of the wage structure which have 
ignored such variation, and these are summarised in section 4.4.3. A discussion of what 
the results imply for interpretation of the role that employer size plays in wage 
determination is left until section 4.5.
4.4.1 Basic Equation
Table 4.3 presents regression results for each of the three sectors as well as for 
the sample pooled across sectors. The excluded categories are male, single, unqualified, 
Australian born, and non union members. Hence, the constant represents the predicted 
base In (wage) for this reference group, with no human capital endowments.
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Table 4.3
Regression Results
(t-ratios in parentheses)
Estimates for Three Sectors 
Small Businesss Extensive Intensive
CS<=100 CS>100 CS>100
WS<=100
(1)
WS<=100
(2)
WS>100
(3)
Dummies
(4) (5)
Educa .0603 ( 2 .7 1 ) .064 ( 5 .7 1 ) .0629 ( 4 .38 ) .0643 ( 6 .7 0 ) .0672 ( 6 . 86 )
Educma -.0273 ( 1 .05 ) -.0429 ( 2 .59 ) -.0276 ( 1.7 8 ) -.0334 ( 3 .0 8 ) -.0371 ( 3 . 36 )
Educmos .0214 ( 1.5 6 ) .0125 ( 1 . 19) .0226 ( 3 .52 ) .0196 ( 3 . 85 ) .0192 ( 3 . 80 )
exp .0478 ( 6 .4 9 ) .0252 ( 3 .6 8 ) .0139 ( 2 . 12) .0256 ( 5 . 85 ) .0257 ( 5 .63 )
exp2 -.000999 ( 6 .5 8 ) -.000476 ( 3 .4 1 ) -.000179 ( 1.26 ) -.000451 ( 4 .7 1 ) -.000455 ( 4 .55 )
tenure .0153 ( 1.3 5 ) -.000439 ( 0 .0 4 ) .0202 ( 2 .9 8 ) .0129 ( 2 .6 3 ) .0143 ( 2 .88 )
tenure2 -.000881 ( 1.6 4 ) .000604 ( 1.4 0 ) -.000603 ( 2 .7 4 ) -.000334 ( 1.9 2 ) -.000350 ( 1 9 4 )
female -.245 ( 4 . 12) -.122 ( 2 . 86 ) -.154 ( 3 .4 3 ) -.159 ( 5 .6 7 ) -.149 ( 5 .22 )
married .110 ( 1.7 6 ) .111 ( 2 .4 3 ) .0464 ( 1.0 .3 ) .0880 ( 2 .9 6 ) .0921 ( 2 .99 )
immig .346 ( 1.0 8 ) .517 ( 2 .6 9 ) .354 ( 1. 86 ) .420 ( 3 . 24 ) .473 ( 3 .6 1 )
union -.162 ( 2 .6 9 ) -.192 ( 5 .0 3 ) -.134 ( 3 . 17) -.150 ( 5 .6 7 ) -.120 ( 4 .7 3 )
hours .0138 ( 6 .4 2 ) .0117 ( 4 .4 5 ) .0130 ( 5 .7 2 ) .0134 ( 9 .7 9 ) .0129 ( 9 .21 )
Lurban .113 ( 1.6 9 ) .190 ( 3 .23 ) .0164 ( 0 .3 2 ) .0910 ( 2 .7 1 ) .0815 ( 2 .35 )
Exten .0663 ( 1.9 8 )
Inten .128 ( 3 .75 )
const 4.211 ( 13 .0 3 ) 4.395 ( 2 1 .9 9 ) 4.627 ( 19.9 )) 4.315 ( 2 8 .75 ) 4.356 ( 2 7 .
n 0 153 198 291 642 642
R2 .4946 .4412 .3595 .4106 .3979
MSE .3095 .2769 .3135 .3045 .3077
exp F(2)= 22.28* 6.79* 3.94* 19.21* 17.74*
ten F(2)= 1.35 8.23* 4.43* 3.89* 5.15*
Breusch/
Pagan X2 26.4* 16.2 14.0 26.6* 21.7
Pooled Sample
With Sector
White's standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity are used for test statistics.
First, for the pooled sample, coefficient signs and magnitudes generally accord 
with a priori expectations. Education has a positive and significant effect on wages. 
Experience and tenure have significant positive effects on wages, but at a decreasing 
rate. The results also suggest a positive wage premium for married workers and workers
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in large urban areas, and lower wages for females and immigrants on average. The 
positive coefficient on the immigrant dummy variable is more than offset by lower 
returns to education, particularly overseas education. Immigrants are predicted to earn, 
on average, 26.7 per cent less than non-immigrants given their respective average years 
of education.
The negative union coefficient is inconsistent with other Australian evidence 
which generally shows positive or insignificant union wage premiums. This is a result 
specific to this sample,6 as noted in the previous section results for the union coefficient 
can not be readily generalised beyond the sample used here.
It is instructive to note that coefficients estimated for the pooled sample are 
robust to the inclusion of sector dummies. Comparing columns (4) and (5) shows that 
controlling for employer size in this manner has no effect on estimates of the wage 
structure. This would imply that the current Australian literature is not producing biased 
estimates by not controlling for company size or not controlling for either measure of 
size.
In addition, estimates of the average wage differential between sectors are 
comparable using the pooled and disaggregated samples. For the pooled sample, 
including dummy variables indicating the sector of employment, shows significant 
differences of 6.9 per cent (Exten) and 13.7 per cent (Inten), compared to small 
businesses.7 From the three sector estimations, the differentials compared to small 
businesses are 8.8 per cent (Exten) and 15.5 per cent (Inten) for individuals given the 
mean characteristics of the pooled sample. The closeness of these estimates suggests 
that controlling for size by including intercept dummies will adequately capture average 
wage differentials.
But higher wages in larger workplaces is not a new result in Australia and 
higher wages by both measures of size has been established in overseas data. What we 
are interested in is whether the disaggregated estimates provide additional information. 
Overall, the equations show significant differences across sectors. The hypothesis that
6 The union coefficient is positive and significant for the sample of excluded observations which do not 
have a measure of company size, and is positive but insignificant for the non-immigrant sample.
7 Coefficients on dummy variables are converted to percentage differences as 100*{eb - 1}.
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all coefficients are equal across the three sectors can be rejected using F tests. The 
calculated test statistic for the hypothesis that all coefficients including the intercept 
terms are equal is F(28,600)= 1.89 compared to a critical value of F005(28,600)=l .46. 
Constraining the slope coefficients to be equal and allowing a different intercept for 
each sector has a test statistic of F(26,600)=l .43, not significant at the 5 per cent level. 
Again this suggests that a large part of average wage differentials between sectors can 
be captured as an intercept shift.
However, it is variation in individual coefficients which are the most 
interesting results. Table 4.4 reports the percentage change in wages associated with one 
unit changes in independent variables, as calculated from the regression results.
Table 4.4
Percentage Change in Wages with Changes in Individual Characteristics
Small
Business
(1)
Three Sec tors  
Extensive
(2)
Intensive
(3)
P o o led  Sam ple  
With Sector 
Dummies
(4) (5)
expa (at mean) 2.03* 1.11* 0.79* 1.2* 1.15*
tenure (at mean) 0.88 0.53* 1.27* 0.9* 1.07*
exp (at 15 yrs) 1.78* 1.09* 0.85* 1.21* 1.21*
tenure (at 5 yrs) 0.65 0.56* 1.42* 0.96* 1.08*
female -21.7* -11.5* -14.3* -14.7* -13.8*
married 11.6 11.7* 4.7 9.2* 9.6*
Lurban 12.0 20.9* 1.7 9.5* 8.5*
a Marginal returns to experience and tenure evaluated at respective sample means. 
* indicates significance at 5 per cent level.___________________________________
The most significant differences between sectors are for returns to tenure and 
experience.8 These differences conform somewhat to expectations with returns to 
general labour market experience declining with size, and returns to tenure increasing. 
Initial wage growth with experience is highest in the Small Business sector but peaks 
earlier, after 23.9 years compared to 26.5 years (Exten) and 38.8 years (Inten).
8 Hypotheses that experience and tenure coefficients are jointly and individually equal across sectors can 
be rejected at the 5 per cent level.
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At the respective sample means, the marginal wage growth with experience is 2 
per cent in small businesses but only 0.8 per cent in the Intensive sector. On the other 
hand, wage growth with tenure is lower in small businesses at 0.9 per cent compared to
I. 3 per cent in the Intensive sector. But in the Small Business sector the tenure 
coefficients are no statistically significant. There are significant returns to tenure in the 
Extensive sector but the marginal returns are less than half of the returns in the Intensive 
sector. The result is similar when marginal returns are calculated for each sector, given 
the same years of experience and tenure.
Other coefficients for worker characteristics show sizable differences between 
sectors, in particular the female and Lurban coefficients.9 There is a significant gender 
wage differential in each sector, however the estimates are suggestive of considerable 
variation. In large companies (Exten and Inten sectors) females tend to earn between
II. 5 and 14.3 per cent less than males. But in small businesses the estimated gender 
wage gap is 21.7 per cent.
The coefficients on Lurban suggest that, in the Extensive sector, there is a wage 
gap of 21 per cent associated with residing in a large urban area. In other sectors, there is 
no comparable wage gap that is significantly different from zero, although the 
coefficient in the Small Business sector is quite large at 12 per cent. A similar result is 
seen for the marriage wage premium; although differences between sectors in the 
coefficient do not show up as significant, only the Extensive sector has a coefficient 
significantly different from zero, with married workers earning, on average, a 12 per 
cent wage premium.
It is interesting to note that for both the lurban and married variables, 
coefficients are close to zero in the Intensive sector. For wage differentials between 
urban and rural areas this result is similar to the finding reported by Main and Reilly 
(1993). Regional wage variation is insignificant among large workplaces in the U.K., 
and urban/rural variation is insignificant here which may indicate that small workplaces 
are more sensitive to local labour market conditions (Main and Reilly 1993).
9 The differences in female and lurban coefficients are not statistically significant at the 5% level, (but at 
10% level). However, the variation is substantial, and is suggestive of underlying differences likely to be 
significant with a larger sample size.
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The differences in tenure coefficients are consistent with specific human 
capital, or deferred compensation models which predict steeper tenure wage profiles in 
large firms. In the Extensive sector wages initially decline with tenure and coefficients 
are jointly significant. This is contrary to the usual finding of positive initial wage 
growth, declining over time. However, the slope becomes positive within the first year. 
The signs on these coefficients suggest that in this sector, workers may wait longer for 
returns to tenure but wage growth will eventually catch up to other sectors. This is 
suggestive of an unanticipated component of returns to tenure which may reflect a job 
matching process with better matches surviving over time, rather than anticipated 
deferred compensation or specific investments. In the Intensive sector there is strong 
wage growth with tenure, being initially greater than wage growth associated with 
accumulating general labour market experience. Current Australian estimates of tenure 
and experience wage profiles ignore this variation by workplace and company size and 
will understate the importance of tenure relative to general experience for large 
workplace employees.
Some coefficients show no variation across sectors, for example, returns to 
years of education. This is unlike previous overseas evidence which showed, variously, 
higher returns in large companies, (Mellow 1983), and lower returns in large 
workplaces, (Main and Reilly 1993).
The wage differential for immigrants relative to Australian born is also 
constant across the sectors. For example, comparing immigrants having 10 years 
overseas education and 2 years Australian education, with Australian born workers 
having 12 years education shows wages, on average, lower for immigrants by 9.5 per 
cent, 8 per cent, and 9.9 per cent in the Small Business, Extensive, and Intensive sectors 
respectively. Immigrants with 12 years education in Australia earn a wage the same as 
Australian born with positive differences of only 1.8, 0.2, and 2.3 per cent. This concurs 
with previous results which have shown a decline in immigrant wage differentials with 
years of education in Australia, (see Chapman and Iredale 1993).
In summary, there is convincing evidence that tenure with the same employer 
earns higher returns in large workplaces whereas general labour market experience earns 
lower returns in larger companies and workplaces. Other results are indicative of
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important variation between sectors. Wage differentials by urban residence and marital 
status seem to be confined to small workplaces employees. The gender wage differential 
is apparently a great deal larger in small companies. Implications for the Australian 
literature will be spelled out in section 4.4.3, after examining results with occupation 
and industry included.
4.4.2 Including Occupation and Industry
Table 4.5 presents regression results for three sectors, controlling for 
occupation and industry. A full definition of occupation and industry categories is 
contained in Appendix 3A. The excluded categories are labourers and light 
manufacturing industries including food, textiles, wood, and paper products. The 
magnitude of other coefficients change slightly from the previous results, but the same 
variation is seen between sectors. For example, returns to experience and the gender 
wage differential are highest in small businesses.
Some occupational wage relativities differ between sectors. In the Small 
Business sector there is no wage differential between clerical workers and labourers, 
however in the Intensive sector, with large workplaces, clerical workers earn, on average 
20 per cent more than labourers. Plant and machine operators earn, on average, 15 per 
cent less than labourers in small businesses but 14 per cent more than labourers in the 
Intensive sector. In large workplaces and companies, all occupation groups show some 
increase in the relative wage compared to labourers and some decrease compared to 
plant and machine operators. However, the only difference which is statistically 
significant is on the coefficient for plant and machine operators, (t=2.60 between Smallb 
and Inten).
There is a clear difference between sectors in industry effects which are jointly 
significant only in the small business sector. Main and Reilly (1993) also find that 
industry variation is insignificant among large workplaces. However, here it can be seen 
that the significance of industry effects decreases with company size, (holding 
workplace size constant), rather than with workplace size (holding company size 
constant).
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Table 4.5
Regression Results Including Occupation and Industry
___________________ (t-ratios in parentheses)____________________
Sector: Small Businesss Extensive Intensive
c:s< = io o &  w s< = io o CS>100& WS<=100 CS>100& WS>100
Educa .0417 (2.13) .0330 (2.66) .0376 (2.53)
Educma -.00923 (0.40) -.0309 (1.93) -.0134 (0.85)
Educmos .0201 (1.42) .00392 (0.43) .0176 (2.86)
exp .0416 (6.06) .0245 (3.92) .0131 (2.08)
exp2 -.000849 (6.03) -.000458 (3.39) -.000156 (1.13)
tenure .0209 (2.26) -.00791 (0.83) .0205 (3.34)
tenure2 -.00106 (2.45) .000617 (1.57) -.000651 (3.29)
female -.236 (4.16) -.157 (4.17) -.126 (2.58)
married .0661 (1.22) .0711 (1.70) .0472 (1.08)
immig .191 (0.66) .325 (1.77) .169 (0.89)
union -.0900 (1.33) -.0980 (2.75) -.0482 (1.25)
hours .00799 (3.71) .0109 (4.80) .0119 (5.11)
Lurban .0982 (1-49) .113 (1.99) .0233 (0.50)
WCollar .248 (2.88) .367 (4.93) .393 (5.92)
trad -.0520 (0.69) .00214 (0.04) .0751 (1.45)
cler -.0152 (0.16) .0633 (0.97) .182 (3.00)
sale .0262 (0.23) .196 (3.09) .185 (2.62)
oper -.163 (2.04) .0375 (0.60) .129 (2.48)
Other .298 (4.46) .162 (2.43) .128 (1.74)
Man:H .138 (2.02) .0535 (1.03) .0882 (1.96)
Whol/Ret .0560 (0.75) .0117 (0.22) -.0212 (0.30)
Finance .271 (2.68) .114 (1.87) .0750 (0.96)
Service -.154 (1.17) .00614 (0.09) .0512 (0.94)
const 4.574 (16.29) 4.707 (22.22) 4.695 (21.00)
153 198 291
R2 .5982 .5327 .4469
exp F(2)= 18.91 * 8.09* 4.30*
ten F(2)= 3.06 3.20* 5.76*
occ F(5)= 6.96* 7.49* 8.47*
ind F(5)= 6.49* 1.80 1.20
Breusch/
Pagan X2 28.5 32.3 38.2*
White's standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity are used for test statistics.
Although differences in individual coefficients are not significant at the 5 per 
cent level there is substantial variation seen for some. The coefficient on the service 
industry group is the only one to increase with both workplace and company size 
implying higher wages compared to the excluded industry category. All other industry 
groups show lower wages compared to the excluded category in larger companies and 
workplaces. This suggests that within service industries wages increase more with size 
than within other industries.
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This is shown in Table 4.6 which reports predicted wage differentials by sector, 
compared to small businesses, for individuals given the mean characteristics of the 
pooled sample.
Table 4.6
Percentage Wage Differentials Compared to 
______ Small Business: By Industry_______
Exten Inten
% %
Mean Industry Distn. 6.6 13.0
Other -1.6 0.9
Man:L 12.8 19.6
Man:H 3.7 13.8
Whol/Ret 8.0 10.8
Finance -3.6 -1.6
Service 32.4 46.8
N o te s :
T h e  fir s t  r o w  g i v e s  p r e d ic te d  w a g e  d i f f e r e n t ia ls  c o m p a r e d  to  S m a ll  
B u s in e s s  w ith  a ll e x p la n a t o r y  v a r ia b le s  in c lu d in g  o c c u p a t io n  a n d  
in d u s tr y  c a t e g o r ie s  g iv e n  th e  m e a n  v a lu e  fo r  th e  p o o le d  s a m p le .
The first row reports the wage gaps, given the "average" industry distribution of 
the pooled sample. Compared to small businesses wages are higher on average by 6.6 
(in Exten) and 13 per cent (in Inten). These are both two percentage points lower than 
the equivalent estimates without controlling for occupation and industry.10 Only a very 
small part of the average wage gap between sectors is potentially explained by 
occupation and/or industry distributions.
There is considerable variation across industry groups in the wage differentials 
compared to small businesses. There are no size wage differentials in the finance 
industry or in the "other" industry group which includes mining, electricity/gas, 
transport, construction, and communications.
10 These were 8.8 per cent (Exten) and 15.5 per cent (Inten) compared to Small Business (see page 77).
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However, in service industries, wages are higher compared to small businesses, 
by 32 per cent with large companies and by 47 per cent when workplaces are also large. 
Other industries which show substantial wage differentials across both measures of size 
are wholesale/retail and light manufacturing industries. It is low wage industries which 
show the largest differentials by employer size.
4.4.3 Implications for the Australian Literature
The results have important implications for Australian research on individual 
wage determination. For example, previous studies which have shown that on average 
females tend to earn between 12 and 15 per cent less than males, (see Chapman and 
Mulvey 1986, Gregory and Daly 1991, Miller 1993), understate the gender wage gap for 
small business employees. Furthermore, whereas controlling for size by including 
dummy variables for the sector of employment showed no effect on the estimated 
gender wage gap, variation in the estimate between small and large companies is 
apparently considerable, ranging from 22 per cent in small companies to 11 to 14 per 
cent in large companies.
Without controlling for size by including interaction terms between gender and 
company size, a data set which under samples small companies may produce estimates 
of gender differences which are biased downwards as a reflection of the population. In 
addition, efforts to explain persistent gender wage differentials will be enhanced by 
asking whether potential explanations are consistent with the finding that women in 
small businesses are more disadvantaged than their counterparts in larger companies.
Estimates of returns to urban residence or being married are similarly affected 
but with these coefficients varying across different sized workplaces. Among large 
workplaces there are no observable wage premiums for married workers or residents of 
large urban areas.
There are also implications for how industry wage differentials are viewed. 
Previous studies have shown significant wage differentials across broad industry groups 
in Australia which follow a pattern similar to that found overseas. One reason to expect
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some interaction between size and industry effects on wages is that they are both 
employer characteristics, with the same potential explanations for wage differentials." If 
industry wage differentials arise from variation in technologies and associated 
specificity, monitoring costs and working conditions, or from variation in market power 
and unionisation, these factors only appear to significantly influence wages among small 
companies.
However, the results we can place most confidence in concern differences 
between sectors in returns to experience and tenure. General labour market experience 
earns lower returns in larger companies and lower again when workplaces are also large. 
On the other hand tenure earns higher returns where workplaces are large. These 
differences are consistent with specific human capital or deferred compensation models 
which predict steeper tenure wage profiles in large firms. Overseas studies have also 
noted greater wage growth with tenure in large workplaces and companies, (see Brown 
and Medoff 1989, Pearce 1990, Mellow 1983), however, until now there has not been 
any evidence from Australian data.
But what insights are gained for how the positive correlation between size and 
wages can be explained? The next section addresses this question.
4.5 The Size Wage Relationship
The aim here is to tease out implications arising from the regression results for 
our understanding of what may be driving the wage differentials between sectors. First, 
the relative contribution of variation in the wage structure and variation in worker 
characteristics to wage differentials between sectors is assessed. It is also instructive to 
consider what the regression results imply for who gains from employment in large 
workplaces or companies. This is done in section 4.5.2 where some stylised facts are 
highlighted which need to be considered by any potential explanation for size wage 
differentials. Then, since there are clear theoretical reasons to expect greater wage 
growth with tenure in larger firms, and this is a potential explanation for average size
11 See Groshen (1991) and Krueger and Summers (1988) for a review of explanations for industry effects, 
and Borland and Suen (1990) and Chapman and Miller (1983) for Australian evidence.
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wage differentials, life-cycle wage profiles are examined in section 4.5.3. In all 
calculations reported in this section, the regression results from Table 4.3, without 
occupation and industry variables, are used.
4.5.1 Decomposition of Average Wage Differentials
Using the method of Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973), the difference in the 
mean lnwage for pairwise comparisons between sectors can be decomposed into the 
portion arising from differences in the average human capital and other characteristics of 
workers and an "unexplained" portion attributable to different coefficients between the 
sectors.
The portion attributable to coefficient differences involves calculating, (for an 
individual with mean characteristics of a sector), the difference between predicted 
wages, if paid according to the wage structure of their own sector and paid according to 
the wage structure of the other sector. Thus it represents the predicted wage differential 
arising form variation in the wage structure controlling for worker characteristics. The 
portion explained by different characteristics of workers involves calculating, (given the 
same wage structure), the difference between predicted wages for an individual with the 
mean characteristics of one sector and an individual with characteristics of the other 
sector.
These calculations are sensitive to the choice of which wage structure is taken 
as fixed. Using the subscripts s and l to represent either small and large workplaces or 
companies, the calculations are as follows.
If the coefficients in the small sector are taken as the common underlying wage 
structure, then:
X ßs (XL - Xs) = portion due to different characteristics 
X XL (ßL - ßs) = portion due to coefficient differences
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Where X is a vector of means for explanatory variables for the respective sector and the 
two components sum to the predicted wage gap between sectors (L XLßL - Z Xsßs).
If the coefficients in the larger employer size sector are used:
Z ßL (XL - Xs) = portion due to different characteristics 
Z Xs (ßL - ßs) = portion due to coefficient differences
A limitation of this procedure is that the effect of variation in the intercept 
cannot be interpreted separately from other coefficients since it is sensitive to the choice 
of excluded categories on the binary variables (Jones 1983). Nevertheless, the 
contribution of variation in the wage structure, including the intercept, can be assessed. 
Calculations are reported in Table 4.7 for three pairwise comparisons between sectors.
The first row compares the Extensive and Small Business sectors which show a 
total lnwage differential of -0.0064 for the "average" person in Extensive compared to 
the "average" person in small businesses. The first point to note is the negative signs on 
the characteristics portions. This suggests that, given the same wage structure, 
employees in the Extensive sector would have lower predicted earnings than employees 
in small businesses. That is, small business employees on average have characteristics 
which earn greater returns. This result is not sensitive to the choice of wage structure 
used in the calculation.
However, for employees in the Extensive sector, the negative effect of 
differences in characteristics is almost offset by the effect of coefficient differences. 
Given the same characteristics, the predicted lnwage is higher from coefficients of the 
Extensive sector than from coefficients of the Small Business sector by between .068 
and .082. This provides an estimate of the wage differential between sectors which 
arises solely from variation in the wage structure. Converted to percentages it suggests
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that employees in the Extensive sector would earn between 7 and 8.5 per cent more than 
small business employees.
Table 4.7
decomposition of Mean Lnwage Differential
D ue to 
C oeffic ien ts
X l(Pl - P s) Xs(ßL- ß s)
D ue to
C h a ra cteristics  
ßs(XL- X s) ßL(XL- X s)
T o ta l
Exten - Smallb .082 .068 -.089 -.074 -.0064
Inten - Smallb .152 .126 -.101 -.075 .0510
Inten - Exten .058 .064 -.0002 -.007 .0574
Calculated from the regression results in Table 4.3.
The other comparisons between sectors show a similar result. Given the same 
individual characteristics, the Intensive sector has a wage differential of between 13.4 
and 16.4 per cent compared to Small Business and a differential of between 6.0 and 6.6 
per cent compared to the Extensive sector. These results imply that higher wages in 
large workplaces and companies are generated entirely by differences in coefficients, but 
this is offset partially or wholly by differences in characteristics of workers which 
favour those in smaller workplaces and companies.
It seems that workers with high earnings capacity tend to be employed in 
smaller firms. However, two things suggest caution in making this inference. First, the 
inference that small business employees have characteristics, at the mean, which receive 
higher returns is limited to observed characteristics. It is possible that unmeasured 
characteristics favour those in large workplaces and companies.
Second, the result appears to be driven mainly by differences in the proportions 
of females, immigrants, and union members in each sector. There are fewer females, 
immigrants and union members in the Small Business sector and given that these 
characteristics are associated with negative coefficients, the "average" person is
100
predicted to earn more in small businesses. But the negative returns to union 
membership are specific to this sample.
However, these calculations establish the importance of variation in the wage 
structure between sectors as a source of higher average wages in large workplaces and 
companies.
4.5.2 Who Gains in Each Sector?
The variation in some coefficients between sectors means that the wage gain 
associated with employment in a large workplace or company will vary with some 
individual characteristics. An assessment of who gains more will influence how the 
relationship between size and wages is interpreted.
Table 4.8 shows variation in the wage differentials (between sectors) for 
males/females, single/married, and urban/rural residents. These represent the change in 
predicted wages from an increase in company size given the same workplace size 
(Exten-SmallB) and from an increase in workplace size given the same company size 
(Inten-Exten).
The largest wage gains with workplace size are for workers residing outside 
large urban areas. For these workers large workplaces pay 23 per cent more than small 
whereas workers in large urban areas gain only 3 per cent from employment in a large 
workplace.
Overall, these calculations suggest that workers with typical characteristics of 
low earners being female, residing in small urban or rural areas, being unmarried, being 
a new entrant to the labour market, and being employed in service industries gain more 
from employment in large companies and/or workplaces than higher earners such as 
married males.
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Table 4.8
Predicted Size Wage Differentials 
For Various Characteristics
Increase in 
Com pany Size 
(Exten-SmallB)
Increase in 
W orkplace Size 
(Inten-Exten)
C om bined
E ffect
(Inten-SmallB)
% % %
Females 19 4 24
Males 6 7 13
Single 9 11 20
Married 9 4 13
Rural 2 23 25
Lurban 10 3 14
New Entrants 25 11 39
Mean exp/tenure 9 6 15
Service Industries 32 11 47
Other Industries 5 6 11
a Rural includes small urban towns (popn < 100,000) as well as rural areas, 
b Predicted wages are calculated given mean characteristics of the pooled sample for 
variables other than those in each panel.______________________________________________
Overseas evidence has also shown that females gain more with workplace and 
company size.12 However, when the total wage structure is considered this is shown to 
be a much wider phenomenon. Individuals that our regressions predict low wages for are 
the ones who gain from workplace and company size. There are many different 
interpretations of this result from the perspective of theory which will be the subject of 
future work. But it is worth noting some possibilities at this stage.
We saw earlier that specific human capital and deferred compensation models 
can explain higher returns to tenure and lower returns to experience in large workplaces. 
However, it is not immediately obvious that these models can explain why workers with 
typical characteristics of low earners gain more with employer size. For example, to
12 See for example, Green et al (1992), Idson and Feastor (1990). An additional finding from these studies 
is that non union members have significantly higher size wage differentials which is not the case in the 
sample used here, although workplace size differentials are higher for non union members when 
nonrespondents on company size are included in the sample.
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explain a lower gender wage differential in larger companies, they would require the 
assumption that either investment in specific training or monitoring costs increase more 
with company size for females than males. Some additional proposition is required such 
as greater job segregation in the Small Business sector with females tending to be 
segregated into jobs with little training and low monitoring costs.
Another potential explanation for size wage differentials comes from rent 
sharing models where large companies have greater ability-to-pay through product 
market power and worker bargaining power is higher where it is less costly to unionise 
or organise collective bargaining. Is there any reason to suspect that low income groups 
traditionally seen as having less bargaining power gain more from such rent sharing? A 
simple rent sharing model would need to assume, for example, that the bargaining 
power of females increases with company size by more than the bargaining power of 
males.13 But the result could be incorporated into such a model if the objective function 
of unions included concern about income distributions and wages of low income groups.
If the question is viewed in a broader context, other possibilities emerge. The 
institutional environment within large companies and workplaces can imply that 
demographic characteristics may be less important for wage outcomes in large firms. 
For example, if larger firms tend to have internal labour market structures with wages 
attached to jobs rather than workers, (Wächter and Wright 1990), and if work group 
morale is more important for productivity than individual performance (Akerlof 1986). 
If large companies are more concerned with reputation in the labour market and are 
more subject to scrutiny from unions this could compress wage differentials across 
demographic characteristics.
The institutional environment external to companies may also be important. 
The result is consistent with differential enforcement of labour market regulations 
across sectors. For example affirmative action legislation only applies to companies 
with more than 100 employees. There is potentially a whole range of regulations 
applying differentially or being enforced differentially across the sectors for example 
union enforcement of award wages is likely to be more vigorous in large companies.
13 See Green et al (1992) for a similar discussion.
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4.5.3 Life-cycle Wage Profiles
To illustrate the wage profiles, predicted wages are calculated at different years 
of experience and tenure from the regression coefficients from Table 4.3 (excluding 
occupation and industry). Individuals are assumed to have the mean characteristics of 
the pooled sample to reflect variation in the wage profiles arising solely from different 
tenure and experience coefficients rather than different worker characteristics across 
sectors. Since the data are from a cross section these can not be taken to represent the 
experience over time of any given individual since variables such as labour market 
conditions or the quality of education may vary over time. However, comparisons 
between sectors are not affected by this unless there are different changes over time in 
each sector.
A further limitation is small sample sizes in the data. There are few 
observations with more than 5 years tenure in the Small Business and Extensive sectors, 
(13 (SmallB) and 30 (Exten) observations compared to 62 in the Intensive sector). 
Although the predicted wage profiles across sectors are consistent with theoretical 
expectations any inferences should be seen as tentative given the data limitations.
Wage profiles are illustrated in Figure 1 from zero to 20 years experience, for 
two scenarios. First, tenure is held constant to show wage increases associated with 
returns to experience alone. Second, tenure is assumed to be one third of total years of 
experience in each year which is the ratio of experience to tenure at the average in the 
pooled sample. The experience profiles should be interpreted as reflecting returns to 
ageing as opposed to factors associated with the specific employer.
An inverse relationship between starting wages and the slope of wage profiles 
is predicted in a number of theories such as specific human capital, deferred 
compensation, or job matching models. Such a relationship is clearly seen in the 
experience profiles. Small businesses show the lowest starting wages but the greatest 
wage growth with experience and the Intensive sector has the highest starting wages and 
flattest profile. There is large variation in predicted starting wages with new entrants 
earning 25 per cent more in the Extensive sector and 39 per cent more in the Intensive
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Figure 4.1
Wage Profiles by Sector
[o]=Smallb k]=Exten 01=Inten
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Total Wage Profiles: Tenure = 1/3 Exp
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sector than in small businesses. But at the average years of experience (15 years), the 
experience profiles suggest virtually no wage differential between sectors.
However, these experience profiles reflect wage outcomes before taking 
account of returns from tenure with the same employer. The inverse relationship 
between starting wages and slopes is then suggestive of factors unrelated to the specific 
employer such as greater investment in general labour market skills by workers in small 
businesses. That is, skills which are transferable between employers, earning returns not 
specific to any one employer.
When the effect of returns to tenure is included, the total wage profile for the 
Intensive sector has predicted wages everywhere above those for the Small Business 
sector. At the average of 15 years experience and 5 years tenure the predicted wage in 
the Intensive sector is 3.6 per cent higher than in Small Business and 8.0 per cent higher 
than in Extensive.
Wage growth with tenure appears to be an important component of higher 
wages for older workers (at the average years of experience), in large workplaces but not 
in large companies. In fact large company employees in the Extensive sector seem to 
benefit less from returns to tenure than small business employees. This suggests an 
interpretation of steeper tenure wage profiles in large firms as reflecting variation in 
workplace characteristics. This could be efficiency wages in the presence of higher 
monitoring costs in larger workplaces or it could be that worker financed firm specific 
training increases with workplace size rather than company size.
Since a tradeoff between starting wages and the slope is predicted by theory, 
but not the extent of such a tradeoff, wage outcomes in the absence of returns to tenure 
are indeterminate. It is not then possible to estimate how much the variation in returns to 
tenure contributes to average size wage differentials.
However, the average age and tenure of employees is higher in the Intensive 
sector.14 Higher returns to tenure in large workplaces and longer tenure of employees, 
suggests that higher average wages in large workplaces can be partially explained by
14 34.5 years of age, 6.3 years of tenure in the Intensive sector compared to age: 33.2 in Exten, 31.7 in 
SmallB; and tenure: 4.7 in Exten, 3.7 in SmallB.
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factors such as monitoring difficulties or specific training. In large workplaces, 
remaining with the same employer is important to secure higher earnings in later years, 
compared to earnings of workers in other sectors. However, the finding that starting 
wages are higher in large workplaces and companies suggests that a large part of 
average wage differentials is arising from a different source. 15
4.6 Conclusion
The empirical exercise of allowing estimates of the wage structure to vary with 
both workplace and company size has highlighted information of importance for both 
the Australian literature on wage determination, and for any interpretation of the role 
that employer size plays in wage determination.
Several new results are important for Australian research on wage 
determination. Future work should take account of variation in the wage structure by 
both measures of employer size. With regards to company size, the gender wage 
differential in small companies is apparently double that in large companies. Further, 
industry wage differentials are only evident among small companies. Without 
controlling for size by including interaction terms between these variables and company 
size, a data set which under samples small companies may produce estimates of wage 
differentials which are biased downwards as a reflection of the population. Estimates of 
wage differentials by marital status and urban residence will be similarly affected, but 
with respect to workplace size.
The result we can place most confidence in is variation in returns to tenure and 
experience which suggest that retention of workers with the same employer is more 
important for wage outcomes in large workplaces. This is consistent with interpretations 
based on deferred compensation in the presence of higher monitoring costs in large 
workplaces, or greater worker financed investment in firm specific training in larger 
workplaces. However, this variation in tenure wage profiles is not likely to play a large
15 Although variation in returns to tenure may not explain a large part of average wage differentials this 
does not rule out the possibility that specific training and monitoring costs increase the incentive to offer 
higher starting wages to attract higher quality workers.
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part in explaining average size wage differentials since starting wages are considerably 
higher in large workplaces and companies implying a wage premium arising from a 
different source.
Another important finding is that workplace size and company size have 
distinct effects on the wage structure. Previous overseas evidence which has not 
disaggregated by both measures of size may be attributing variation in coefficients to the 
wrong measure of size. For example, previous results which have shown insignificant 
industry wage differentials among large workplaces in the United Kingdom may in fact 
be picking up a company size effect. The finding here is that industry effects fall with 
company size (given the same workplace size) but not with workplace size (given the 
same company size).
A further result of interest is that workers with typical characteristics of low 
earners (unmarried, females, small urban or rural residents, new entrants, and in service 
industries) gain a higher wage premium from being employed in larger companies 
and/or workplaces. Whereas overseas evidence has shown this result for females it is 
shown here to be much a wider phenomenon. The question of why typically low income 
groups are more disadvantaged in small businesses is not readily answered by simple 
models of wage determination. The institutional environment within large workplaces 
and companies, as well as broader labour market institutions may contribute to an 
explanation for this result. But, whatever the source of greater disadvantage in small 
businesses, asking the question in future work certainly has the potential to increase our 
ability to explain persistent wage differentials.
These results give rise to some crucial questions about wage determination 
within each sector. In small business is the greater variation arising from worker or firm 
heterogeneity? What characteristics of firms in this sector are associated with high wage 
high productivity strategies? Why is the Extensive sector so different? In the Intensive 
sector is the wage structure an efficient response to specific skills and imperfect 
information or is it a response to the institutional environment and unions without 
offsetting productivity benefits?
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Chapter 5
Product Market Structure and The Size-Wage Relationship
5.1 Introduction
The goal in this chapter is to investigate the influence of product market 
structure on the size-wage relationship. Although a rent sharing explanation for size- 
wage differentials has been frequently suggested in the literature, few studies have 
explored this proposition empirically and those that have do not distinguish between the 
workplace and the company.
Incorporating product market structure into the analysis has implications for 
how the results in chapters 3 and 4 can be interpreted. Can a lower incidence of rent 
sharing in Australia explain the result from chapter 3 that company size has no effect on 
wages above a threshold of twenty employees (unlike U.S. evidence). Can variation 
within or across the Small Business, Extensive, and Intensive sectors examined in 
chapter 4 be attributed to rent sharing effects?
In addition, the suggestion in the literature that the potential for rent sharing 
effects on wages will show up as higher wages by company size (the profit centre) rather 
than workplace size can be assessed. But if the suggestion made by Hodson (1983), that 
company size is relevant for ability-to-pay and workplace size is relevant for bargaining 
power is valid, then both measures of size are required.
There are three main reasons why product market power on the part of large 
firms may be passed on to their employees in the form of higher wages: (i) employees of 
large firms have more bargaining power through greater unionisation; (ii) large firms 
have greater managerial discretion to pursue goals which may diverge from shareholder 
interests for example where employee morale enters managerial utility functions; and 
(iii) product market power of large firms reduces uncertainty about future demand 
conditions and thus increases the firm's and employees' incentive to invest in specific 
training. Thus size, unionisation, training, and market power are interrelated variables
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within the rent sharing framework. 1 It is not clear whether increased training 
investments in the presence of market power should be interpreted as a rent sharing 
effect or not. But by examining training effects we take into account the possibility that 
interactions between market power and size wage effects are affected by variation in 
training effects.
We are interested in the separate and joint effects of market structure and size 
on the average wage and whether these effects are related to variation in unionisation or 
on-the-job training. Empirical relationships are interpreted with a rent sharing 
framework, although finding that market power influences the size wage relationship 
does not rule out any influence of alternative factors such as working conditions, 
employee quality, effort intensity, monitoring costs. 2
Empirical relationships are examined using the AWIRS data set which includes 
measures of workplace size, company size, product market structure, unionisation and 
on-the-job training. No previous Australian studies have investigated the relationship 
between size-wage differentials and product market power. Furthermore, the few 
overseas studies that have addressed this topic have used one or the other measure of 
size but not both.
The analysis is largely exploratory at this stage. We do not attempt to address 
all of the theoretical and econometric issues such as whether size is endogenous. Rather, 
the goal is to explore the empirical relationships and outline a framework for 
interpreting the results within a rent sharing framework.
1 Rent sharing does not necessarily imply non profit maximising firms. In the presence of significant 
bargaining or turnover costs a positive correlation between ability-to-pay and wages can be cost 
minimising. However, Caves (1987) has suggested that there is some Australian evidence that large 
management-controlled firms with market power may pursue goals other than profit maximisation and be 
operating at higher than minimum costs, so called X-inefficiency. He cites studies using data from the 
1970's which have shown a negative correlation between profitability and industry concentration and 
between profitability and company size and a positive correlation between market dominance (near 
monopoly) and firms of large absolute size.
2 Other theoretical frameworks do not explicitly predict a relationship between market power and size- 
wage differentials. Although it is possible that product market power increases the value of marginal 
product and hence increases the incentive to opt for a high wage high productivity strategy independent of 
employee bargaining power, it is equally possible to argue as Slichter (1950) that if employers believe that 
higher wages will attract more productive employees then firms facing product market competition would.
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An important consideration that has been overlooked in the literature is that 
employer size can interact with market structure in different ways depending on whether 
size is an indicator of the firm's ability-to-pay or the employees' ability to extract a share 
of rents. We raise the complicating issue of a variety of sources of ability-to-pay some 
of which are related to size and some of which are related to measures of product market 
structure which are commonly used as indicators of market power.
We also show that the direction of the effect of market structure on size-wage 
differentials can be negative if size and market structure are alternative indicators of 
ability-to-pay and positive if size is an indicator of bargaining power. We can then say 
whether the data is consistent with the proposition that bargaining power increases with 
workplace size and ability-to-pay increases with company size. The findings do support 
this proposition. The wage differential between small and large companies is lower 
where there is less competition whereas the workplace size wage differential is higher.
The next section considers how the wage effects of workplace size, company 
size, and market power are inter-related within a rent sharing framework. Following this 
the data and variables are described in section 5.3. In section 5.4 the separate and joint 
influences of size and market power on the average wage are examined. Variation in 
returns to training and unionisation are then considered in section 5.5.
5.2 Product Market Power, Workplace Size, and Company Size:
Separate or Joint Effects on wages?
In rent sharing models, as reviewed in chapter 2, the important variables are the 
employer's ability-to-pay and employees' ability to extract a share of rents.3 A firm's 
ability-to-pay above the going wage rate relies on their ability to exert some market 
power which in turn relies on market share, the degree of price collusion, and the 
existence of barriers to entry and exit.
3 The probability of unemployment and employee risk aversion are also important variables in the rent 
sharing framework but empirical measure of these are not available. It is implicitly assumed in the analysis 
that these variables do not vary systematically across workplaces.
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Market power can also influence wages by influencing specific training 
investments. The argument that investments in specific training will be greater in large 
firms is based on the idea of a longer life expectancy of these firms (see Oi 1991). As 
well as increasing the stock of specific training, longer expected tenure will induce 
workers to undertake a larger share of the investment. However, the life expectancy of 
firms could be related to a lack of potential rivals in the market and hence market power 
rather than size per se. It is specific training rather then general training which will be 
affected by market power. If the proposition raised in chapter 4 that in large workplaces 
a higher proportion of training is specific than in small businesses then market power 
can be expected to influence training returns in large more than small workplaces.
A rent sharing hypothesis asserts that wage gains from employee bargaining 
power will be higher where firms have product market power. The conventional 
approach to testing such an hypothesis is to estimate separate and interaction effects of 
ability-to-pay and bargaining power on wages. Most of the empirical literature 
concentrates on the relationship between unionisation as a proxy for bargaining power 
and measures of financial performance, product market structure or elasticity of product 
demand as proxies for the employer's ability-to-pay. The model predicts a positive 
interaction effect, that is the union wage gap will be higher where there is market power.
A complication arises when the goal is to test for rent sharing as an explanation 
for higher wages in larger companies and workplaces. Are workplace and company size 
indicators of ability-to-pay or bargaining power or both? The expected sign of the 
interaction effect depends upon which of these underlying variables increases with size. 
Size wage differentials may be higher or lower in the presence of market power and yet 
be consistent with a rent sharing model. The issue arises because ability-to-pay can 
come from a variety or sources and empirical measures of market power and bargaining 
power are imperfect.
We will run through different scenarios and expected interaction effects in the 
context of the variables to be used for market structure. The market structure variables 
relate to the number of competitors and the degree of competition in the market. Few 
competitors or a low degree of competition can indicate that firms are more likely to be 
able to exert some market power. However, size can be an alternative indicator of
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ability-to-pay if  large firms have cost advantages arising from economies of scale, 
economies of multi-plant operation, or low cost of capital. There is some evidence that 
large firms face a lower cost of non-labour inputs including discounts on material inputs 
through bulk buying or vertical integration and low interest rates (see Fitzroy 1991, 
Bureau of Industry Economics 1992).
The relative bargaining power of employees is higher where they are able to 
impose a higher cost of disagreement on the firm. This can be related to higher capital 
labour ratios or greater unionisation in large firms where it is less costly to organise. 
There is evidence that union membership and union activity is greater in large 
workplaces and companies (Grimes 1994). Evidence from the United States suggests 
that large firms use more advanced (newer) technologies (Dunne 1994), and are more 
capital intensive (Barron et al 1987, Idson and Feaster 1990).
But rent sharing may occur independently of unionisation or capital intensity 
where satisfaction enters managerial utility functions and company performance enters 
employee utility functions such that, as "...one side's reward increases, both parties see it 
as equitable that the other side's should increase" (Carruth and Oswald 1989). This may 
be more likely in large firms where there is a separation of ownership and control, and a 
greater reliance on teamwork and employee cooperation. But could also occur in small 
firms in the event that bargaining power is endogenous and the presence of market 
power increases employees wage demands. This is distinct from efficiency wage models 
where the direction of causality is reversed such that paying a fair wage increases morale 
and productivity. In these models the payment of such an efficiency wage is more likely 
to occur where monitoring costs are higher in large firms but not more likely to occur 
where there is market power. Why would firms with market power choose a high wage 
high productivity strategy more than firms facing competition?
Size-wage differentials may be higher or lower in the presence of few 
competitors or a low degree of competition and yet be consistent with the rent sharing 
model. To illustrate this point take the following estimating equation where: L and MP 
are binary variables equal to one if  the firm is large (L) or has market power from few 
competitors or a low degree of competition (MP); a, b, c, and d are coefficients to be 
estimated; ej is an error term.
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Wagej =  a + bLj + cMPj + dL*MPj + ej (5.1)
With binary variables there are four categories: small with no market power (S) 
(the excluded category), large with no market power (L), small with market power 
(MP), and large with market power (L+MP). The expected wage within each of these is:
E[w]s = a
E[w ]l = a + b
E[w]MP = a + c
E[w]p+mp —a + b + c + d
Thus b represents the wage gain associated with size, in the absence of market 
power and c represents the wage gain associated with market power in the absence of 
size. It is the expected sign of the interaction coefficient ( d ) that is ambiguous because 
size can be an indicator of ability-to-pay and/or bargaining power.
The four categories are represented in Table 5.1 which sets out the source of 
ability-to-pay and employee bargaining power in each. The necessary conditions for rent 
sharing to occur, namely the existence of ability-to-pay and employee bargaining power 
are met in all sectors apart from small firms facing competition. In small firms ability- 
to-pay can be higher where there is less competition in the market and where this 
increases employee wage demands rent sharing will occur. The wage effects of rent 
sharing will be reflected in the coefficient c from equation 5.1. Large firms will have 
greater ability-to-pay from cost advantages. These cost advantages can be viewed as 
either allowing higher profits independent of the level of competition or as barriers to 
entry preventing competition on the same scale. The wage effects of rent sharing in the 
large firm high competition sector will be reflected in the coefficient b from equation 
5.1.
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Table 5.1
Sources of Ability-to-pay and Employee Bargaining Power
Many Competitors 
High degree of competition
Few Competitors 
low degree of competition
(E[w]=a) (E[w]=a + c)
Small Abilitv-to-pav 
Low Competition
Bargaining Power 
Fair wages
(E[w]=a + b) (E[w]=a + b + c + d)
Large
Abilitv-to-pav 
Cost advantages: 
Multi-plant economies 
scale economies 
low cost of capital
Abilitv-to-pav 
Low Competition 
Cost advantages: 
Multi-plant economies 
scale economies 
low cost of capital
Bargaining Power 
Unionisation 
high K/L ratio 
Fair Wages
Bargaining Power 
Unionisation 
high K/L ratio 
Fair Wages
To illustrate a scenario where the interaction coefficient (d) will have negative 
sign, consider the case where there is either rent sharing or not and the effect on wages 
is the same regardless of the sources of ability-to-pay and bargaining power. The 
coefficients b and c will both reflect the wage premium associated with rent sharing but 
the expected wage in firms which are both large and have low competition will be no 
higher than in firms which are either large or have low competition. Since the expected 
wage in this sector is a + b + c + d, the coefficient d will be negative. A negative 
interaction coefficient is then consistent with size and market structure reflecting the 
same underlying variable which within the rent sharing framework is ability-to-pay.
An alternative scenario is that size is exclusively an indicator of bargaining 
power and low competition is exclusively an indicator of ability-to-pay. Rent sharing 
requires the presence of both variables and this will be reflected in a higher wage in
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large firms which also have low competition hence the interaction coefficient will be 
positive. A positive interaction coefficient is then consistent with size and market 
structure representing different underlying variables which have mutually reinforcing 
positive effects on wages.
A positive interaction effect does not rule out the possibility that large size is 
associated with ability-to-pay as well as bargaining power but suggests that the positive 
interaction effect from greater bargaining power is sufficiently large to offset any 
negative interaction effect from size and market structure both reflecting ability-to-pay. 
But this implies that a zero interaction effect cannot be interpreted as evidence that the 
wage effects of size and market structure are unrelated to rent sharing. In the event that 
the negative and positive interactions offset each other the interaction coefficient can be 
close to zero.
Although it is not possible to test the hypothesis that the wage effects of market 
structure and size are independent, it is possible to determine whether the interaction 
effect is negative or positive which evoke different interpretations of the role that size 
plays in wage determination. If workplace size and company size are reflecting different 
underlying variables, for example if workplace size is a proxy for bargaining power and 
company size is a proxy for ability-to-pay, different signs might be expected. The 
distinction between workplace and company size allows us to say whether there is any 
evidence in support of (but not against) the proposition that company size is reflecting 
ability-to-pay and workplace size is reflecting bargaining power.
This brings into contention current evidence on the relationship between rent 
sharing and size-wage differentials because only one measure of size has been used. 
Stewart (1990) uses the British Workplace Industrial Relations Survey data and finds 
that workplace size wage differentials are not significant where there is limited 
competition in the product market (defined as few competitors). In contrast, where 
workplaces face competition (defined as many competitors), large workplaces (500+) 
pay up to 40 per cent more on average than small workplaces (with 25 to 50 employees). 
This is interpreted as suggesting that either workplace size is a substitute for market 
power or an additional indicator of market power (Stewart p.l 128). This result of a 
negative interaction effect between workplace size and market power suggests that size
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and market power may be a proxy for the same underlying variable (ability-to-pay). 
However, this may be due to including only one measure of size which is likely to pick 
up both workplace size and company size effects. We will show that interaction between 
workplace size effects and market structure are different after controlling for company 
size.
There are two U.S. studies which have asked whether market power can 
explain size wage differentials. Mellow (1982) includes a measure of industry 
concentration ratios in a wage equation along with dummy variables for workplace and 
company size groups. But the concentration ratio is only interacted with one large 
company size category (1000+). A positive interaction effect is found with large 
companies paying 11 per cent more than small (<25) in the least concentrated industries 
but increasing to an 18 per cent size-wage premium in the most concentrated industries. 
Estimates of differentials by other categories of workplace and company size were not 
significantly affected by controlling for concentration ratios. Brown and Medoff (1989) 
examine variation in estimates of product demand elasticities across workplace size and 
single-plant versus multi-plant companies. Multi-plant companies are shown to have, on 
average, less elastic product demand (market power) but large workplaces face more 
competition (higher demand elasticity) than small. However, the elasticity measures 
have no significant wage effects and do not change size wage effects when included in 
equations. No interaction effects between elasticities and size are examined.
In the Australian context evidence on rent sharing is limited. Brown et al 
(1984) consider data from a 1974 survey of 198 establishments in Adelaide. They 
compare variation in the magnitude of over-award payments across occupations and 
across establishments and find that "...the magnitude of over-awards is predominantly 
related to the establishment, rather than the occupation with which they are associated." 
They also find that industries with higher concentration ratios have the highest variation 
in over-award payments and the strongest establishment specific variation as opposed to 
occupation specific. They conclude that "...the findings support the view that wage drift 
is strongly influenced by the employer's product market power."
Apps et al (1992) use the AWIRS data to investigate whether the union 
influence on wages is greater where there is less competition in the product market. The
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measure of competition used is managers' rating of the degree of competition on a scale 
from 1 to 6 (limited to intense) and the sample is disaggregated into those which 
reported intense competition (6) and all others. The findings show significant positive 
wage differentials on average in the non-competition sector for four of the eight broad 
occupation groups. However, no consistent results arise across all occupation groups for 
either the union variables or workplace size.
The definition of market power used in Apps et al (1992) is questioned in this 
chapter by using two different cut-off points in the degree of competition variable and 
using an additional variable indicating whether there are few or many competitors in the 
market. The literature is also extended by incorporating both workplace and company 
size.
5.3 Data and Variables
Three empirical questions are asked in this chapter. First, do size-wage 
differentials vary with product market structure? Second, is such variation dependent on 
unionisation or training? Third, is there any evidence that the incidence of rent sharing 
increases with company size (the profit centre) rather than workplace size? For these 
goals there are several advantages of the AWIRS data. First, measures of product market 
structure are available for individual workplaces, a more relevant unit of analysis than 
industry aggregates which are commonly used. Second, the information on unionisation 
is more comprehensive than in the IMA data so that separate effects of membership and 
union presence in the workplace can be allowed for (See Grimes 1994). Third, a 
measure of on-the-job training is available which is more closely related to the concept 
of specific human capital than the measure of tenure used in the previous chapter which 
did not allow alternative explanations such as job matching or deferred compensation to 
be rejected.
Overall characteristics of the AWIRS survey have already been described in 
Appendix 3C. As in Chapter 3, the data is pooled so that each occupation specific wage 
is treated as an independent observation and a separate intercept is estimated for each 
occupation to control for any systematic variation. However, the sample and variables
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used in this chapter differ. A sample of 3676 observations representing 764 workplans 
is used in this chapter. In chapter 3 the objective was to compare results from the IMA 
and AWIRS data as far as possible using similar variables and in view of this all 
available information on worker characteristics was used. In this chapter we are 
interested in training and union effects so more detailed variables for these are used- The 
sample differs slightly because missing values on variables differ.
In addition the sample now excludes workplaces which were not asked 
questions about market structure in the survey. This was the case for workplaces defined 
as either an administrative office only, or providing inputs to other parts of the company. 
Characteristics of the excluded observations are described in appendix 5A. In each of 
the Small Business, Extensive, and Intensive sectors the excluded observations have a 
higher mean wage. But they also have different coefficients in particular higher returns 
to, training time, and both workplace and company size.
Measures for training include whether there is a formal training program (apart 
from on-the-job) at the workplace and the time taken for a new employee to leafn the 
job done by most employees. Dummy variables are constructed for: the presence of a 
formal training scheme (TRNWP), time taken to learn the job from 1 to 6 months 
(TRNM) and more than six months (TRNH), with training of less than 1 month and no 
formal program as the excluded categories. All on-the-job training will include a firm- 
specific component and a general component and these measures of training do not 
allow a distinction to be made between these. However, it is specific training rather then 
general training which is potentially affected by market structure. If the proposition 
raised in chapter 4 that in large workplaces a higher proportion of training is specific 
than in small businesses then market structure can be expected to influence training 
returns in large more than small workplaces.
Union membership is recorded for each occupation group and occupation 
specific dummy variables are constructed for: some union members (UNOCCM) and all 
union members (UNOCCH) with no union members in the occupation group as the 
excluded category. In addition union membership is aggregated to form a membership 
density variable for the entire workplace as a percentage of total employees (UNWP)> to 
allow for occupation specific and workplace specific effects of membership, ^he
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presence of a union delegate in the workplace (UNDEL) is also included to allow for 
differing effects of union presence and union membership. Following evidence from 
Grimes (1994), union presence is expected to be more important for wage gains than 
membership.
Given the measurement of variables at different levels of aggregation there is 
no a priori reason to prefer any particular functional form and statistical tests did not 
allow a preferable form to be identified (see appendix 5A). For the basic estimating 
equation the natural logarithm of weekly wages for occupation k in workplace j is used 
as the dependent variable:
ln(W)jk = a k + I  ßXj + (JqTRNMj + (J)2TRNHj + <j)3TRNWPj + yjUNWPj
+ Y2UNOCCM|k + y3UNOCCHjk + y4UNDELj + £jk (5.2)
Subscript j refers to the workplace and k refers to specific occupations. Xj is a vector of 
control variables for worker characteristics which includes: the proportion of full time 
permanent employees who are female (female), and dummy variables indicating 
whether more than 10 per cent of employees are less than 20 years of age (teenlO), over 
50 years of age (ov5010), and of non English speaking background (nesblO). The effect 
of overtime and shift work on the typical wage is accounted for by two dummy 
variables: more than 5 per cent of employees worked overtime (ovt), and rotating shifts 
operate at the workplace (,rshift).
A full description of how variables are constructed is given in Appendix 5A 
(Table 5A.1) and potential biases in the AWIRS data are assessed in detail. Limited 
controls for worker characteristics implies that the effects of ability, education, age of 
individuals among others will be picked up in the error terms. Where there is a positive 
correlation between the productivity of individual workers and their investment in 
training, the sector of employment or the presence of market power, biases will result. 
The combined effect of these biases is uncertain, however it is expected that it will show
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up in returns to training which may be overstated for example if more productive 
employees receive more training.
Following Chapter 4, separate equations are estimated for the Small Business 
(small company), Extensive (small workplace/large company), and Intensive (large 
company and workplace) sectors.-' But we are also interested in how coefficients and 
predicted wages vary with market structure. Since there are uncertainties about 
functional form, we allow for the effect of market structure by estimating separate 
equations for sub-samples defined as facing a market structure likely to allow market 
power and facing a competitive structure. In effect this allows all coefficients in the 
equation to vary with market structure rather than constraining some or all coefficients 
to be the same.5 6 *8There are then six sub-samples of the data with separate equations.
To test for sensitivity of results to alternative measures of market structure, two 
variables from the AWIRS survey are used to construct three definitions of the less 
competitive and more competitive market structures. First, the number of competitors 
comes from a survey question which asked whether "the market for this workplace's 
major product or service is one with many competitors, few competitors or no 
competitors." Only a small number of workplaces in the sample reported having no 
competitors (41 workplaces) and these are combined with the group that reported few to 
create a binary variable FEWC.
A second measure is the degree of competition in the market (DC) which 
comes from a question which asked workplace managers to rate "the degree of 
competition for this workplace's major product or service" on a scale from 1 to 6 
(limited to intense). The less competitive sample is defined as either (i) having few 
competitors (FEWC), or a low degree of competition, (DC<5, or DC<6), with the 
corresponding competitive samples being MANYC, DC=5+, or DC=6 s
5 To be consistent with the earlier chapter a cut off point of 100 employees is used to define small and 
large workplaces and companies.
6 Including dc and fewc variables as additional dummy variables are not presented in the chapter because
coefficients are generally insignificant for this sample although they are sometimes significant when the 
full sample is used and a dummy variable included to indicate observations for which measures of market 
power are not available.
8 Only 14 per cent of the total sample rated competitiveness at between I and 3 and it was not possible to 
disaggregate the sample at the midpoint of the DC variable without running into small sample size 
problems in some sectors.
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These measures have some advantages over using measures of accounting 
profits which are likely to be endogenous and not necessarily correlated with economic 
rents in a cross section. But they have their own limitations. There is no necessary 
correlation between the number of competitors and market power if markets are 
contestable or if there is variation in the market share of workplaces. Also, the degree of 
competition variable is a subjective rating with around half of the sample of workplaces 
(53 per cent) reporting 6 (intense competition) which may indicate a tendency to 
overstate.
With this formulation, estimates of the separate and interaction effects of size 
and market structure can be calculated from the predicted wage from equation (5.2) for 
each sector. The percentage wage differential between any two sectors i and j is 
calculated as the proportional change in predicted wages controlling for other 
characteristics by setting all explanatory variables equal to the means for the total 
sample.
AW,, = 100 * E(W,)-E(Wj) /  E(W,) (5.3)
The separate effects of size and market structure will be reflected in wage 
differentials by size in the absence of market power, and wage differentials by market 
structure in the small company/workplace size sector.
The interaction effect is negative (positive) if the wage differential with 
workplace size is lower (higher) in the presence of market power and the wage
7 Profits are not a good measure in a cross section because: (i) accounting practices may vary 
systematically between small and large companies; (ii) profits and wages are jointly determined if there is 
rent sharing, so a simultaneity bias will be resent; (iii) Hildreth and Oswald (1993) argue that a positive 
correlation between wages and profits is consistent with short run frictions in a competitive market, (iv) 
although accounting profits may be positively related to union demands in the event that they are the 
unions source of information on company performance, there will be lagged effects which can only be 
picked up with time series data. Other measures of market power also have limitations. In cross section 
there is no necessary relationship between price elasticity and market power where strategic pricing occurs 
for example to deter entry of new firms or if managerial objectives value long run growth as well as or 
instead of profit maximisation. Firms with market power may compete via price in the short run.
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differential with market structure is lower (higher) in the large workplace/company 
sector.
In the next section estimates of size-wage differentials by market structure are 
presented. Returns to unions and training are then examined in section 5.5. Within the 
rent sharing framework these variable should be at least in part driving the variation in 
average wages.
But first, inspection of the raw data reveals some interesting patterns. Table 5.2 
presents mean values for independent variables across the Small Business, Extensive, 
and Intensive sectors for the sample of 764 workplaces. The most noticeable differences 
are in union membership, union delegate presence, training, overtime, and shiftwork. 
Union delegates are present in 80 per cent of workplaces in the Intensive sector and on 
average 69 per cent of employees are union members. These proportions are more than 
double those in the Small Business sector where union delegates are present in only 27 
per cent of workplaces and on average 32 per cent of employees are members.
Table 5.2
Workplace Characteristics by Sector
# w o r k p l a c e s :
Smallb
204
Exten
247
Inten
313
Pooled
764
female 29.805 32.421 34.512 32.579
teen 10 .289 .300 .323 .306
ov5010 .255 .219 .415 .309
nesb10 .113 .113 .153 .130
ovt .711 .729 .863 .779
rshift .216 .300 .514 .365
TRNM .382 .518 .524 .484
TRNH .147 .134 .115 .130
TRNWP .358 .571 .703 .568
UNWP 32.223 54.106 68.959 54.348
UNDEL .265 .486 .799 .555
FEWC .284 .377 .342 .338
DC<5 .299 .312 .214 .268
DC<6 .564 .530 .514 .533
In the Intensive sector formal training programs are present in 70 per cent of 
workplaces compared to 36 per cent in Small Business. Both the Extensive and
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Intensive sectors have 64 per cent of workplaces providing more than one month on-the- 
job training compared to 53 per cent in Small Business.
The Intensive sector also has more workplaces working overtime (86 per cent 
compared to 71 and 73 per cent) and more operating rotating shifts (51 per cent 
compared to 22 and 30 per cent). This is consistent with higher capital intensity and 
rates of utilisation in large workplaces.
It is interesting to note that the market structure variables are not significantly 
correlated with the training or union variables (apart from a positive correlation of .116 
between FEWC and DEL) but the employer size sector is. Market structure does not 
appear to increase levels of unionisation and training as company and workplace size 
do. There is also no consistent variation in the proportion of workplaces with market 
structure across each of these sectors. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient 
between the FEWC and degree of competition variables is significant at -.439 (few 
competitors = less competitive) but neither of these variables is significantly correlated 
with the employer size sector.
There is also some evidence in the raw data that the employer size sector is 
more consistently and significantly related to wages than market structure as shown in 
table 5.3. When variation with size is ignore, the only evidence of any influence of 
market structure on wages is where there are few competitors compared to many. The 
degree of competition has no effect. When variation with market structure is ignored 
there are returns to both company and workplace size of around 4 per cent.
A consistent pattern emerges when the sample is disaggregated by both size 
and market structure. For all definitions of market structure, returns to company size are 
only evident in the competition sector and returns to workplace size are only evident in 
the sector with market power. In addition, returns to market power are only evident in 
the Intensive sector with the average wage being 6 per cent higher for two out of the 
three definitions of market structure.
This pattern suggests that the positive wage effects of workplace size and 
market power are mutually reinforcing with the highest wages occurring in large 
workplaces with market power. On the other hand the positive returns to company size
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in the competition sector are offset by a negative interaction effect where the workplace 
has some degree of market power. Although market structure has little direct effect on 
wages it appears to reduce the company size wage differential and increase the 
workplace size wage differential.
Table 5.3
Average Wages By Sector 
(Percentage A in Wages Reported Where Significant @5%)
(# wage observations/# workplaces in parentheses)
Smal lb
%  A w ith  
Ex te n  C S iz e
%  A w ith  
Inten W S iz e Pooled
Market Power: 
FewC
%A w ith  M P
520.52
(251/58)
530.58
(399/93)
• 587.39
(686/107)
6 .9 *
1 0 .7 * 557.86
(1336 /258)
3 .3
DC<5 522.84
(255/61)
528.79
(310/77)
• 572.56
(400/67)
8 .3 * 545.36
(965/205)
DC<6
%A w ith  M P
522.13 
(497/1 15)
527.17
(542/131)
-5.tr
• 579.65
(963/161)
6 .2
1 0 .0 * 551.16
(2002/407)
Competition:
ManyC 517.02
(614/146)
545.93
(596/154)
5 .6 * 549.27
(1130/206)
539.96
(2340 /506)
DC=5+ 516.02
(610/143)
544.74
(685/170)
5 .6 * 561.16
(1416/246)
• 540.85
(2711 /559)
DC=6 512.50
(368/89)
554.86 
(453/1 16)
S .3 * 545.63
(853/152)
• 540.85
(1674 /357)
Pooled 518.03
(865/204)
539.77
(995/247)
4 .2 * 563.67
(1816/313)
4 . 4 * 546.46
(3676/764)
These comparisons have not controlled for other workplace characteristics. 
However in the next section the same pattern is revealed after controlling for 
occupation, characteristics of the workforce, training and union variables.
5.4 The Influence of Size and Market structure on the Average Wage
Disaggregating the sample by the three employer size sectors and by market 
structure gives six sectors. With three definitions of the market power sector this results
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in 18 regressions. In view of this, reporting of results in the chapter is restricted to key 
relationships. Full regression results for each sector are reported in appendix 5C. We 
will focus first on the overall effects of size and market structure on the average wage 
before examining variation in union and training coefficients in the next section.
To establish the validity of treating these sub-samples as separate sectors, test 
statistics are calculated for the restriction that all coefficients (but allowing the intercept 
to vary) are equal between employer size equations, within the same market structure 
sector, and between the market power and competition equations within the same size 
sector. In general, hypotheses that coefficients are jointly equal across sectors are 
rejected using F tests with statistics reported in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4
F-Statistics for Equality of Coefficients Across Size and 
___________ Market structure Equations.___________
Small!)
ß x T - ß s B
F(20) Exten
ß lT - ß x T
F(20) Inten Pooled
FewC
ManyC
ß\lP=ßc F(20) (1.18)
(1.50)
(2.12)*
(2.38)*
(1.80)*
(2.50)*
(1.74)* (1.56)
DC<5
DC=5+
ßMP=ßc p(2°) (1.70)*
(1.79)*
(1.53)
(1.72)*
(1.73)*
(2.91)*
(2.19)* (1.16)
DC<6
DC=6
ß | V I P - ß c  p ( 2 ° ) (1.44)
(2.13)*
(1.17)
(3.17)*
(1.63)*
(4.22)*
(1.83)* (1.90)*
P ooled (2.06)* (2.35)*
White's standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity are used for test statistics.
The difference in coefficients between the Extensive and Intensive sectors is 
significant within both the market power and competition samples (using either 
definition of market structure). Furthermore, within both the Extensive and Intensive 
sectors the market power and competition equations are significantly different. Within 
the Small Business sector, significance of the F statistics is sensitive to how the market 
power sample is defined.
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Before presenting results for the Small Business, Extensive, and Intensive 
sectors, estimates of wage differentials using one or other measure of size are presented 
to see if results are broadly consistent with the literature. Table 5.5 presents estimates of 
percentage wage differentials comparing either small and large workplaces or small and 
large companies without controlling for the other measure of size.
These have been calculated as the differential between predicted wages in each 
sector with all explanatory variables set to the mean values in the total sample.9 Thus the 
percentage wage differentials represent the returns to each measure of size given the 
same workforce characteristics, overtime, shiftwork, training, and union membership 
and presence in the workplace.
Table 5.5
Percentage Size Wage Differentials 
Using Only Workplace Size OR Company Size
Com paring  
Large and Sm all 
W orkplaces 
IT-{XT and SB}
C om paring  
Large and Sm all 
Com panies 
{IT and XT}-SB
Market Power:
FewC 7.6* 2.6
DC<5 7.0* 0.8
DC<6 8.4* 3.3
Competition:
ManyC 6.9* 10.1*
DC=5+ 6.8* 10.2*
DC=6 4.7* 9.5*
Average 6.4* 7.1*
* indicates significant difference in predicted wages at the 5 per cent level 
with White's standard errors used to calculate standard error of predictions.
Stewart found that workplace size wage differential only significant where 
there are many competitors. But here there is very little variation with market structure
9 The expected wage for any sector is calculated as expfpredicted lnwage) hut a more precise estimate 
given the semi-log functional form is expfpredicted lnwage) + l/2 a 2. The standard error of the regression 
does not however vary across the Small Business. Extensive, and Intensive sectors so the calculated wage 
differential does not change with the addition of I/2a2 to the predicted wage.
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around the mean wage differential between large and small workplaces of 6.4 per cent. 
Where few or many competitors is used to define the sectors the workplace size effects 
are respectively 7.6 and 6.9 per cent. Using the degree of competition rating to define 
sectors the workplace size effects are 7.0 and 6.8 per cent for competition less than 5 or 
5 and above and for a cut-off point of less than 6 or equal to 6 the corresponding 
workplace size effects are 8.4 and 4.7 per cent.
It is the company size effects that follow the same pattern as Stewart’s results. 
Comparing large and small companies (regardless of workplace size) shows significant 
wage differentials of between 9.5 and 10.2 per cent in the competition sectors. But in the 
market power sectors there are no company size wage differentials.
How different are the results after controlling for the alternate measure of size. 
These wage differentials associated with workplace size and company size are reported 
in Table 5.6 and represent the returns to each measure of size (independent of the other 
measure). What the data show for workplace size effects is quite different after 
controlling for company size but company size effects are again positive only in the 
competition sectors and not in the market power sectors.
There are significant returns to workplace size in the absence of market power 
of around 4 per cent and the interaction effect of workplace size and market power is 
positive so that the return to workplace size is higher where there is also some degree of 
market power (with 7 to 8 per cent differential between large and small workplaces).
Workplace size wage differentials (given large company size) increase with 
market power using either definition. This result is the opposite to the finding in Stewart 
(1990).10 Within the framework outlined in the section 5.2 this result implies that 
workplace size increases the bargaining power of employees and/or managerial 
discretion which will have a larger influence on wages where the workplace also has 
some degree of market power." Workplace size may not be reflecting ability-to-pay so
10 The variables and sample used in Stewart (1990) have been replicated as far as possible with the 
AWIRS data in Appendix 5C. The same positive interaction between workplace size effects and few 
competitors is found which suggests that the different results are not simply due to different variables and 
samples.
11 An alternative interpretation suggested by Mellow (1982) is that market power in the large workplace 
sector may be positively correlated with size and hence the increases due to market power may be simply 
and extension of wage gains with size which are not picked up by having only two size categories.
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much as the ability of employees to extract a share of rents. We can then say that, within 
a rent sharing framework, the data is consistent with the proposition that bargaining 
power increases with workplace size and ability-to-pay increases with company size.
Table 5.6
Predicted Percentage Size Wage Differentials
R e tu rn  to R e tu rn  to
W o rk p la c e C o m p a n y
S ize S ize
( IT -X T ) (X T -S B )
Market Power:
FewC 6.8 -0.8
DC<5 7.0* -2.1
DC<6 8.5* -0.8
Competition:
ManyC 3.9* 8.0*
DC=5+ 4.2* 7.8*
DC=6 3.1 7.7*
Average 5.2* 4.1*
* indicates significant difference in predicted wages at the 5 per cent level 
with White's standard errors used to calculate standard error of predictions.
The opposite is seen for company size. Given the same workplace size, there is 
a negative relationship between company size wage differentials and market power. This 
negative interaction effect suggests that either large companies tend to have a degree of 
market power that we are not measuring or company size is an alternative source of 
ability-to-pay such as cost advantages which has a similar effect on wages.
Figure 5.2 illustrates the separate, interaction, and combined effects of size and 
few competitors as percentage differentials compared to the small business sector with 
many competitors. For small workplaces, either having market power or being part of a 
large company results in a similar wage effect. Compared to small businesses facing
However, regressions with the natural log of workplace size included have been estimated with no 
substantial change in the result.
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competition the wage gam from having few competitors by itself is 8.5 per cent and the 
wage gain from companx size bv itself is 8 per cent. But the large negative interaction 
effect (-8.9 per cent) means that the differential by market structure is not evident in the 
large company sector and the differential by company size is not evident where there are 
few competitors.
With regards to workplace size effects, given small workplace size there are no 
wage gains associated with facing few competitors but the interaction effect is positive 
so that the size wage differential of 3.9 per cent increases to 9.8 per cent where there are 
few competitors.
Figure 5.2
Independent, Interaction, and Combined Effects of Size and Few Competitors
(Percentage Change in Wages)
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The result is not likely to be different if we had a measure of the company's 
market power unless a significant proportion of observations are re-allocated between 
the market power and competition sub-samples. That is if market power of the 
workplace and the company are inversely correlated. In addition the pattern is very 
similar to that shown in the raw data (see Table 5.3) and is robust across the three 
definitions of market power.
It is perhaps not surprising to find the lowest wage in small businesses facing 
competition and the highest wage in large workplaces with some market power. 
However, the difference between key relationships in the Extensive sector and other 
sectors is striking. The result in chapter 3 that the large company small workplace group 
has low wages may in part be due to market power not flowing through to wages in this 
sector.
The result that the largest companies do not pay higher wages than medium 
sized companies may in part be explained by differences within the Extensive sector. 
For example if bargaining power is related to company size in the U.S. but related to 
workplace size in Australia. Or if the institutional environment in Australia compresses 
wage differentials it does so within the Extensive sector
5.5 Training and Union Effects by Size and Market Power
If unionisation and training are important in the rent sharing framework we 
expect part of the positive interaction between workplace size effects and market power 
and the negative interaction between company size effects and market power to be 
apparent in returns to unions and training. Predicted wages are calculated given high 
unionisation (UNOCCH and UNDEL equal to one), given low unionisation (UNOCCH 
and UNDEL equal to zero), given high levels of training (TRNH and WPTRN equal to 
one), and given little training (TRNH and WPTRN equal to zero). All other independent 
variables are set equal to mean values of the total sample as in the previous section.
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Union Effects
Table 5.7 reports wages for unionised and non-unionised workplaces within 
each size and market power sector compared to the non-union wage in small business 
facing competition. The pattern that emerges is robust across the different definitions of 
market power and competition sectors. With regards to workplace size, compared to 
small non-unionised workplaces facing competition, there are strong independent and 
positive wage effects from workplace size, market power, and unionisation.
There are complex interaction effects between unionisation, company size, 
workplace size, and market power. The union wage increases with company size or 
market power but not both whereas the non-union wage increases with market power 
but does not increase with company size unless there is also market power.
Table 5.7
Percentage Wage Differential Compared to Non-Union, Small Businesses 
______________________ Facing Competition^______________________
Samples:
C om petitors 
M any Few 5+
D egree o f  Com petition  
<5 =6 <6
Sm allb
Non-U 0 8.7 0 4.6 0 5.2
Union 13.3 23.5 12.1 20.9 12.1 15.8
Exten
Non-U 0.8 19.5 2.1 19.4 -5.2 10.0
Union 25.6 12.3 21.8 10.0 24.2 10.4
Inten
Non-U 13.6 11.6 13.1 5.2 14.7 6.1
Union 20.2 27.5 18.6 31.0 11.8 26.7
P ooled
Non-U 6.1 11.2 5.8 10.0 3.5 6.7
Union 21.3 19.9 19.6 18.7 17.1 17.4
a Union is defined as 100 % union membership within the specific occupation group 
(UNOCCH=l) and a union delegate present at the workplace (UNDEL=1). Non-union is defined 
as no occupation specific membership and no delegate present.
Compared to non-union small workplaces in large companies, workplace size 
by itself increases wages by 11 to 21 per cent, unionisation by itself increases the wage 
by 19 to 31 per cent and market power by itself increases wages by 12 to 15 percent. 
However, in comparison to small companies unionisation and market power by 
themselves increase wages but company size does not.
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Given large company size the non-union wage increases with market power or 
workplace size by themselves but the wage gain is lower where both. The union wage 
falls with market power or workplace size by themselves but increases where both. Thus 
the wage in unionised workplaces exhibits the same pattern of variation across size and 
market power sectors as the average wage (see table 5.6). The non-union wage on the 
other hand exhibits the opposite pattern.
It is again the Extensive sector that displays incongruous results. In the Small 
Business sector the union wage gap is independent of market structure. In the Intensive 
sector the union wage gap increases with market power which is consistent with the rent 
sharing hypothesis. In the Extensive sector the union wage gap falls dramatically with 
market power. For workplaces facing competition the union wage gap is of the order of 
20 to 30 per cent. But where workplaces have few competitors the non-union wage 
increases and the union wage decreases to the point where there is a negative union 
wage gap. This is the opposite to what a rent sharing model predicts.
If the presence of unions in the workplace is interpreted as increasing 
bargaining power it appears to do so only in large workplaces not small. It is non-union 
wages that gain from market power in the small workplace large company group.
Training Effects
The story is different however when returns to training are considered. Wage 
differentials by the level of training are reported in table 5.8. The direction of change in 
these training differentials across market structure groups is reversed for the few 
competitors and the degree of competition variables.
When the sample is split by the number of competitors the training differential 
in the small business sector increases where there is market power (from 2.7 to 10.3 per 
cent), decreases slightly with market power in the Extensive sector (6.5 to 2.3 per cent), 
and decreases dramatically with market power in the Intensive sector (from 13.7 to 1 per 
cent).
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However when the degree of competition variable is used, the opposite is seen 
in the Small Business and Intensive sectors. The training differential decreases with 
market power in Small Business (10.3 to -1.2 per cent) but increases with market power 
in the Intensive sector (0 to 1 1.7 per cent).
Table 5.8
Predicted Return to Training0 Within Each Sector
Competitors Degree of Competition
Samples: Few Many <5_____ 5+ <6____________=6 Pooled
Smallb 10.3 2.7 -1.2 10.3* 4.9 11.4 4.6
Exten 2.3 6.5 3.9 8.7 5.7 6.7 5.3
Inten 1.0 13.7* 0.0 11.7* 10.4* 6.8*
*oooo
Pooled 4.9* 1 1.0* 1.9 11.9* 7.2* 10.2*
a Training is defined as more than six months to learn the job (TRNH) and a formal training 
program apart from on-the-job (TRNWP) and predicted wages are compared to workplaces 
with less than one month to learn the job and no formal program._________________________
We cannot infer anything from these results about interaction between returns 
to training and market structure. When the sample is pooled across the market power 
sector the training differentials vary across the small Business, Extensive, and Intensive 
sectors in a way consistent with the results for tenure wage profiles in chapter 4. The 
training differentials of 4.6 and 5.3 per cent in the small business and Extensive sectors 
are not significant. It is only in the intensive sector with large workplaces that there is a 
significant training differential of 8.8 per cent.
Training coefficients are also sensitive to the inclusion of other variables in the 
equation (see Appendix 5A). Given that there are unobservable variables likely to be 
correlated with both training and wages we can't be certain that we are estimating the 
"true" training effects without estimating structural equations which is not possible with 
the data.
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5.6 Conclusion
We set out to examine interaction between size-wage differentials and product 
market structure with a view' to assessing the validity of interpreting the size wage 
relationship within a rent sharing framework. Along the way we raised the complicating 
issue of a variety of sources of ability-to-pay some of which are related to size and some 
of which are related to market structure. We outlined scenarios where rent sharing could 
occur in large companies (workplaces) where there are many competitors and a high 
degree of competition in the product market and where rent sharing could occur in small 
companies (workplaces) where there are few competitors and a low degree of 
competition. We also showed that the direction of the effect of market structure on size- 
wage differentials can be negative if size and market structure are alternative indicators 
of ability-to-pay and positive if size is an indicator of bargaining power.
The results are consistent with the proposition that company size is positively 
correlated with ability-to-pay rather than the ability of employees to extract a share of 
rents. Negative interaction effects between company size and market power suggest that 
they are proxies for the same underlying variable which within the rent sharing 
framework is ability-to-pay. Thus lower company size wage differentials in the presence 
of market power is consistent with a rent sharing explanation.
Workplace size, on the other hand, appears to be positively correlated with 
employees' ability to extract a share of rents. This interpretation is reinforced by 
variation in union wage effects which do not increase where there is market power or 
workplace size alone but do increase where there are both.
This is an important finding and brings into contention the literature which 
attempts to assess rent sharing effects as an explanation for size-wage differentials but 
use only one measure of size. The relationship between returns to employer size, and 
measures of product market power depends upon the measure of size used.
We showed that comparing large and small workplaces regardless of company 
size produces a zero interaction effect with market structure which according to our 
discussion in section 5.2 is difficult to interpret. But it is also misleading since after
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Controlling for company size workplace size and market power have mutually 
reinforcing positive wage effects.
That the lowest wages are found in small companies facing competition in the 
product market is perhaps not surprising but what is noteworthy is that key relationships 
are very different in the Extensive sector than in either the Small Business or Intensive 
sectors. Having few competitors in the product market does not increase the average 
wage in the Extensive sector and, contrary to the rent sharing model, actually reduces 
the union wage gap. In other sectors having few competitors flows through to higher 
wages. In the Small Business sector this market structure effect is independent of 
unionisation but in large workplaces it relies on the presence of unions in the workplace.
The difference between the company size wage relationship shown in chapter 3 
and evidence from the U.S. is potentially explained by variation in rent sharing effects. 
But it is the Extensive sector that is likely to be driving the different company size 
effects.
The conclusions we have drawn must be treated with a degree of caution. 
Limitations in the empirical measures of market structure are likely to be confounding 
the results particularly if size and market power are jointly determined. We were not 
able to control for variables such as the degree of price collusion or barriers to entry. 
More could be done by for example measuring size relative to the industry average as an 
indicator of market share but other variables will effect market power such as whether 
the market is international or domestic. The results for average wages and the union 
wage gap were robust across the three measures of market structure used.
We have been unable to draw conclusions about interaction between returns to 
training and size or market structure. This is perhaps due to misspecification. Estimates 
of coefficients on training variables are sensitive to alternative measures of product 
market structure.
Nevertheless, if our interpretation is correct, then there is rent sharing in small 
business independent of unions, there is rent sharing in large workplaces which are 
unionised, but the large company small workplace group shows perverse results. This 
chapter has been largely exploratory and is only a first step toward understanding the
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complex interrelationships between company size, workplace size, and product market 
characteristics. Much more research needs to be done on the relationship between the 
company and the workplace and on interaction between product market and labour 
market strategies of employers.
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion
The primary objective of the thesis has been to document and interpret the 
employer size-wage relationship in the Australian context, using measures of both 
company size and workplace size in an econometric analysis. Data from two very 
different surveys, measured at the individual and workplace levels, have been used to 
document the effects of company and workplace size on wages.
The first step in chapter 3 was to use a standard functional form to estimate 
separate wage intercepts in different size categories. This enabled a comparison with 
existing evidence on the wage effects of both measures of size; evidence that is only 
available for the United States. The magnitudes of wage differentials by workplace size 
and company size are consistent with existing evidence, but the shape of the company 
size wage relationship is quite different. Company size effects on wages are non-linear 
with the highest wages in medium sized companies but no statistically significant 
difference for all company size groups with more than 20 employees.
Importantly, this suggests that it is not a universal phenomenon for the largest 
companies to pay the highest wages. The role of company size in wage determination 
may vary with the institutional environment. Alternatively, it may vary with the 
ownership or management structure of companies or the industry distribution of 
companies which vary between the countries.
The standard functional form used in the estimation of size effects, dummy 
intercepts by size, assumes that the relationship between size and wages can be captured 
a fixed wage premium for all employees. In chapter 4 we tested the validity of this 
constraint by estimating separate equations for a Small Business sector where both the 
workplace and the company are small, an Extensive sector where workplaces are small 
but companies are large, and an Intensive sector where both the workplace and the 
company are large. We showed that it is potentially misleading to constrain the impact 
of demographic and human capital variables to be the same across different sized 
workplaces and companies. There is a distinctive wage structure in each of the three 
sectors.
In view of data limitations, in particular the unrepresentative samples of both 
surveys and the level of aggregation in the AWIRS survey, inferences must be taken 
with a degree of caution. Nevertheless the results have important implications for the
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current literature on wage determination and raise new questions that need to be 
analysed.
6.1 Are Australian Results using Both Measures of Size Consistent with Existing 
Evidence?
The answer is clearly no for company size. We find that there is a threshold 
size (20 employees Australia wide) below which very small companies pay low wages 
but above which there are no further wage increases with company size independent of 
workplace size. The largest companies do not pay more than medium sized companies 
unless they operate larger workplaces.
Given Australia's tradition of centralised wage setting we would not be 
surprised to find differing size-wage relationships. However, it is only the company size 
- wage effects which differ. The relationship between workplace size and wages is 
consistent with existing evidence. Characteristics of workplaces appear to affect wages 
in a similar fashion regardless of institutional and structural differences across countries.
If the wage setting environment impacts to a larger degree on companies than 
on individual workplaces, the finding that company size effects differ, whilst workplace 
size effects do not, might be explained by differences in wage bargaining processes. 
However, we would also expect the regulatory environment to impact on companies 
rather than workplaces. For example payroll tax and affirmative action legislation are 
two examples of government policies for which small companies are exempt (but not 
necessarily small workplaces). But there are clearly many other possible reasons for 
differing company size effects including the ownership structure of companies and size 
and industry distributions.
6.2 Biases in Current Estimates of the Wage Structure
The main message from the thesis for the Australian literature is that workplace 
size and company size are both significant variables in wage determination and that the 
functional form matters when controlling for size. We show in chapter 3 that there are 
significant wage differentials by workplace size and company size. Including these 
measures as dummy variables, to estimate a separate intercept by size, generally 
changes other coefficients in the expected direction but these changes are not 
statistically significant.
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Defining three labour market sectors in chapter 4, we find a different process of 
wage determination depending on the workplace and the company. When we extend the 
conventional methodology and estimate separate equations (slope coefficients) for three 
sectors, we find variation in the wage structure by both measures of employer size that 
should be considered in future work.
For example, variations in returns to tenure and experience suggest that 
retention of workers with the same employer is more important for wage outcomes in 
large workplaces. In the Small Business sector on the other hand, wages increase with 
experience in the labour market rather than attachment to a particular employer. Other 
results suggest that the gender wage differential in the Small Business sector is double 
that in large companies. In addition, industry wage differentials are only evident among 
small companies.
Without controlling for size by including interaction terms between these 
variables and company size, a data set which under samples small companies will 
produce estimates of wage differentials that are biased downwards as a reflection of the 
population. Estimates of wage differentials by marital status and urban residence will be 
similarly affected without interactions with workplace size.
The increasing focus on policies to encourage growth of the small business 
sector (see Bureau of Industry Economics 1987) may affect the relative wage of 
different groups of workers as well as the level of wages. If the greater wage 
differentials in the small business sector are driven by firm heterogeneity, for example 
variation in wage/productivity strategies, targeting such policies to encourage the 
growth of high wage high productivity firms rather than sweat shops may be warranted.
6.3 How can the Evidence be Interpreted Within Existing Theory?
It is the analysis in chapters 4 and 5 that provides some insight into reason for 
size-wage differentials. The result we can place most confidence in is variation in 
returns to tenure and experience which suggest that retention of workers with the same 
employer is more important for wage outcomes in large workplaces. This is consistent 
with interpretations based on deferred compensation in the presence of higher 
monitoring costs in large workplaces, or greater worker financed investment in firm 
specific training in larger workplaces. However, starting wages are considerably higher 
in large workplaces and companies implying that variation in tenure wage profiles can 
only explain a part of the average size-wage differential.
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A further result of interest is that workers with typical characteristics of low 
earners (unmarried, females, small urban or rural residents, new entrants, and in service 
industries) gain a higher wage premium from being employed in larger companies 
and/or workplaces. Whereas overseas evidence has shown this result for females it is 
shown here to be much a wider phenomenon.
The question of why typically low income groups are more disadvantaged in 
small businesses is not readily answered by simple models of wage determination. The 
institutional environment within large workplaces and companies, as well as broader 
labour market institutions may contribute to an explanation for this result. But, whatever 
the source of greater disadvantage in small businesses, asking the question in future 
work certainly has the potential to increase our ability to explain persistent wage 
differentials.
Immigrants are an important exception to this result where in the individual 
level data the relative wage of immigrants is invariant across the sectors, and in the 
workplace level data a concentration of non-English speaking background workers in 
the workplace has no significant effect on wages in large companies but a significant 
positive effect on wages in small businesses. A data set which oversamples non-English 
speaking background immigrants, such as the IMA data set used here, is likely to 
understate size-wage effects.
In chapter 5 we argued that given imperfect measures of market power and a 
variety of sources of ability-to-pay, the direction of the effect of market structure on 
size-wage differentials can be negative if size and market structure are alternative 
indicators of ability-to-pay and positive if size is an indicator of bargaining power.
The results are consistent with the proposition that company size is positively 
correlated with ability-to-pay. Workplace size, on the other hand, appears to be 
positively correlated with employees' ability to extract a share of rents. This is an 
important finding and brings into contention the literature which attempts to assess rent 
sharing effects using only one measure of size.
The relationship between returns to employer size, and measures of product 
market power depends upon the measure of size used. The results suggest that 
comparing large and small workplaces regardless of company size produces a zero 
interaction effect with market structure which according to our empirical model is not 
interpretable. But it is also misleading since (after controlling for company size) 
workplace size and market power have mutually reinforcing positive wage effects.
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The data are consistent with the existence of rent sharing in small business, 
independent of unions, and rent sharing in large workplaces which are unionised. 
Results for the large company small workplace group are the opposite of what a rent 
sharing model predicts.
6.4 Distinguishing Between the Workplace and the Company
Workplace size effects and company size effects are shown to vary in a number 
of respects. We have already mentioned how the different pattern of wage intercept 
shifts may be interpreted. But can we say that, for small workplaces, the wage gain 
associated with being part of a larger company is a different phenomenon to the wage 
gain with workplace size among large companies?
In some respects they are quite different. For example the finding in chapter 4 
that the impact of some wage determinants vary with company size and others vary with 
workplace size. The differences are most striking however, when we considered 
interaction with product market structure.
6.5 Further Questions
The thesis raises as many questions as it answers. We have highlighted 
implications for the current Australian literature which should be considered in future 
work
That the company size-wage relationship differs between the Australian data 
sets used here and evidence from the U.S. deserves further analysis. Particularly in the 
context of the debate about whether and how labour market institutions affect the level 
and structure of wages. To draw any inferences at this stage would be unwise without 
assessing alternative explanations for the difference between Australian and U.S. 
results, such as variation in company ownership and management structures and size or 
industry distributions.
Variation in the wage structure across three sectors, as evidenced in chapter 4, 
gives rise to some important questions about wage determination within each sector. In 
small business is the greater variation arising from worker or firm heterogeneity? What 
characteristics of firms in this sector are associated with high wage high productivity 
strategies? Why is the Extensive sector so different? In the Intensive sector is the wage 
structure an efficient response to specific skills and imperfect information or is it a
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response to the institutional environment and unions without offsetting productivity 
benefits?
The analysis in chapter 5 of interaction between product market structure and 
the size-wage relationships was essentially a first step towards assessing the validity of 
interpreting size effects within a rent sharing framework. The next step should be to 
come to grips with endogeneity issues, and refine empirical measures of market power.
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Appendix 3A
Estimating Equation and Variable Definitions
Derivation of The Human Capital Earnings Function:
See Mincer and Polachek (1974)
Et = Et. 1 +rCiA (1)
where Et is gross earnings in period t, Ct_i is the dollar amount of net investment in 
period t-1 and r is the average rate of return to the individual's investment in human 
capital. If the proportion of investment expenditures to gross earnings, Ct/Et is given by 
kt, then by viewing investment in time-equivalent units:
Et = Et.1 ( l+ rk t.1) (2)
Since Et = E0 (1 + rk0) (1 + rkj) ......(1 + rkt_ j), and since ln (1 + rk) = rk for small
values of rk, equation (2) may be written as:
lnEt = lnE0 + r Zj kj for i=0,...,t-l (3)
Analysing schooling and post-school experiences, we can separate the k terms, giving
lnEt = lnE0 + r Zj kj + r Zj kj for i=0,....,s-l and j=s, ,t-1 (4)
where and kj are respectively investment ratios during and after the schooling period. 
Assuming k = l,a
lnEt = lnE0 + rs + r Zj kj for j=s,...,t-l (5)
Since post-schooling investments are expected to decline over the lifetime ( as 
retirement approaches, the expected return from investment falls), (5) may be 
approximated with the inclusion of a quadratic experience term. Thus the estimating 
equation becomes:
InWj = a + bSj + cExpj + dExp2; + eZj + £ (6)
a This is equivalent to assuming that student earnings are the same as direct educational expenditures.
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where, for individual i, InW is the hourly wage, S is years of schooling, Exp is length of 
time in the labour force, Z is a vector of other wage determining variables, and £ is a 
randomly distributed error term.
The addition of tenure allows an examination of the returns to general labour 
market experience and returns to time on the job separately.
The data has normal gross weekly wages reported in 14 categories. Hours 
worked is reported as hours actually worked in the previous week rather than normal 
hours, hence there is no accurate measure of normal hourly wages. The dependent 
variable used is weekly wages with hours worked being included as an independent 
variable. The midpoint of each wage interval is used with the open-ended category 
(900+) being assigned 1000. The results are not qualitatively different if 1400 is used.
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Variable Definitions
w a g e n o rm a l  g ro s s  w e e k ly  w a g e s
s c h o o l(  Y e a r s ) A g e  le f t  s c h o o l  - 5
e x p Y e a r s  o f  la b o u r  m a r k e t  e x p e r ie n c e  
(A g e  - Y e a r s  o f  E d u c a tio n ^ 5 - 5 )
te n u re Y e a r s  w ith  c u r r e n t  e m p lo y e r
h o u r s H o u r s  a c tu a l ly  w o r k e d  in  p r e v io u s  w e e k
B in a ry  V a r ia b le s  =1 if:
a c e r t A u s t .  c e r t i f ic a te ,  D ip lo m a ,  o r  o th e r  q u a l i f ic a t io n
a tra d e A u s t .  t r a d e  q u a l i f ic a t io n s
a u n i A u s t .  B a c h e lo r s ,  o r  H ig h e r  d e g r e e
o s c e r t O v e r s e a s  c e r t i f ic a te  o r  o th e r
o s t r a d e » t r a d e  q u a l i f ic a t io n s
o s u n i » B a c h e lo r s ,  o r  H ig h e r  d e g r e e
fe m a le f e m a le
m a r r ie d m a r r ie d  /  d e  fa c to
m ig r a n t n o t  A u s t r a l ia n  b o rn
u n io n u n io n  m e m b e r
L u rb a n R e s id e  in  m a jo r  u r b a n  a r e a  ( P o p n  > = 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 )
I n d u s t ry  c a te g o r ie s :
" O th e r" - in c lu d in g  M in in g ,  E le c t r ic i ty  /  G a s ,  
T r a n s p o r t /s to r a g e ,  &  C o m m u n ic a t io n s ;
M a n :L - in c lu d in g  f o o d , te x t i le s ,w o o d ,  a n d  p a p e r  
m a n u f a c tu r in g ;
M a n :H - in c lu d in g  c h e m ic a l ,  m e ta l ,  t r a n s p o r t ,  a n d  
m a c h in e r y  p r o d u c ts ;
C o n s tr C o n s tr u c t io n ;
W h o l W h o le s a le ;
R e ta i l R e ta i l ;
F in a n F in a n c e ;
C o m S C o m m u n i ty  s e r v ic e s
R e c re R e c r e a t io n  a n d  P e r s o n a l  s e r v ic e s .
h Post school qualifications were assigned, 6 years (higher degree), 3 years (bachelors degree), 2 years 
(diploma/certificate/trade), and 1 year (other).
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Appendix 3B 
The IMA Survey:
Sample Characteristics and Data Issues
Characteristics of the data suggest potential sources of bias. First, the survey 
consisted of four sub-samples: a core random sample, and additional samples of second 
generation Australians, Non English Speaking Background immigrants, and recent 
arrivals. As such, immigrants are over represented in the data. Previous Australian 
evidence has shown that wage structures differ between non English speaking 
background immigrants and other workers. With the small sample size it is not possible 
to examine this group separately throughout the thesis but using a functional form which 
constrains wage structures to be the same will bias estimates of some coefficients. 
Second, observations which do not have a measure of company size are excluded, and 
these nonrespondents have different characteristics. A selection bias is suggested where 
nonrespondents have a lower average wage than respondents within the smallest 
workplaces but a higher average wage in all other size categories. That is, the sample 
which excludes nonrespondents excludes low wage workers in small workplaces which 
will change the size wage relationship. Third, pooling male and female samples may 
bias some coefficients given previous evidence that coefficients differ between the two. 
Fourth, the wage variable is recorded in intervals and mid-points have been used. If the 
distribution of wages within these intervals varies by employer size, estimates of size 
wage effects will be biased.
After outlining characteristics of the sample, the direction and extent of these 
biases is assessed, with reference to the analysis contained in Chapter 3.
3B.1 Sample Characteristics
The sample is restricted to non-agricultural private sector workplaces and to 
full time workers (>=30 hours or weekly wage>=$120). There are likely to be some 
workers incorrectly assigned to full time or part-time status due to measurement error in 
the hours worked variable. Hours refers to hours worked in the previous week rather 
than normal hours worked. Thirty hours is taken as the cutoff point so as to reduce the 
likelihood of excluding full time workers who may have worked a short week.
Because of the measurement problem for hours, six observations with 
hours>=30 are additionally excluded where normal weekly income is less than $120. 
This implies hourly wages less than $3 if these individuals normally worked 40 hours 
per week. Characteristics of these workers are given in Table 3B.1. There are three 
observations with normal weekly wages less than $80 and three with wages $80 to $120
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per week. Although it is possible that some full time workers earn between $80 and 
$120, these three work for large companies and two are union members. It is then more 
likely that the wage refers to normal part time earnings rather than full time.
Table 3B.1
Characteristics of Six Excluded Observations
Wage($) 1-39 1-39 40-79 80-119 80-119 80-119
Hours 38 40 36 51 35 32
School 13 12 9 10 13 12
Aquals 0 0 0 0 uni cert
OSquals trad 0 0 cert 0 0
Exp 5 13 32 41 6 3
Tenure 2 4 0 7 1 3
Female 0 1 1 0 1 0
Married 0 0 1 0 0 0
Immig 1 1 0 1 0 0
Union 0 0 0 1 0 1
Occ para sale sale oper labo labo
Industry Recre Whol Retail Man:L ComS Retail
WSize 51-100 21-50 <=20 500+ 101-500 <=20
CSize 101-500 21-50 1001 + 1001 + 1001 + 1001 +
See Appendix 3A for variable definitions
The exclusion of these observations leaves 1184 full time workers with 642 of 
these having a measure of company size. Summary statistics are presented in Table 3B.2 
for these samples, and for the sample which does not have a measure of company size 
(nonrespondents). Characteristics of the total full time sample are broadly comparable 
with other Australian cross section data sets, apart from the number of immigrants. (See 
Borland and Suen 1990, Chapman and Mulvey 1986, Miller 1993).
Most immigrants in the sample of respondents are NESB, with only 27 from 
English speaking countries. This is too few to analyse this group separately and they are 
included with immigrants rather than Australian born. However, due to their small 
number, the results for immigrants can be considered to be for NESB immigrants. The 
oversampling of immigrants may bias some coefficients where the wage structure varies 
between NESB immigrants and other workers, and the functional form constrains wage 
structures to be the same. Section 2 evaluates the extent of this bias.
Comparing the nonrespondents and respondents samples shows that 
nonrespondents are more concentrated in the smallest workplaces (55 per cent compared 
to 26 per cent of respondents). Other characteristics which show differences are those 
which are correlated with workplace and company size. The sample of nonrespondents 
has less union members, less in manufacturing, more in Community Service and 
Recreation and Personal Service industries, more females, and lower average years of
tenure.
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Table 3B.2
Statistical Characteristics of Samples Means (Std Dev.)
Sample: Respondents
n=642
Total Fulltime 
n = l184
Non Respondents 
n=542
Wage 449.74(193.78) 430.53(187.84) 407.78(178.06)
Hours 44.06(8.8) 44.18(9.8) 44.31(11.0)
Human Capital Variables:
school( Years) 11.53(1.90) 11.46(1.96) 11.39(2.02)
acert .1215 .1334 .1771
atrade .1308 .1309 .1310
auni .1106 .1056 .0701
oscert .0763 .0853 .0959
ostrade .0919 .0904 .0886
osuni .0592 .0633 .0683
exp 15.57(11.05) 15.64(11.12) 15.72(11.21)
tenure 5.17(6.69) 4.32(6.17) 3.32(5.32)
Other Characteristics:
female .2508 .2948 .3469
married .6495 .6394 .6273
immig .5810 .5895 .5996
union .4970 .4088 .3044
Lurban .8255 .8294 .8339
Occupation:
mana .0748 .0769 .0793
prof .0966 .1005 .1052
para .0421 .0574 .0756
trad .2165 .2424 .2731
der .1324 .1166 .0978
sale .0935 .0938 .0941
oper .1340 .1233 .1107
labo .2103 .1892 .1642
Industry:
Other .0685 .0633 .0572
Man:L .1900 .1740 .1550
Man:H .3178 .2416 .1513
Constr .0483 .0726 .1015
Whols .0857 .0794 .0720
Retail .0950 .1115 .1310
Finan .1184 .1132 .1070
ComS .0343 .0794 .1328
Recre .0421 .0650 .0923
Workplace size:
WS<=20 .2648 .3961 .5517
WS21-50 .1511 .1495 .1476
WS51-100 .1308 .1149 .0959
WS101-500 .2290 .1900 .1439
WS500+ .2243 .1495 .0609
Company Size:
CS<=20 .0919
CS21-50 .0779
CS51-100 .0685
CS101-500 .1854
CS501-1000 .1199
CS1001+ .4564
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The undersampling of small workplaces implies a potential bias in the results if 
the nonrespondents are not a random sample from the population in small workplaces. 
A lower average wage in the sample of nonrespondents suggests that small, low wage 
workplaces were underrepresented in the data collection. Table 3B.3 shows that it is 
only in the smallest workplaces that the average wage (weekly or hourly) is lower for 
nonrespondents. For non respondents, the average wage is $369 compared to $455 for 
respondents, whereas in all other workplace size categories the average wage of 
nonrespondents is slightly higher. This introduces a selection bias where the size wage 
relationship will differ if workers at the lower end of the wage distribution within small 
workplaces are excluded from the sample.
Table 3B.3
Average Weekly and Hourly Wages by Workplace and Company size
Size:
R esponden ts
(n=642)
A v era g e  %
W e ek ly  W a g e  C h an ge
N onresponden ts 
( n = l 184)
A v era g e  %
W eek ly  W a g e  C hange
R espondents
(n=642)
A v era g e  %
H ou rly  W a g e  C h an ge
N onresponden ts 
( n = l 184)
A v era g e  %
H ou rly  W age  C h an ge
W S < = 20 455 .59 0 400.53 0 9.92 0 9.07 0
W S 21-50 422.01 -7.37 425.34 6.19 9.62 -3.02 9.72 7.17
W S 51-100 425 .30 -6.65 430.63 7.52 9.71 -2.12 9.77 7.72
W S 101-500 434 .29 -4.68 448 .40 11.95 9.95 0.30 10.06 10.92
W S 500+ 491 .60 7.90 492 .43 22.94 11.49 15.83 11.46 26.35
C S < = 20 448 .47 0 9.48 0
C S 21-50 430 .00 -4.12 9.64 1.69
C S 5 1-100 46 4 .2 0 3.51 10.15 7.07
C S 101-500 430 .46 -4.02 9.78 3.16
C S 501-1000 472.08 5.26 10.72 13.08
C S 1001+ 453 .16 1.05 10.50 10.76
It is not possible to determine whether small low wage companies are also 
underrepresented in the data since there are no reliable estimates of employment 
distributions by company size for the population. However, two things suggest that this 
is likely to be the case. First, nonrespondents were missed either because the worker did 
not report the name of their employer or because the employer did not respond to the 
follow up survey. If employer non response was due to companies going out of business 
in the time between surveys, these are more likely to be small low wage companies 
where business failure is higher for small companies. Second, the sample of respondents 
has less workers in small companies and more in large companies than in both U.S. and 
Australian Bureau of Statistics data sources.
Employment distributions by company size are compared with U.S. data in 
Table 3B.4. In the IMA samples, there are proportionally fewer workers in very small 
companies; 9 to 10 per cent compared to 19 to 37 per cent in U.S. survey data. The
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differences are contrary to expectations where the U.S. distributions should be skewed 
towards larger companies given a much larger market.
Table 3B.4
______Employer Size Distributions in IMA and U.S. Data_____________
IMA U.S Data
Fulltime With Fulltime 1979 1983 1983 1980
only parttime Males With P/T With P/T F/T Males F/T
(Percentages)
WS1-24 27 28 26 38 25 31
WS25-99 28 27 29 24 14 24
WS100-499 23 23 21 19 13 22
WS500+ 22 22 24 19 49 23
CS1-24 9 9 10 27 31 37 19
CS25-99 15 20 16 14 15 23 14
CS100-499 19 18 19 14 14 20 13
CS500-999 12 11 11 5 5 6 7
CS1000+ 46 47 45 39 36 13 47
Australian Bureau of Statistics estimates for 1988 to 1989 suggest that 33 per 
cent of workers are employed by companies with fewer than 20 employees, and 45 per 
cent are in companies with more than 100 employees.2 It can be inferred then that small 
low wage companies are under-represented in the IMA sample of respondents, as well 
as small workplaces. Estimates of both workplace size and company size effects are 
expected to be biased downwards, and section 3 will assess the extent of this.
A further potential bias from undersampling small workplaces and companies 
comes from the functional form used in Chapter 3 which constrains wage structures to 
be the same across different sized employers. Chapter 4 will address this issue, but it is 
worth noting that estimates in Chapter 3 may be biased as a reflection of the total 
population where coefficients vary by size. For example, tenure coefficients are 
expected to be biased upwards where tenure profiles are steeper in large companies and 
workplaces. The female and union coefficients are also expected to be biased 
downwards where wage differentials for these groups are lower among large firms.3
2 See Table 1.6 in Australian Bureau of Statistics catalogue number 1321. However, company size is 
defined as the number of employees of an enterprise "in a particular State/Territory and not necessarily 
the size of the enterprise Australia wide. The number of workers in small companies is likely to be 
overstated where some of these are part of larger organisations Australia wide.
3 There is evidence of steeper tenure profiles in large companies from U.S. studies (See Pearce 1990). 
Size wage differentials are also shown to be greater for females and non union members (see Mellow 
1982). Chapter 4 also presents similar results.
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3B.2 Oversampling of Immigrants
To evaluate the extent of bias from estimating equations pooled across 
immigrants and non immigrants, separate wage equations are estimated and reported in 
Table 3B.5.
Table 3B.5
Wage Equations For Immigrant and Australian Born Samples
Sam ple:
(1)
A ust. Born 
C oef. t
(2)
Im m igs 
C oef. t
(3)
In terac tions
t
(4)
Pooled  
C oef. t
school .0519039 2.898 -.0027293  0 .366 ( 2 . 9 4 ) .010445 1.495
acert .1322754 2.262 .0035586 0 .080 ( 1 . 7 9 ) .0642307 1.871
atrade .0687934 1.082 -.0327659  0 .599 ( 1 . 2 2 ) .0252819 0.655
auni .181986 2.402 .04415520 .546 ( 1 . 2 4 ) .1489342 2.912
oscert . .025898 0.585 .0026478 0.058
ostrade . .0400361 0 .980 .0446558 1.065
osuni . .2055989 3.886 .2060421 3.951
exp .0383302 5.454 .0127787 2.655 ( 3 . 0 7 ) .0228838 5.944
exp2 -.0006562 4.005 -.0002531 2.488 ( 2 . 1 5 ) - .0004189 5.005
tenure .0113191 1.336 .0109244 1.723 ( 0 . 0 3 ) .0131049 2.628
tenure2 ..0004441 1.359 -.000315  1.356 ( 0 . 3 2 ) -.0004004 2.140
fem ale -.1488133 2.905 -.131362  3.563 ( 0 . 2 8 ) - .1475476 4.967
m arried .0435243 0.932 .0750318 2.092 ( 0 . 5 4 ) .056574 1.999
m igran t . - .0634086 2.195
union .0069124 0.152 -.0926285  2.647 ( 1 . 7 6 ) - .0618669 2.295
hours .0097953 4.778 .0138888 7.267 ( 1 . 4 7 ) .0116165 8.484
L urban .1165241 2.703 .0405886 0 .779 ( 1 . 1 1 ) .0769788 2.433
m ana .3665003 3.984 .4347363 5.555 ( 0 . 5 7 ) .4086572 7.278
p ro f .3179093 3.323 .3051937 4.685 ( 0 . 1 1 ) .3447473 6.638
para .2660579 2.385 .3500963 4 .316 ( 0 . 6 2 ) .3360582 5.306
trad .0706077 0 .852 .0825553 2.009 ( 0 . 1 3 ) .0749457 2.015
cler .1240624 1.669 .0809173 1.335 ( 0 . 4 5 ) .1091537 2.485
sale .2187568 2.692 .1297778 1.982 ( 0 . 8 6 ) .2068466 4.281
oper .0621122 0.753 .0306456 0.681 ( 0 . 3 4 ) .0506983 1.290
O ther .1957461 2.319 .0609283 0.894 ( 1 . 2 6 ) .1356921 2.617
M an:H .0859755 1.314 .0218411 0 .562 ( 0 . 8 6 ) .0600692 1.799
C onstr .1824438 1.863 .2048443 2 .620 ( 0 . 1 8 ) .2277048 3.854
W hols .055717 0.725 .05212750 .799 ( 0 . 0 3 ) .034796 0.731
R etail - .1069513 1.362 .0557063 0 .829 ( 1 . 5 9 ) -.0498003 1.017
Finan .0577247 0.743 .1046699  1.686 ( 0 . 4 8 ) .0833269 1.784
Com S .0204629 0.184 -.0763867 0.759 ( 0 . 6 5 ) -.0315677 0.454
R ecre .0024224 0.019 -.0163012  0.229 ( 0 . 1 3 ) .0051579 0.084
W S 21-50 -.0602682 0.924 .0237831 0.478 ( 1 . 0 4 ) - .0156262 0.396
W S 5 1-100 -.0639299 0.871 .0234166 0.445 ( 0 . 9 8 ) - .0174882 0.407
W S 101-500 -.0240158 0.353 .032535 0 .672 ( 0 . 6 9 ) .0134803 0.347
W S 500+ .1022598 1.481 .0980493 1.948 ( 0 . 0 5 ) .0992158 2.457
C S 21-50 .108676 1.211 .05734640 .688 ( 0 . 4 2 ) .0973399 1.658
C S 51-100 .1959135 2.063 .0704491 0 .790 ( 0 . 9 7 ) .1442262 2.280
C S 101 -500 .2008545 2.396 .0553519 0.749 ( 1 . 3 1 ) .1279994 2.451
C S 501-1000 .1357952 1.467 .1725207 2.135 ( 0 . 3 0 ) .1748147 2.999
C S 1 0 0 1 + .1291959 1.741 .0882507 1.216 ( 0 . 3 9 ) .1321479 2.638
const 4 .218182 17.94 4 .987935  31.16 ( 2 . 7 7 ) 4 .79042  39.79
n 269 373 642
R 2 .5740 .4799 .5188
W S F(4)= 1.74 1.09 2.69
CS F(5)= 1.33 1.39 1.93
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The hypothesis that all coefficients are equal for immigrants and Australian 
born can be rejected at the 5% significance level. Column (3) reports t-ratios for 
interaction terms which show that individual coefficients are significantly different for 
education, experience, and union membership variables. Coefficients for these variables 
will be biased downward in the functional form used in Chapter 3, due to the 
oversampling of immigrants.
Estimates of size wage differentials are not significantly different for 
immigrants and non-immigrants. For large workplace size, and most company size 
categories, coefficients are slightly lower for immigrants than non-immigrants. This 
suggests that any bias from over sampling immigrants will be downward for estimates 
of size wage effects. However, the overall pattern of size effects is the same for 
immigrants and non-immigrants. When both measures of size are included, only the 
largest workplaces have higher wages, and there is a non-monotonic pattern of company 
size effects which concurs with results in Chapter 3.
Tables B6 and B7 show the change in coefficients, when size measures are 
included, for immigrants and non immigrants separately. Although the value of 
coefficients is different, between the two samples, the same variables change when size 
is included, and in the same direction.
The magnitude of change is similar for some variables. For example, the tenure 
coefficient falls by 16% for immigrants and 15% for Australian born when both 
measures of size are included. Some coefficients change by more for the Australian 
Born sample. For example, the coefficients on auni suggest that, when both measures of 
size are included, the wage advantage of Australian university qualifications falls by 
two percentage points for immigrants and by four percentage point for Australian born. 
Coefficients on Construction and Community Service industries also change by more 
for the Australian Born sample. For the union coefficient, the percentage point change is 
greater for the sample of immigrants. But the same direction of change is seen in both 
samples.
Overall, the results for both samples concur with those in Chapter 3 using the 
constrained functional form. There are no statistically significant changes to coefficients 
when either workplace size or company size (or both) are included in the wage equation.
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Table 3B.6
Immigrant Sample
(n=373)
Change in Coefficients with Size Included
Without Size 
Coef. t
With WS 
Coef. t
With CS 
Coef. t
With Both 
Coef. t
school -.0042611 0.573 -.0024758 0.332 -.0034851 0.472 -.0027293 0.366
acert .0078642 0.180 .0132773 0.303 .0029095 0.067 .00355860.080
atrade -.0387578 0.711 -.0234907 0.432 -.0461653 0.850 -.0327659 0.599
auni .0647601 0.799 .0624507 0.775 .0461089 0.572 .04415520.546
oscert .0390767 0.876 .031298 0.706 .02886930.652 .025898 0.585
ostrade .0466039 1.135 .0476103 1.168 .0392889 0.964 .04003610.980
osuni .2277148 4.314 .2218856 4.228 .208685 3.959 .20559893.886
exp .0119655 2.481 .0123599 2.573 .0127502 2.661 .01277872.655
exp2 -.0002475 2.434 -.0002487 2.450 -.0002555 2.529 -.0002531 2.488
tenure .0130504 2.051 .0114926 1.815 .0112971 1.783 .01092441.723
tenure2 -.0003485 1.490 -.0003511 1.513 -.000296 1.274 -.000315 1.356
female -.1374207 3.720 -.1315316 3.577 -.1361212 3.699 -.131362 3.563
married .0867864 2.418 .082874 2.317 .07644872.144 .07503182.092
union -.0598117 1.786 -.0836134 2.428 -.0867886 2.512 -.0926285 2.647
hours .0128676 6.732 .0135713 7.106 .0135816 7.130 .01388887.267
Lurban .0179487 0.345 .0380341 0.731 .0291671 0.563 .04058860.779
mana .421756 5.381 .42048695.403 .43923815.631 .43473635.555
prof .2899538 4.498 .2876139 4.484 .3045942 4.713 .30519374.685
para .3556215 4.396 .3566702 4.392 .350372 4.364 .35009634.316
trad .0588086 1.441 .0709555 1.735 .07779 1.907 .08255532.009
cler .0910034 1.513 .0860249 1.433 .0770647 1.283 .08091731.335
sale .1058664 1.622 .1277395 1.956 .1164414 1.794 .12977781.982
oper .0269631 0.597 .031761 0.706 .02858790.639 .03064560.681
Other .0718336 1.068 .0600798 0.895 .0646187 0.957 .06092830.894
Man:H .0375969 0.981 .0224778 0.581 .02867 0.744 .02184110.562
Constr .1673387 2.150 .1919334 2.474 .195127 2.500 .20484432.620
Whols .0433285 0.674 .0535523 0.830 .0499618 0.775 .05212750.799
Retail .046129 0.708 .05251290.805 .04381980.656 .05570630.829
Finan .0966767 1.573 .1043783 1.706 .0966075 1.564 .10466991.686
ComS -.0940652 0.946 -.0921515 0.933 -.0673888 0.672 -.0763867 0.759
Recre .0067497 0.096 -.0092931 0.132 -.0075902 0.107 -.01630120.229
WS21-50 .0459732 0.980 .0237831 0.478
WS51-100 .0382818 0.792 .0234166 0.445
W S101-500 .0665925 1.532 .032535 0.672
WS500+ .1364115 3.057 .0980493 1.948
CS21-50 .0644058 0.815 .0573464 0.688
CS51-100 .0807387 0.974 .0704491 0.790
CS101-500 .0671726 0.988 .0553519 0.749
CS501-1000 .2080204 2.806 .1725207 2.135
CS1001+ .1322911 1.997 .0882507 1.216
const 5.171878 35.67 5.054611 33.91 5.02844 31.80 4.987935 31.16
R2 .4678 .4769 .4793 .4799
Aquals F(3)=0.45 0.32 0.41 0.26
OSQuals F(3)=6.33 6.11 5.30 5.12
Exp F(2)=3.14 3.32 3.55 3.53
Tenure F(2)=2.49 1.69 1.91 1.59
Occ F(7)=6.58 6.55 7.07 6.88
Ind F(8)= 1.15 1.45 1.30 1.51
WSj=WS:=0 F(4)=2.49 F(4)=1.09
CS;=CS:=0 F(5)=2.51 F(5)=1.39
162
Table 3B.7
Australian Born Sample
(n=269)
Change in Coefficients with Size Included
Without Size 
Coef. t
With WS 
Coef. t
With CS 
Coef. t
With Both 
Coef. t
school .0617836 3.494 .0571686 3.227 .0580618 3.254 .05190392.898
acert .1390259 2.427 .1286454 2.243 .1467205 2.527 .13227542.262
atrade .0737799 1.163 .067684 1.062 .06742231.062 .06879341.082
auni .2206987 2.959 .1834885 2.423 .2131045 2.853 .181986 2.402
exp .0368372 5.271 .0369495 5.306 .0369249 5.239 .03833025.454
exp2 -.0006167 3.802 -.000614 3.804 -.00062593.807 -.00065624.005
tenure .0133413 1.575 .0122512 1.446 .0122382 1.443 .01131911.336
tenure2 -.0004542 1.387 -.0004405 1.348 -.0004467 1.363 ..0004441 1.359
female -.1509107 2.990 -.1553351 3.042 -.1534807 3.026 -.1488133 2.905
married .0620145 1.335 .0514427 1.104 .0553914 1.190 .04352430.932
union .0223901 0.532 .0018638 0.042 -.0006563 0.015 .00691240.152
hours .0088493 4.335 .0093817 4.589 .0095076 4.623 .00979534.778
Lurban .0974878 2.268 .1071187 2.491 .1056954 2.454 .11652412.703
mana .3464018 3.846 .3419014 3.766 .3654686 4.002 .36650033.984
prof .3017475 3.332 .2880347 3.163 .3058536 3.226 .31790933.323
para .2631371 2.440 .2492983 2.312 .2604623 2.334 .26605792.385
trad .0509972 0.635 .0404012 0.498 .072011 0.875 .07060770.852
cler .1081212 1.501 .1051196 1.456 .1 143542 1.539 .12406241.669
sale .2154003 2.712 .2096029 2.627 .2149143 2.653 .21875682.692
oper .0270724 0.347 .0234945 0.302 .0479091 0.579 .06211220.753
Other .2107349 2.513 .2005642 2.376 .2065045 2.456 .19574612.319
Man:H .1050747 1.633 .0977926 1.518 .0896082 1.368 .08597551.314
Constr .1305494 1.395 .1722482 1.780 .1696053 1.748 .18244381.863
Whols .0214997 0.283 .0481232 0.628 .0385206 0.505 .055717 0.725
Retail -.1272136 1.655 -.1 135757 1.459 -.1273827 1.638 -.1069513 1.362
Finan .045311 0.608 .06650770.867 .03876210.516 .05772470.743
ComS -.0473308 0.443 .0033931 0.031 -.0308823 0.289 .0204629 0.184
Recre .045136 0.358 .04399680.350 .01734870.135 .00242240.019
WS21-50 .0035174 0.060 -.0602682 0.924
WS51-100 .0196522 0.307 -.0639299 0.871
WS101-500 .0403721 0.715 -.0240158 0.353
WS500+ .1428602 2.422 .1022598 1.481
CS21-50 .0710873 0.854 .108676 1.211
CS51-100 .1421002 1.691 .1959135 2.063
CS101-500 .1547247 2.091 .2008545 2.396
CS501-1000 .1282568 1.659 .1357952 1.467
CS1001+ .1423402 2.253 .1291959 1.741
const 4.280315 18.45 4.286204 18.37 4.18447 17.75 4.218182 17.94
R2 .5660 .5710 .5686 .5740
Aquals F(3)=3.47 2.54 3.42 2.54
Exp F(2)= 17.85 18.17 17.38 18.53
Tenure F(2)=1.25 1.05 1.05 0.95
Occ F(7)=3.64 3.50 3.52 3.48
Ind F(8)=2.81 2.49 2.67 2.25
WSj=WS:=0 F(4)= F(4)=1.74
c s ;=cs,=o F(5)= 1.29 F(5)=1.33
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3B.3 Results for the Male Sample
Due to a small sample size, the analysis throughout the thesis uses the sample 
pooled across male and female sub-samples. One of the examiners of this thesis 
suggested including results for the sub-sample of males within this appendix. A 
parsimonious equation is estimated given the smaller sample size and results are given 
in Table 3B.8. For the sample of 481 males, coefficients show the same pattern as with 
the pooled sample. Size coefficients are slightly lower in magnitude and statistical 
significance.
Table 3B.8 
Males [n=481]
Without Size With WS With CS
educa .0683634 (6.026) .0628273 (5.404) .0656552 (5.851) .0627601 (5.506)
educma -.0379899 (2.996) -.0302038 (2.326) -.0353335 (2.808) -.0303699 (2.379)
educmos .021027 (3.563) .0223045 (3.779) .020305 (3.455) .0218379 (3.651)
experience .0060227 (3.012) .0063831 (3.304) .0061318 (3.155) .0064427 (3.371)
tenure .0046173 (1.759) .0034682 (1.303) .0037317 (1.376) .0032073 (1.177)
married .1932955 (5.262) .183597 (5.151) .1857385 (5.164) .1796994 (5.062)
immigrant .4537957 (2.991) .35144 (2.245) .4146691 (2.736) .3494009 (2.264)
union -.1044755 (3.367) -.1282625 (3.930) -.1304373 (3.972) -.1319083 (3.915)
hours .0135194 (9.061) .0140891 (9.612) .0141686 (9.594) .0143181 (9.763)
Lurban .0731044 (1.789) .0880554 (2.235) .0837029 (2.090) .0910998 (2.326)
WS21-50 .0297207 (0.635) -.0084998 (0.171)
WS51-100 .0187325 (0.365) -.0229741 (0.426)
WS 101-500 .0810061 (1.748) .0362242 (0.714)
WS500+ .1261037 (2.900) .0802765 (1.646)
CS<=20
CS21-50 .0889155 (1.246) .0966831 (1.268)
CS51-100 .0939401 (1.149) .1123187 (1.293)
CS 101-500 .113684 (1.674) .1077338 (1.462)
CS501-100C .1753347 (2.392) .1431413 (1.777)
CS1001+ .1501019 (2.289) .1171894 (1.626)
constant 4.424927 (25.617) 4.430364 (25.883) 4.328254 (25.043) 4.354187 (24.980)
R2 .3497 .3572 .3552 .3557
MSE .3210 .3191 .3196 .3195
Joint Significance:
Educ* F(3) 15.17 14.03 14.78 14.25
WS* F(4) 2.71 1.45 1.38
CS* F(5) 0.66
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3B.4 Exclusion of Nonrespondents
A selection bias is suggested from a lower average wage for the excluded 
nonrespondents who are in small workplaces. Estimates of wage equations for the total 
fulltime sample (including nonrespondents), and for the sample of respondents, are 
reported in Table 3B.9.
Comparing columns (1) and (3) shows noticeable differences, between 
samples, in coefficients for university qualifications, tenure, female, union membership, 
and some industry groups. In the sample of respondents, returns to university 
qualifications are lower by 5 percentage points (25.9% compared to 20.4%), but this 
difference is not statistically significant. Returns to tenure are significantly higher when 
nonrespondents are excluded. For this sample tenure coefficients are jointly significant 
with a test statistic of F(2,609)=5.08, but for the total sample tenure coefficients are not 
significant at the 5 per cent level with F(2,l 151 )=2.65. Initial wage growth with tenure 
is more than doubled when nonrespondents are excluded.
Other coefficients which are significantly different between the samples are on 
union membership and the Recreation and Personal Service industry. Union members 
have lower wages on average than non union members only when nonrespondents are 
excluded. For the total sample the union coefficient is not significant. Coefficients are 
significantly different at the 1 per cent level between the samples. The Recreation and 
Personal Service industry has wages 10.5 per cent lower than in the "Light" 
Manufacturing group in the total sample, however, when nonrespondents are excluded 
there is no difference between the two industry groups.
Despite these differences in the magnitude of coefficients the change in 
coefficients when workplace size is included has a similar pattern to that shown in 
Chapter 3. The analysis in Chapter three has tenure coefficients biased upwards, union 
coefficients biased downwards, and coefficients on the Recreation and Personal Service 
industry biased upwards. However, the same coefficients show some change, and in the 
same direction, after controlling for size. None of these changes are statistically 
significant and the inferences drawn in Chapter Three, that coefficients are fairly robust 
to the inclusion of size, are not affected by the exclusion of nonrespondents from the 
sample.
The results suggest that workplace size coefficients are biased downwards; as 
expected, they are higher in the total sample which includes nonrespondents. The same 
monotonic pattern of size wage differentials is seen but excluding nonrespondents 
reduces these by between 2 and 5 percentage points. The differences in size coefficients 
are not individually or jointly significant at the 5 per cent level. However, one 
noteworthy change is that the significant 8.5 per cent wage premium associated with
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Table 3B.9
Estimates With and Without Nonrespondents
Sam ple:
0 )
Total Fu lltim e
(2) (3)
R esponden ts
(4)
school .0098 1.89 .0098 1.92 .0101 1.42 .0108 1.54
acert .0736 2.83 .0774 3.01 .0714 2.06 .0684 2.00
atrade .0607 2.02 .0604 2.04 .0256 0.65 .0262 0.67
auni .2300 5.66 .2154 5.37 .1853 3.61 .1581 3.08
oscert .0612 1.77 .0516 1.51 .0069 0.14 .0031 0.06
ostrade .0814 2.44 .0741 2.25 .0489 1.15 .0515 1.22
osuni .1546 3.89 .1439 3.68 .2229 4.24 .2160 4.16
exp .0218 7 .50 .0221 7.72 .0226 5.79 .0229 5.92
exp2 -.0004 6.57 -.0004 6.63 -.0004 4.94 -.0004 4.98
tenure .0070 1.86 .0047 1.27 .0149 2.95 .0135 2.71
tenure2 -.0001 1.04 -.0001 0.81 -.0004 2.19 -.0004 2.19
fem ale -.1728 7.69 -.1679 7.58 -.1475 4.92 -.1482 4.98
m arried .0657 3.06 .0573 2.71 .0709 2.48 .0637 2.25
im m ig -.0398 1.75 -.0491 2.19 -.0506 1.73 -.0590 2.04
union .0341 1.74 -.0001 0.00 -.0334 1.29 -.0579 2.18
hours .0087 9.38 .0090 9.76 .0107 7.74 .0114 8.28
L urban .0437 1.76 .0487 1.99 .0618 1.93 .0749 2.35
m ana .4405 0.68 .4372 0.76 .3929 6.95 .3948 7.06
p ro f .3482 8.40 .3337 8.14 .3326 6.44 .3277 6.40
para .3138 7.10 .3089 7.09 .3370 5.28 .3348 5.29
trad .0526 1.81 .0672 2.35 .0576 1.53 .0647 1.74
cler .1066 2.98 .1020 2.89 .1071 2.43 .1084 2.48
sale .1667 4.41 .1700 4.56 .1981 4 .06 .2064 4.28
oper .0481 1.48 .0563 1.76 .0447 1.12 .0482 1.22
O ther .1513 3.67 .1585 3.90 .1497 2.88 .1388 2.68
M an:H .0640 2.31 .0455 1.65 .0772 2.31 .0601 1.80
Constr .1302 3.28 .1683 4.26 .1706 2.90 .2007 3.42
W hols .0399 1.04 .0538 1.42 .0115 0.24 .0307 0.64
Retail - .0799 2.21 -.0648 1.81 -.0578 1.18 -.0505 1.04
Finan .1146 3.16 .1321 3.68 .0788 1.71 .0909 1.97
C om S -.0690 1.68 -.0547 1.35 -.0659 0.94 -.0415 0.59
Recre -.1112 2.67 -.1018 2.48 .0199 0.31 .0060 0.09
W S 21-50 .0474 1.79 .0246 0.67
W S 51-100 .0816 2.77 .0321 0.83
W S 101-500 .1080 4.25 .0671 1.96
W S500+ .1734 6.06 .1461 4.13
const 5 .0346 59 .84 4.9781 59.7 4.9611 43.11 4 .8800 42.11
n 1184 1184 642 642
R 2 .4686 .4856 .5029 .5150
e'e 100.1468 96 .61757 47.611 46.143
W S ize F (4) 10.47 4.81
workplaces of 51 to 100 in the total sample falls to 3 per cent and is insignificant when 
nonrespondents are excluded.
In Chapter 3, (see Table 3.9) controlling for company size is shown to reduce 
the effect of workplace size so that only the largest workplaces have wages significantly 
higher than the smallest (a 10.4% differential). To test the sensitivity of this result 
company size has been included in the equation for the total sample with a dummy 
variable included for nonrespondents. The coefficient on the dummy variable is .0113
166
and insignificant. The effect of including company size is to reduce workplace size 
effects by between 2 and 4 percentage points, as in Chapter 3. However, there are still 
significant wage gains in the 101 to 500 size category, of 8 per cent. A further result of 
interest from this exercise is that company size coefficients are between 2 and 5 
percentage points lower and workplace size coefficients are between 2 and 5 percentage 
points higher. Results in Chapter 3 may overstate wage gains with company size relative 
to wage gains with workplace size. However, the same overall pattern of size effects is 
seen; workplace size coefficients fall when company size is included, and only very 
small companies have wages systematically different from other companies.
It is also important to note differences, between the two samples, in the 
sensitivity of size coefficients to the inclusion of various groups of independent 
variables. Table 3B.10 shows estimates of workplace size coefficients from various 
specifications of the wage equation where groups of independent variables are added 
sequentially.
Table 3B.10
Sensitivity of Workplace Size Effects
Sample:
Workplace Size:
Excluding Nonrespondents 
21-50 51-100 101-500 500+ 21-50
Total fulltime 
51-100 101-500 500+
Including:
Hrs -.0082 -.0004 .0093 . 1578* .0858* .0905* .1227* .2423*
+ Educ .0074 .0218 .0416 .1502* .0797* .0916* .1299* .2181*
+ Exp -.0061 -.0054 .0023 .1094* .0645* .0677* .1009* .1902*
+ Tenure -.0082 -.0143 -.0039 .0919* .0618* .0611 .0947* .1654*
+ Other -.0035 -.0075 .0171 .1022* .0637* .0624* .0998* .1600*
+ Union .0209 .0264 .0587 .1442* .0710* .0743* .1133* .1736*
+ Occ .0282 .0279 .0549 .1469* .0580* .0745* .0955* .1644*
+ Ind .0246 .0321 .0671* . 1461* .0474 .0816* .1080* . 1734*
* indicates significance at 5 per cent level for two tailed t tests.
Other_____includes female, married, immig, and lurban variables._____
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The first point to note is that, in the total sample nearly all size coefficients are 
significant whereas with nonrespondents excluded only the largest workplaces show 
consistently higher wages.
A second important difference is that for the total sample, a regression 
controlling for hours only gives an estimate of the wage differential in the largest 
workplaces of 27%, which falls to 19% when all other variables are included. For the 
sample of respondents, the equivalent wage differential falls by only one percentage 
point, from 17 to 16%. The sample of respondents understates the importance of other 
explanatory variables in explaining a portion of the raw size wage differentials.
The direction of change in size coefficients is generally the same between 
samples when additional variables are included. However, a noticeable difference is 
when union is added to the equation. The full sample shows a one percentage point 
increase in workplace size coefficients whereas with nonrespondents excluded, there is a 
four percentage point increase. This is primarily due to a significant negative union 
coefficient in the sample of respondents and correlation between size and union 
membership. The implication is that results regarding the relationship between 
workplace size and union membership are specific to the sample used throughout the 
thesis.
3B.5 Grouped Dependent Variable
If the distribution of wages within the recorded intervals varies by employer 
size, estimates of size effects may be biased. The direction of bias may be in either 
direction, however, if larger workplaces and companies tend to pay higher wages within 
each recorded interval, size effects will be biased downwards.
A grouped dependent variable will generally result in inconsistent OLS 
estimates. (Stewart 1983). The estimation procedure developed by Stewart (1983) 
overcomes this by defining a latent continuous dependent variable and estimating 
coefficients by maximum likelihood. In effect this method assigns an expected wage for 
each individual conditional on the observed wage interval as well as individual 
characteristics. Results using this estimation technique are reported in Table 3B.11.
There is very little difference between coefficients reported in Table 3B.11 and 
the equivalent OLS estimates reported in Table 3.7 in Chapter 3. The same coefficients 
change when measures of size are included and the change is of the same magnitude. 
Most coefficients on workplace and company size are slightly higher in the maximum 
likelihood estimations, however, the difference is less than one percentage point in each
case.
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Table 3B.11
Maximum Likelihood Estimations
C oef. t C oef. t Coef. t C oef. t
school .0118 1.70 .0126 1.84 .0117 1.71 .0121 1.79
acert .0623 1.84 .0604 1.80 .0640 1.90 .0559 1.67
atrade .0286 0.74 .0291 0.77 .0249 0.66 .0287 0.76
auni .1876 3.68 .1600 3.16 .1725 3.42 .1520 3.01
oscert .0034 0.07 -.0005 0.01 -.0011 0.02 -.0005 0.01
ostrade .0478 1.15 .0503 1.23 .0418 1.01 .0431 1.06
osuni .2231 4.30 .2148 4 .20 .2117 4 .10 .2042 3.99
exp .0236 6.17 .0238 6.32 .0235 6.22 .0239 6.36
exp2 -.0004 5.18 -.0004 5.24 -.0004 5.19 -.0005 5.28
tenure .0136 2.75 .0122 2.49 .0121 2.46 .0117 2.40
tenure2 -.0004 2.03 -.0004 2.04 -.0003 1.89 -.0004 1.98
fem ale -.1394 4.75 -.1403 4.83 -.1425 4.91 -.1395 4.83
m arried .0616 2.20 .0542 1.96 .0521 1.88 .0469 1.70
im m ig -.0467 1.63 -.0557 1.97 -.0547 1.93 -.0599 2.12
union -.0369 1.46 -.0623 2.41 -.0640 2.46 -.0652 2.49
hours .0118 8.46 .0126 9.05 .0124 8.96 .0129 9.28
L urban .0629 2.00 .0756 2.42 .0694 2.23 .0778 2.51
m ana .4181 7.47 .4206 7.62 .4354 7.82 .4361 7.88
p ro f .3250 6.41 .3185 6.37 .3287 6.48 .3364 6.65
para .3487 5.51 .3479 5.56 .3392 5.41 .3487 5.59
trad .0518 1.41 .0591 1.63 .0640 1.76 .0697 1.93
cler .1028 2.39 .1040 2.44 .0958 2.23 .1059 2.48
sale .1862 3.90 .1949 4.15 .1856 3.92 .1962 4.18
plan .0349 0.90 .0382 0.99 .0367 0.95 .0412 1.08
O ther .1564 3.06 .1458 2.88 .1469 2.90 .1431 2.83
M an:H .0757 2.32 .0577 1.78 .0667 2.05 .0581 1.79
Constr .1710 2.98 .2021 3.54 .2207 3.82 .2287 3.99
W hols .0222 0.47 .0412 0.88 .0363 0.78 .0457 0.98
Retail - .0604 1.26 -.0530 1.12 -.0644 1.34 -.0514 1.07
F inan .0882 1.94 .1003 2.22 .0803 1.77 .0928 2.03
ComS -.0618 0.90 -.0354 0.51 -.0409 0.59 -.0226 0.33
R ecrc .0265 0.43 .0107 0.17 .0213 0.35 .0101 0.16
W S21-50 .0235 0.66 -.0179 0.46
W S 51-100 .0367 0.97 -.0146 0.34
W S 101-500 .0719 2.16 .0200 0.52
W S 500+ .1512 4.36 .1063 2.70
C S 21-50 .0834 1.55 .1013 1.76
C S 51-100 .1359 2.41 .1566 2.53
C S 101-500 .1185 2.57 .1272 2.49
C S 501-1000 .2000 3.92 .1757 3.07
C S 1001+ .1658 3.80 .1311 2.67
const 4 .8823 42.79 4 .7962 41.81 4 .744 39.87 4.7055 39.64
Log
L ikelihood: -1139 .53 -1128.91 -1129 .928 -1123 .699
<J(t) .2659(32 .85) .26141(32 .81) .2619(32 .82) .2593(32 .79)
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3B.6 Summary
The results presented here suggest that the overall conclusions from the 
analysis in Chapter 3 are not substantially affected by either of the potential biases 
considered. First, pooling the sample across immigrants and non-immigrants results in 
lower estimates of returns to qualifications and experience, as well as a negative 
correlation between wages and union membership, but little difference in average size 
wage differentials. Pooling the sample across males and females also does not affect the 
pattern of size effects.
Second, the assumption that wage distributions within recorded intervals are 
equivalent across different sized employers has no effect on results. Maximum 
likelihood estimations show slightly higher size effects suggesting that larger firms will 
have higher average predicted wages within each interval, but this changes size 
coefficients by less than one percentage point.
Third, the qualitative conclusions drawn in Chapter 3 are not changed when 
nonrespondents are included in the sample. The selection bias from excluding 
nonrespondents results in estimates of workplace size coefficients between 2 and 5 
percentage points lower in the sample used in Chapter 3. However, all results 
concerning the sensitivity of other coefficients when workplace size is included, show 
the same direction and similar magnitude of change between the two samples including 
and excluding nonrespondents. Workplace size coefficients also follow the same 
monotonic pattern. However, any interaction between union membership and workplace 
size is specific to the sample used throughout the thesis.
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Appendix 3C
Comparison of AWIRS and IMA
The question addressed in this appendix is whether the AWIRS data can be 
meaningfully employed to assess the employer size wage relationship, given that 
information about worker characteristics is limited and measured at the aggregate 
workplace level. After describing the AWIRS data, and comparing the AWIRS and 
IMA samples, a comparison is made of the estimated wage effect of worker 
characteristic variables which are available from both surveys.
The AWIRS data comes from a survey of workplaces where there are at least 
20 employees.7 Information on wages and the number of employees was collected from 
an initial questionnaire sent to workplaces. Other variables used here were collected 
from follow up interviews with general managers and / or employee relations managers 
at the workplace. Wages are recorded for each of eight occupation groups separately and 
indicate the weekly wage that most full time permanent workers receive. This is 
reported in 12 intervals.
In AWIRS, the number of workers in each occupation group is recorded as the 
total, including part-time and casual workers whereas the wage variable relates to full 
time permanent workers only. It is not then possible to calculate an average wage for 
each workplace without assuming that casual and part-time workers receive the same 
average weekly wage as full-time permanent workers. Instead the data has been pooled 
so that there is a separate observation for each wage variable within a workplace.8 There 
are then up to eight observations for each workplace with the wage variable taking a 
different value for each occupation group and the independent variables having one 
value across each observation for a workplace. This results in 4650 observations 
representing 927 workplaces.9
The AWIRS data has only a few variables for worker characteristics measured 
at the aggregate workplace level. As a result, estimating wage equations with this data is 
not very informative for individual wage determination. However, employer size
7 This was undertaken by the Department of Industrial Relations and is available through the Social 
Science Data Archive.
8 This is necessary to allow a comparison with the IMA data which has too few observations in some 
occupation groups to estimate separate size wage effects. Dummy variables indicating the occupation 
group are included.
9 If these are not 4650 independent observations, standard errors will be underestimated. This could be 
the case if measurement errors are correlated across wage variables within each workplace. To control for 
this would require using fixed effects estimators. For the purposes of this paper OLS estimates are 
reported with the caution that significance of parameter estimates may be overstated.
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variables are measured the same way in the AWIRS and IMA data and the wage effect 
of these measures are compared in section 4.1.
AWIRS survey information on wages indicates the weekly wage that most full 
time permanent workers receive and is recorded in 12 intervals for each of eight 
occupation groups separately. The number of workplace employees in each occupation 
group is recorded as the total, including part-time and casual workers whereas the wage 
variable relates to most full time permanent workers. It is not then possible to calculate 
an average wage for each workplace without assuming that casual and part-time workers 
receive the same average weekly wage as full-time permanent workers. Instead the data 
has been pooled so that there is a separate observation for each wage variable within a 
workplace.8 There are then between one and eight observations for each workplace with 
the wage variable taking a different value for each occupation group and the 
independent variables having one value across each observation for a workplace. This 
results in 4650 observations representing 927 workplaces.9
For comparison of the two data sets, results are reported for two sub samples of 
the IMA data, identified by the number of observations in each.
Sample: 472 Excludes workplaces<20 and excludes those without company size.
642 Includes workplaces<20 and excludes those without company size
The first is comparable to the AWIRS sample which surveyed only workplaces 
with at least 20 employees. Comparing this with the 642 sample will indicate how 
estimates differ when small workplaces are included. Distributions by size, industyry, 
and occupation are compared in Table 3.C1.
Given the measurement of variables at different levels of aggregation there is 
no a priori reason to prefer any particular functional form and statistical tests did not 
allow a preferable form to be identified. For the basic estimating equation the natural 
logarithm of weekly wages for occupation k in workplace j is used as the dependent 
variable:
The AWIRS sample has proportionally fewer observations in large workpalces 
(>500) and more observations in small companies (<100). Different industry 
distributions may also be reflected in different results if size effects vary across
8 This is necessary to allow a comparison with the IMA data which has too few observations in 
occupation groups to estimate separate wage equations by occupation. Dummy variables indicating the 
occupation group are included.
9 Because there are missing values on some occupational wages, pooling the data changes the sample 
characteritics. The survey weights supplied with the AWIRS data are not used because
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industries. The AWIRS sample has proportionally less observations in Man:H, and more 
in Retail.
Table 3.C1
Size, Industry, and Occupation Sample distributions
n:
A W IR S
4650 472
IM A
642
M ean W age 561.156 447.65 449 .74
S td .D ev (270 .316) (188 .26) (193 .78)
P roportion  o f  sam ple in:
W S 1-20 .2648
W S 21-50 .2290 .2055 .1511
W S 51-100 .2492 .1780 .1309
W S 101-500 .3828 .3114 .2290
W S 500+ .1389 .3051 .2243
C S 1-99 .2086 .1229 .2321
C S 100-499 .2439 .2076 .1916
C S 500-999 .1303 .1292 .1044
CS 1000-4999 .1905 .2373 .2165
C S 5000-9999 .0826 .1335 .1153
CS 10000-19999 .0415 .0699 .0530
C S 20000+ .1026 .0996 .0872
O ther .0783 .0720 .0685
M an:L .1940 .2097 .1900
M an:H .2882 .3708 .3178
C onstr .0340 .0360 .0483
W holes .0641 .0657 .0857
Retail .1480 .0742 .0950
F inan .1019 .0953 .1184
C om S .0308 .0339 .0343
R ecre .0609
M ana .1699 .0530 .0748
P ro f .0923 .0932 .0966
Para .0908 .0487 .0421
T rad .1243 .2225 .2165
C ler .1722 .1292 .1324
Sale .1187 .0742 .0935
O per .0953 .1462 .1340
L abo .1366
A higher average wage in AWIRS is probably due to the occupation 
distribution, with a higher proportion of observations for managers. Size effects may be 
biased upward if managers wage differentials by size are greater than other occupations.
Other independent variables used are restricted to those which are available in 
both the AWIRS and IMA data and defined in Table 3.C2. In the AWIRS data, there is 
information on the proportion of workers who are less than 20 years of age, over 50 
years, and born in a non English speaking country (NESB). Dummy variables are 
constructed for these with three categories: <10%, 11-25%, and >25%. The proportion
173
of workers with more than 10 years tenure is included as four dummy variables, (1-10%, 
11-25%, 26-50%, and >50%) with the excluded category being workplaces with no 
employees with more than ten years tenure.
Table 3.C2
Independent variables Used to Cmpare AWIRS and IMA Results
A W I R S
F e m a le n u m b e r  o f  f e m a l e s  a s  % o f  to ta l  w o r k e r s
N e w e m p n o . p e r m a n e n t  w o r k e r s  h ir e d  in  th e  p a s t  y e a r  
e x p r e s s e d  a s  a  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  c u r r e n t  w o r k e r s .
U n io n P e r c e n t a g e  o f  w o r k e r s  w h o  a r e  u n io n  m e m b e r s
B in a r y  V a r ia b le s =  1 if:
T e e n s  1 1 0 - 2 5 %  o f  w o r k e r s  < 2 0  y e a r s
T e e n s 2 > 2 5 %  o f  w o r k e r s  <  2 0  y e a r s
O v e r 5 0 1 1 0 -2 5 %  o f  w o r k e r s  > 5 0  y e a r s
O v e r 5 0 2 > 2 5 %  o f  w o r k e r s  >  5 0  y e a r s
N E S B 1 1 0 - 2 5 %  o f  w o r k e r s  n o n  E n g l i s h  s p e a k in g  b o r n
N E S B 2 > 2 5 %  n o n  E n g l i s h  s p e a k in g  b o r n
T e n u r e  1 1 -1 0 %  o f  w o r k e r s  w i t h  t e n u r e  > 1 0  y e a r s
T e n u r e 2 1 0 -2 5 %  o f  w o r k e r s  w i t h  >  1 0  y r s  te n u r e
T e n u r e 3 2 5 - 5 0 %
T e n u r e 4 > 5 0 %
H o u r s  1 4 1 - 8 4  h o u r s  o f  o p e r a t io n  p e r  w e e k
H o u r s 2 > 8 4  h o u r s  o f  o p e r a t io n  p e r  w e e k
I M A
B in a r y  V a r ia b le s =  1 if:
f e m a l e f e m a le
t e e n < 2 0  y e a r s
o v e r 5 0 o v e r  5 0  y r s
N E S B B o r n  in  n o n  E n g l i s h  s p e a k in g  c o u n t r y
n e w e m p te n u r e  < 1  y e a r
te n 5 te n u r e  > = 5  a n d  < 1 0
te n  1 0 te n u r e  > 1 0  y e a r s
u n io n u n io n  m e m b e r
Also included is the number of females and the number of permanent 
employees hired in the previous year. Union membership is reported for each 
occupation separately, and is aggregated to form a union density variable for the 
workplace. The IMA data has information on whether individual workers have 
characteristics corresponding to those in AWIRS.
Summary statistics are presented in Table 3.C3. Because the AWIRS data has 
been pooled and workplaces have differing numbers of observations, the characteristics 
do not represent averages for workplaces. For example, the teens variables indicates that 
15% of the observations are in workplaces with 11 to 25% of workers being teenagers 
and 9% of observations where more that 25% are teenagers.
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Table 3.C3 
Means (Std Dev.)
n:
A W IR S
4650 472
IM A
642
W age W age
Fem ale 32 .80282  (25.70) fem ale .25 .2508
T eens 1 .1550538 teen .0530 .0545
T eens2 .0954839
O ver501 .2875269 over50 .0848 .0763
O ver502 .075914
N ESB1 .1653763 N ESB .5636 .5389
N E SB 2 .1886022
N ew em p 33.36708  (36 .77) new em p .2140 .2352
T enure 1 .3066667 ten5 .1504 .1340
T enure2 .2580645 ten 10 .1822 .1636
T enure3 .2036559
T enure4 .0877419
U nion 54 .90507  (34 .30) union .5911 .4969
H ours 1 .3587097 hours 4 3 .4428 (8 .08 ) 44 .0639 (8 .78 )
H ours2 .3313
Continuous variables are expressed as a percentage of total workplace employees.
Table 3.C4 presents coefficients from OLS estimations, which show that there 
are some similarities between AWIRS and IMA estimates. Because of the different 
wage variable and the different level of aggregation, interpretation of the estimates 
differs. Estimates with IMA data give the effect on individual wages of having a 
particular characteristic. Estimates with AWIRS give the effect on the wage of the 
"typical" full time worker of being in workplaces with a greater concentration of 
workers with particular characteristics.
The female, teens, and tenure variables are significant in both, with the same 
sign. This suggests that the effect of these variables is reflected in workplace as well as 
individual wages. The over 50 and new employee variables are insignificant for 
individual or workplace wages. There is also a similar pattern to industry wages. In all 
samples, the three highest paying and the four lowest paying industries are the same. 
The effect of union membership is also insignificant in both data sets. Other studies....
There are differences in the NESB variables. Workplaces with 10 to 25% non 
English speaking born tend to pay higher wages to most workers compared to 
workplaces with less than 10%. However, individual wages are apparently the same for 
these workers as Australian born or migrants from English speaking countries.
The hours variable is significant in all samples but only for workplaces 
operating more than 84 hours per week in the AWIRS data. However, the variable is 
measuring different things at the workplace and individual level, with longer hours at 
the workplace level indicating the presence of either shiftwork or overtime. At the
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individual level it does not necessarily reflect either of these since hours normally 
worked is not known.
Table 3.C4
Results from AWIRS and IMA
n
AWIRS
4650 472
IMA
642
%female -.0023 (11.64) Female -.1503 (4.29) -.1543 (5.22)
teens 1 -.0605 (5.64) Teen -.3431 (5.55) -.4850 (9.32)
teens2 -.1662 (10.89)
over501 -.0173 (1.87) Over50 -.0350 (0.70) -.0220 (0.50)
over502 -.0157 (1.03)
NESB1 .0234 (2.23) NESB -.0148 (0.52) -.0033 (0.14)
NESB2 .0114 (1.09)
%newemp -.0000 (0.34) Newemp .0210 (0.58) -.0038 (0.13)
tenlOl .0136 (1.11) Ten>5 .1163 (2.84) .1131 (3.18)
ten 102 .0127 (0.96) Ten>10 .1301 (3.29) .1172 (3.39)
ten 103 .0470 (3.22)
ten 104 .0397 (2.25)
union .0000 (0.18) Union -.0443 (1.46) -.0274 (1.07)
Hrsl .0014 (0.15) Hours .0120 (6.99) .0112 (8.12)
Hrs2 .0244 (2.35)
Other .2822 (12.86) Other .0761 (0.93) .1360 (1.93)
Manuf:A .0627 (3.32) Manuf:A -.0326 (0.45) -.0240 (0.39)
Manuf:B .1011 (5.36) Manuf:B .0303 (0.44) .0440 (0.74)
Constr .1989 (7.20) Constr .1295 (1.35) .1317 (1.73)
Wholes .1168 (5.07) Wholes -.0054 (0.07) -.0154 (0.23)
Retail -.0034 (0.18) Retail -.1037 (1.27) -.0978 (1.48)
Finance .2168 (10.50) Finance .0707 (0.88) .1075 (1.66)
Comm .0677 (2.47) Comm -.0431 (0.43) -.0473 (0.56)
const 5.8969 (241.18) const 5.4017 (50.1) 5.4103 (60.41)
F(30,4619)=231.17 F(24,447)= 16.48 F(24,617)=27.38
R-square =0.5976 R-square=0.4410 R-square=0.4969
Notes:
1. Dependent variable is natural log of the mid-point o f each reported weekly wage interval.
2. t statistics are reported in parentheses.
3. Estimations include seven occupation dummies.
4. Excluded category in AWIRS is workplaces which operate up to 40 hours per week and have less than 11% of workers being 
teenagers, over 50, NESB, and no workers with more than 10 years tenure.
The results suggest that some worker characteristics affect both individual and 
workplace wages in the same direction. However, these cannot be interpreted as 
reflecting the same wage determination processes. There is difficulty interpreting some 
variables for the AWIRS data because of measurement at the aggregate level. Only the 
employer size variables are measured the same way in each data set so the wage effect 
of these is easier to interpret across data sets. These are presented in Chapter 3, Table 
3.11.
Appendix 4
Further Results for Chapter Four
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Table 4.1 reports estimates for a two sector model analogous to estimates 
presented in Chapter Four. This is equivalent to allowing coefficients to vary between 
the Intensive sector, and the other two sectors (Small Business and Extensive) 
combined.
Table 4.1
Two Sector Estimations
Sam ple:
Sector:
W S:
T otal F u lltim e 
SB and X T  
< 100
C oef. t
In tensive
100+
C oef. t
E xclud ing  N onresponden ts 
SB and X T  In tensive
W S :< 100  100+
C oef. t C oef. t
educ .02354 5.033 .02773: 57 5 .010 .0210174 3.038
exp .0291762 9.141 .015575 3.399 .0338026 7.793
exp2 -.0005515 7.423 -.0002204 2.112 -.0006427 6.364 - J
tenure .0008751 0.181 .0194852 3.369 .0086862 1 . 1 1 1
tenure2 .0000457 0.239 -.0006026 2.908 -.0002525 0.753 - .
fem ale -.1813336 6.635 -.1451336 4 .016 -.16665 4.287
m igran t -.0476903 1.867 -.0749473 2.258 ..0 4 4 5 4 5 4 1.244 - J
union .0113984 0.458 -.0283796 0.871 -.0916813 2.705 - .
hours .0072774 6.582 .014967 9.092 .0105061 6.100
L urban .0855223 2.721 -.0060117 0.159 .1224853 2.756
W hitec .3857437 9.885 .3922545 7.901 .3350876 6.158
trad .057298 1.660 .056932 8 1.257 .0085084 0.180
cler .0736089 1.652 .1830498 3.185 .0267177 0.476
sale .1393049 3.113 .1459543 2.167 .1420143 2.402
oper .048863 1.169 .081891 7 1.669 -.0195952 0.360
O ther .1755009 4.421 .1229465 2.136 .2061676 3.720
M an:H .0525901 1.394 .0569613 1.419 .0585068 1.228
W hol/R et -.0126675 0.337 -.0236604 0.428 .0049548 0.098 - .
Finan .173304 3.896 .050988 0.795 .1674974 2.925
Services -.1034697 2.445 -.0201083 0.381 -.0708774 1.048 .1
const 4.895204 54.57 4.749361 39.45 4.793852 36.07 4.801
n 7 8 2 402 351 291
R 2 .4595 .5175 .5539 .4638
e'e 68 .00758 29 .10640 23.48556 22.21424
exp F (2)= 45 .52 F (2)=  10.00 F (2 )= 32 .60 F(2)=6 .77
tenure F (2)= 0 .35 F(2)= 5.74 F(2)=0 .85 F (2)= 5 .84
occ F (5 )= 26 .08 F (5)= 14.59 F (5)=  12.12 F (5)= 8.89
ind F (5 )= 14 .30 F(5)= 1.83 F(5)= 6 .53 F(5)= 1.57
For most variables, the direction of change of coefficients between sectors is the 
same, although the magnitude of change differs between the total and the respondents 
only samples. However, for the union and trad variables, and for the intercept, the 
direction of change differs between samples. In the sample excluding nonrespondents, 
union members earn on average 9.6% less than non union members, in small 
workplaces, and are better off, compared to non union members, in large workplaces 
where the wage differential is still negative but not significantly different from zero. 
However, when nonrespondents are included in the sample, union members are better 
off in small workplaces compared to non union members. But these union effects are
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insignificant suggesting no union wage effects in small or large workplaces. This is 
probably due to the nonrespondents with low wages in small workplaces being non 
union members.
The implication is that results regarding the relationship between workplace size 
and union membership as well as trade will be only applicable to the sample used and 
cannot be generalised.
Table 4.2 shows maximum likelihood estimates across three sectors 
corresponding to OLS estimates in Chapter 4. Again there is very little difference in 
coefficients between the two estimation techniques.
Table 4.2
Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Three Sectors
Sector: Small Businesss Extensive Intensive
CS<100,WS<100 CS>=100,WS<100 CS>=100,WS>=100
Educ .0305 2.43 .0192 2.49 .0305 4.58
exp .0422 6.03 .0273 5.22 .0157 2.85
exp2 -.0009 4.92 -.0005 4.03 -.0002 1.54
tenure .0270 2.26 -.0089 0.91 .0211 3.13
tenure2 -.0013 2.45 .0006 1.39 -.0007 2.80
female -.2594 3.72 -.1426 3.30 -.1243 2.82
migrant -.0452 0.83 -.0543 1.20 -.0716 1.84
union -.1065 1.70 -.0919 2.31 -.0577 1.47
hours .0102 3.95 .0116 4.91 .0140 6.39
Metro .1135 1.61 .1136 2.10 .0023 0.05
Whitec .2944 3.49 .3664 5.60 .3995 6.73
trad -.0329 0.45 .0103 0.18 .0758 1.47
cler .0383 0.39 .0432 0.68 .1835 2.78
sale .0565 0.56 .1831 2.71 .1786 2.19
plan -.1398 1.54 .0387 0.61 .1233 2.16
Other .2972 3.75 .1577 2.19 .1504 2.21
Man:H .1168 1.59 .0486 0.80 .0903 1.97
Whol/Ret .0356 0.47 .0068 0.10 -.0086 0.13
Finance .2888 3.06 .1245 1.79 .0712 0.92
Services -.1561 1.39 .0147 0.18 .0609 0.81
const 4.6128 21.73 4.8444 29.08 4.7059 32.31
n 153 198 291
log
likelihood: -263.224 -324.302 -520.377
q (t)____________ .2557(15.64) .2273(18.19)_______ .2696(22.25)
It is not possible to analyse migrants and non-migrants separately for the 
analysis of wage structure differences as in Chapter 4. If migrant disadvantage is 
confined to one or other sector, then wage structures for migrants and non-migrants may 
vary in different ways between small and large workplaces and companies. However, 
there is no reason to expect this to be the case, and the similar changes in coefficients 
after controlling for size suggest otherwise.
Also for Chapter 4, union effects vary in a different direction between small and 
large workplaces for this group. The different relationship between union and workplace 
size for the two groups implies that results for union effects cannot be generalised 
beyond the sample used in the thesis.
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Table 4.3
Test statistics for difference between coefficients
Sectors:
H0:
Extensive 
-Small Businesss
bEX=bSB
t
Extensive
-Intensive
bEX=bIT
t
Small Businesss 
-Intensive
bSB=bIT
t
Joint
bSB=bEX =bn
F
Educa (0.15) (0.06) (0.11) (0.01)
Educma (0.49) (0.61) (0.01) (0.21)
Educmos (0.46) (0.80) (0.07) (0.33)
exp (2.03)* (1-18) (3.14)* (4.93)*
exp2 (2.07)* (1.46)* (3.32)* (5.55)*
tenure (0.88) (1.48)* (0.32) (1.10)
tenure2 (1.93)* (2.14)* (0.44) (2.64)*
female (1.46)* (0.47) (1.16) (1.10)
married (0.02) (0.89) (0.84) (0.54)
migrant (0.42) (0.52) (0.02) (0.15)
union (0.38) (0.96) (0.39) (0.46)
hours (0.53) (0.36) (0.22) (0.14)
Lurban (0.73) (2.08)* (1.05) (2.26)*
const (0.51) (0.72) (1.22) (0.77)
Joint significance of Experience and Tenure:
Exp (2.19) (1.18) (5.54) (2.86)
Ten (4.32) (2.98) (1.58) (2.59)
* indicates significance at 10% level or better for one-tailed tests.
Table 4.6
Test statistics for difference between coefficients
Sectors:
H0:
Extensive 
-Small Businesss
bEX~bSB
t
Extensive
-Intensive
bEX=bIT
t
Small Businesss 
-Intensive
bSB~bIT
t
Joint
bSB=bEX=bIT
F
Educa (0.34) (0.22) (0.17) (0.06)
Educma (0.71) (0.74) (0.15) (0.35)
Educmos (0.85) (1.14) (0.14) (0.74)
exp (1.61) (1.25) (2.82) (3.99)*
exp2 (1.63) (1.57) (3.00) (4.63)*
tenure (1.70) (2.14) (0.03) (2.46)*
tenure2 (2.29) (2.35) (0.69) (3.38)*
female (0.88) (0.46) (1.28) (0.82)
married (0.06) (0.35) (0.27) (0.07)
migrant (0.35) (0.53) (0.06) (0.14)
union (0.10) (0.81) (0.55) (0.37)
hours (0.77) (0.28) (1.17) (0.70)
Lurban (0.15) (1.15) (0.85) (0.81)
WCollar (0.98) (0.26) (1.32)* (0.89)
trad (0.52) (0.86) (1.35)* (1.00)
cler (0.61) (1.18) (1.58)* (1.47)
sale (1.26) (0.09) (1.18) (0.92)
oper (1.64)* (0.97) (2.60)* (3.39)*
Other (1.14) (0.31) (1.58)* (1.30)
Manuf:B (0.81) (0.41) (0.55) (0.33)
Whol/Ret (0.41) (0.34) (0.76) (0.29)
Finance (1.23) (0.34) (1.57)* (1-29)
Services (1.05) (0.37) (1.45)* (1.06)
const (0.36) (0.04) (0.35) (0.08)
Joint Significance:
Exp (1-37) (1.38) (4.51) (2.41)
Tenure (3.12) (2.77) (1-22) (2.08)
* indicates significance at 10% level or better for one-tailed tests.
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Appendix 5A
A WIRS Data Issues: Functional Form and Potential Biases
5A.1 Functional form
Characteristics of the AWIRS data are such that little is known a priori about 
the appropriate functional form to use for wage equations. One issue arises because 
variables are measured at different levels of aggregation. The wage variable relates to 
most full time permanent employees but other variables are measured at different levels. 
Since hours worked is recorded as a categorical variable in the survey, and refers to total 
hours including standard and overtime hours, weekly wages are used as the dependent 
variable. Dummy variables for the presence of overtime and shift work are included as 
independent variables.
Table 5A.1
 ^ _____  Variable Definitions ______________
Rshift =1 if the workplace operates rotating shifts. (ed5)
Ovt =1 if fewer than 5 per cent of employees worked overtime in previous
month (ed7, ed8)
Composition of Workforce:
Female percentage of full time permanent employees who are female. (N27)
TeenlO =1 if >10% younger than 20 years, (edla)
Ov5010 =1 if >10% older than 50 years, (edlb)
NESB10 =1 if >10% non English speaking born. (edlc)
Training:
TRNM between 1 and 6 months taken for a new employee to learn the job
which is done by the largest number of employees from the dominant 
occupation (ejlo)
TRNH training time more than 6 months
TRNWP presence of a formal training program (apart from on-the-job) in the 
workplace (ejl4)
Unions
UNOCCM at least some or most employees of a specific occupation are union 
members. (ek2A-ek2H)
UNOCCH all within occupation are union members
UNWP percentage of total employees who are union members (N40)
UNDEL =1 if at least one union delegate present at the workplace. (ek!6) 
The variable name from the original questionnaires is included in parentheses.
Of the variables for employee characteristics, only the proportion of females is 
available for full time permanent employees rather than for the workplace as a whole. 
Other variables for the proportion of teenagers, over 50 years, and non-English speaking 
background refer to total employees. If workers with these characteristics tend to be 
concentrated in part time and casual jobs or in particular occupations there is no reason
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to expect an effect on the wage of full time permanent employees in specific 
occupations.
The variables for training and unions allow direct and spillover effects to be 
identified. The training time variable relates to a particular job (the job with most 
employees from the dominant occupation group). This can be related to the wage that 
most full time employees within the dominant occupation receive and the wage that all 
occupations receive by interacting TRNM and TRNH with the dominant occupation. In 
all equations the interaction terms are insignificant (and close to zero) suggesting 
training effects spillover to all occupations. Either all occupations receive similar returns 
to training time or training within any particular occupation increases the importance of 
fairness considerations, for example if the morale of employees across occupations is 
interrelated, firms with training investments may pay higher wages across all 
occupations to minimise turnover costs related to one group.
The union membership variable is occupation specific and is aggregated up to a 
total workplace membership variable as well. In all estimations the workplace 
membership coefficient is negative and the occupation specific coefficients are positive 
or insignificant for UNOCCH and negative or insignificant for UNOCCM. This implies 
that low wage workplaces tend to be heavily unionised but 100% occupation specific 
unionisation pays returns.
There is also a question regarding the assumption that some variables are 
exogenous. Whereas characteristics of individuals are given, workplace aggregates may 
not be if employers are active in recruiting and screening potential employees. If high 
wages derive from some other exogenous factor (e.g. technology, training requirements, 
unions, or competition via productivity/quality rather than price) then workforce 
characteristics and wages may both be determined by this. Such selection effects cause a 
particular problem given that we are interested in the returns to training and unions 
which are correlated with some workforce characteristics. In particular training and the 
proportion of part time and casual employees are negatively correlated and estimates of 
training coefficients are very sensitive to the inclusion of these variables. They are 
excluded from the estimations in this chapter because there is no necessary connection 
between these variables and the wage of full time permanent employees and because 
training is viewed as the exogenous factor rather than characteristics of workers. This 
issue suggests that we should be estimating structural equations but that is not possible 
with the data.
RESET tests (2,3,and 4), are highly significant suggesting mis-specification. 
However, tests against various alternative forms of the dependent variable did not allow 
any to be identified as performing better than others. Breusch-Pagan test statistics are 
also significant for all equations suggesting the presence of heteroskedasticity, although
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this may also be the result of mis-specification. The mis-specification appears in all 
estimated equations, including the unpooled data with the wage variable aggregated to 
an average wage for the workplace. The major results presented in the chapter are 
however evident in the raw data and from the estimated equations.
5A.2 Potential Biases With Workplace, Rather than Individual, Level Data
Variation in coefficients across sectors is described in this section with a view 
to assessing possible biases in the light of chapter 4 results. Table 5.3 presents 
regression results for each of the three sectors as well as for the sample pooled across 
sectors.
Table 5A.2
Regression Results By Size Sectors Using The Full Sample
Small Business Extensive Intensive Pooled Sample
mana .7470 (21.86) .7613 (24.37) .8067 (32.94) .7792 (45.56)
prof .7251 (18.99) .6954(20.42) .6531(27.02) .6788 (38.83)
para .4408 (12.10) .5223 (16.04) .4408 (20.14) .4647 (28.86)
trad .2705 (9.96) .2511 (9.45) .2423 (13.80) .2494 (19.33)
der .1176 (4.76) .1201 (5.22) .1097 (6.71) .1145 (9.75)
sale .2185 (6.74) .1990 (6.97) .2188 (9.74) .2085 (13.33)
plan .1289 (4.20) .1255 (3.98) .09434 (4.76) .1106 (7.39)
female -.001960 (5.22) -.003024(8.25) -.003518(13.84) -.003099(17.18)
teen 10 -.05745 (2.90) -.1420 (7.62) -.1235 (8.88) -.1230 (12.91)
ov5010 -.07000 (3.70) .03604 (2.00) .003299(0.30) -.003930 (0.47)
nesblO .06287 (3.36) .002199(0.12) -.001917(0.18) .009977 (1.22)
Ovt .03921 (1.54) -.06337 (2.89) -.02793 (1.41) -.01753 (1.38)
rshift -.05500 (2.29) -.08338 (5.05) .02433 (2.31) -.009049 (1.07)
TRNM -.008798 (0.45) .03381 (2.04) .03125 (2.72) .02707 (3.19)
TRNH .09620 (3.30) .05337 (1.81) .05310 (3.10) .06357 (4.74)
TRNWP -.02881 (1.61) -.007654(0.47) .03271 (2.62) .007347 (0.84)
UNWP -.0009970 (2.55) -.001008(2.98) -.001009(3.60) -.001011 (5.41)
UNOCCM .004087 (0.17) -.02318 (1.14) -.02951 (2.09) -.01744 (1.68)
UNOCCH .07650 (2.22) .02448 (1.04) .01399 (0.81) .02568 (1.99)
UNDEL .03777 (1.64) .05827 (3.29) .02652 (1.50) .04413 (4.10)
Exten
Inten
const 5.9145 (167.36) 6.08535(156.32) 6.09790(180.68)
.05269 (4.24)
.1018 (8.09)
5.9843 (305.54)
n o 993 1271 2369 4633
R2 .5061 .5381 .5993 .5574
S .2724 .2749 .2498 .2647
TRNM/H 7.13 2.78 6.10* 12.42*
UNOCC* 3.03 2.16 4.47* 6.69*
ln(W) 6.160118 6.222489 6.275208
.0118112 .0076781 .0071603
Notes:t-statistics in parentheses. White's adjusted standard errors used for significance tests.
Coefficients on the workforce variables are generally as might be expected. 
There is a negative effect of a higher proportion of females and teenagers in the 
equations for all sectors. The coefficients on ov5010, and NESB10 vary across
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employer size groups with ov5010 being negative in Small Business but zero in the 
Intensive sector and NESB10 being positive in Small Business and insignificant in other 
sectors. The impact of these variables can be interpreted as measuring a direct effect 
where full time permanent employees have these characteristics combined with a 
spillover effect where other employees have these characteristics.
Several results concur with chapter 4. First controlling for size by the inclusion 
of sector dummies has little effect on other coefficients. The only noticeable change is 
in the UNDEL coefficient which falls by 1.5 percentage points after controlling for the 
sector.
Second, estimates of the average wage differential between sectors are similar 
using the disaggregated or the pooled samples. For the pooled sample, including dummy 
variables indicating the sector of employment, shows significant differences of 3.4 per 
cent (Exten) and 8.2 per cent (Inten), compared to small businesses. From the three 
sector estimations, the differentials compared to small businesses are 4.1 per cent 
(Exten) and 9.5 per cent (Inten) for workplaces given the mean characteristics of the 
pooled sample.
Because of the different wage variable and the different level of aggregation, 
interpretation of coefficients differs from chapter 4. Estimates with IMA data give the 
effect on individual wages of having a particular characteristic. Estimates with AWIRS 
give the effect on the wage of the "typical" full time worker of being in workplaces with 
a greater concentration of workers with particular characteristics.
Whereas individual wages for immigrants did not vary on average between the 
sectors, the differential between workplaces with few immigrants of non-English 
speaking background and those with more than 10 per cent differs between sectors. It is 
positive in the small busines sector and close to zero in others.
One result which is contrary to IMA is that the negative gender effect is 
significantly greater in the Intensive sector compared to Small Business. This might be 
explained by the exclusion of workplaces with fewer than 20 employees. Alternatively 
the previous results may have reflected part time and casual effects rather than gender 
since the variable here is the proportion of full time permanent employees who are 
female rather the proportion of the total.
We are particularly interested in the training and union coefficients which may 
reflect rent sharing concerns but the only significant variation between sectors in 
individual coefficients is on the formal workplace training program between small 
business and Intensive. There are only positive wages effects in large workplaces.
183
5A. 3 Potential Biases From the Exclusion o f Input and Admin workplaces
Table 5A.3
Characteristics of Excluded and Included Observations
Small Business Extensive Intensive Pooled
n:
Exc
128
Inc
865
Exc
276
Inc
995
Exc
553
Inc
1816
Exc
957
Inc
3676
InWage 6.218 6.167 6.301 6.203 6.355 6.252 6.321 6.219
female 25.300 26.828 32.675 28.032 30.611 30.761 30.496 29.097
teen 10 .195 .286 .254 .246 .201 .250 .215 .257
ov5010 .453 .249 .196 .258 .430 .468 .366 .360
nesblO .539 .302 .210 .238 .477 .389 .409 .328
ovt .664 .782 .681 .785 .886 .891 .797 .837
rshift .086 .208 .243 .307 .434 .529 .332 .393
TRNM .703 .365 .540 .504 .582 .514 .586 .476
TRNH .133 .143 .069 .150 .146 .126 .122 .137
TRNWP .531 .360 .562 .580 .761 .722 .673 .598
UNWP 20.546 31.478 41.830 53.232 61.496 68.974 50.347 55.890
UNOCM .063 .139 .196 .167 .204 .198 .183 .176
UNOCH .133 .155 .207 .305 .354 .378 .282 .306
UNDEL .156 .289 .464 .533 .785 .826 .608 .620
Exten .288 .271
lnten .578 .494
Table 5A.4
Regression Results for the Included and Excluded Observations
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Included Excluded t
mana .7535 (40.02) .8668 (22.13) (2.60)
prof .6583 (32.65) .7074 (20.10) (1.21)
para .4594 (24.57) .4607 (14.79) (0.03)
trad .2484 (17.31) .2515 (8.88) (0.09)
cler .1102 (8.40) .1191 (4.44) (0.29)
sale .2010 (11.81) .2524 (6.63) (1.23)
plan .1103 (6.57) .1094 (3.47) (0.02)
female -.003029 (14.83) -.003190 (8.04) (0.36)
teen 10 -.1354 (12.78) -.03872 (1.88) (4.18)
ov5010 -.005568 (0.59) .02749 (1.52) (1.62)
nesblO .01477 (1.61) -.02672 (1.41) (1.98)
Ovt -.004034 (0.27) -.06679 (2.79) (2.24)
rshift -.01272 (1.37) .03159 (1.61) (2.05)
TRNM .01234 (1.30) .09120 (4.78) (3.70)
TRNH .05532 (3.66) .1035 (3.32) (1.39)
TRNWP .01301 (1-34) -.02922 (1-48) (1.92)
UNWP -.0009645 (4.56) -.0008318 (2.02) (0.28)
UNOCCM -.02791 (2.43) -.001898 (0.08) (1.05)
UNOCCH .02590 (1.80) .007446 (0.25) (0.56)
UNDEL .04809 (4.13) .04395 (1.60) (0.13)
Exten .03358 (2.46) .1232 (3.67) (2.47)
lnten .07918 (5.71) .1806 (5.38) (2.79)
const 5.9891 (268.21) 5.9301 (130.95) (1.16)
3676 957
R2 .5471 .6127
sP .2636 .2559
F(22,4587) 3.33
Notes: White's adjusted standard errors used for significance tests.
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Appendix 5B
Results Compared to Stewart (1990)
Stewart (1990) uses the British WIRS data. The variable for unions used by 
Stewart is whether any unions are "recognised by management for negotiating pay and 
conditions for any sections of the manual workforce". The variable used here is whether 
any union delegates are present in the workplace.
Stewart's analysis is restricted to the wage for semi-skilled manual workers and 
the sample is restricted here to the wage for the occupations of plant and machine 
operators and labourers. Results are presented in Table 5B.1 using both measures of 
competitiveness. There are some noticeable differences between these results and those 
of Stewart. Of particular interest is the finding that workplace size effects are significant 
only where there are few competitors or less than intense competition. This is the 
opposite of Stewart's result that workplace size only matters in the competitive sector.
Table 5B.1
AWIRS Results With Specification Following Stewart (1990) 
Wage of Plant & Machine Operators and Labourers.
In tense
com petition
n=359
L ess than in tense 
com petition  
n=435
M any
com petito rs
n= 410
Few
com petito rs
n=384
% fem ale -.00405 (4 .0 2 ) -.00407  (4 .4 3 ) -.00470  (4 .3 3 ) -.00355 (4 .2 3 )
% parttim e -.00149  (1 .8 7 ) -.00200  (2 .6 6 ) -.00147 (1 .8 5 ) -.00262  (3 .1 8 )
m ajority  m ale -.0187 (0 .3 4 ) .0152 (0 .2 8 ) -.0387  (0 .6 6 ) .00182 (0 .0 3 )
m anufactu ring -.0514  (1 .8 5 ) -.167 (6 .9 5 ) -.0927  (3 .2 6 ) -.119 (5 .0 5 )
sing le p lant -.0484  (1 .3 3 ) .0907 (3 .1 1 ) -.0186  (0 .5 4 ) .0893 (2 .7 9 )
sh iftw ork .0462 (1 .5 0 ) .0635 (2 .6 3 ) .0457 (1 .4 9 ) .0976 (4 .2 2 )
fo re ign  ow ned -.00382  (0 .1 1 ) .0122 (0 .4 5 ) .00435 (0 .11 ) .0224 (0 .9 5 )
w size50-100 -.00164  (0 .0 4 ) .0265 (0 .8 7 ) -.00906  (0 .2 4 ) .0473 ( 1.56)
w size 100-500 .0180 (0 .4 5 ) .0880 (2 .6 8 ) .0138 (0 .3 4 ) .0684 (2 .1 2 )
w size500 -1000 .0978 (1 .7 2 ) .124 (2 .4 9 ) .0995 (1 .5 5 ) .116 (2 .6 9 )
w size 1000+ .00257 (0 .0 3 ) .156 (2 .1 9 ) .00676 (0 .0 7 ) .106 (1 .9 2 )
D elegate  p resen t/
in ternational m arket ..0 8 4 4  (1 .4 8 ) .132 (2 .9 0 ) -.0497  (0 .9 1 ) .0446 (0 .8 5 )
in ternational m arket .0 0 0 6 0 2 (0 .0 1  ) -.0527 (1 .4 0 ) - .0 0 3 5 6 (0 .0 8 ) -.0142  (0 .3 0 )
D elegate  p resen t .077 (1 .9 9 ) -.00396  (0 .11 ) .117 (2 .8 0 ) -.0142  (0 .4 3 )
cons 6.077 (7 5 .6 3 ) 6.116 (8 6 .6 6 ) 6 .129  (7 3 .0 4 ) 6.084 (9 2 .4 0 )
R 2 .1635 .3088 .1951 .2654
M SE .2393 .2228 .26459 .1981
w size F (4)= 0.96 3.03 0 .80 2.17
union  F (2)= 2.08 6.63 4.87 0.37
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Appendix 5C
Further Results for Chapter Five
Table 5C.1
Regression Results for Three Size Sectors
Small Business Extensive Intensive
mana .7360 (20.20) .7358 (21.49) .7732 (27.90 .7549 (39.88) .7535 (40.02)
prof .7153 (16.86) .6800 (15.90) .6239 (22.69 .6663 (33.12) .6583 (32.65)
para .4462 (10.76) .5221 (13.67) .4306 (16.82 .4656 (24.93) .4594 (24.57)
trad .2726 (9.66) .2336 (7.77) .2458 (12.26) .2495 (17.46) .2484 (17.31)
cler .1008 (3.91) .1272 (4.96) .1052 (5.63) .1111 (8.47) .1102 (8.40)
sale .2073 (5.91) .2018 (6.53) .2057 (8.33) .2027 (11.84) .2010 (11.81)
plan .1335 (4.17) .1118 (3.13) .09560 (4.16) .1112 (6.63) .1103 (6.57)
female -.001958(4.72) -.003032(7.15) -.003465(11.93) -.002813(13.96) -.003029(14.83)
teen 10 -.06220 (2.94) -.1718 (8.11) -.1361 (8.45) -.1354 (12.75) -.1354 (12.78)
ov5010 -.05015 (2.36) .01940 (0.97) -.001666 (0.13) .0008476(0.09) -.005568 (0.59)
nesblO .05510 (2.61) .02667 (1.29) -.004361(0.36) .01840 (2.01) .01477 (1.61)
Ovt .03573 (1.18) -.02183 (0.87) -.02934 (1.28) .004483 (0.30) -.004034 (0.27)
rshift -.03707 (1.50) -.07938 (4.41) .02197 (1.85) -.002270 (0.24) -.01272 (1.37)
TRNM -.01061 (0.51) .02081 (1.10) .009467 (0.74) .01353 (1.43) .01234 (1.30)
TRNH .06129 (2.02) .04514 (1.40) .05295 (2.54) .05653 (3.73) .05532 (3.66)
TRNWP -.01676 (0.85) .006736 (0.37) .03175 (2.27) .02759 (2.91) .01301 (1.34)
UNWP -.0009675(2.25) -.001052(2.66) -.0008820(2.74" -.0007330(3.53) -.0009645(4.56)
UNOCCM -.009128 (0.37) -.01260 (0.54) -.05320 (3.36) -.02592 (2.26) -.02791 (2.43)
UNOCCH .06946 (1.90) .03332 (1.28) .005795 (0.29) .02526 (1.74) .02590 (1.80)
UNDEL .04640 (1.92) .05870 (2.97) .02337 (1.20) .06223 (5.43) .04809 (4.13)
Exten .03358 (2.46)
Inten .07918 (5.71)
const 5.9174(149.38) 6.04779(132.18) 6.1125(151.61) 5.9830 (276.27) 5.9891 (268.21)
n _ 865 995 1816 3676 3676
R2 .4974 .5208 .5932 .5429 .5471
S C .2734 .2753 •2476
3.26*
.2648 .2636
TRNM/H 2.85* 1.18 6.98 6.70
UNOCC* 3.02 1.49 8.07 7.72 8.61
ln(W) 6.162284 6.202027 6.253164
S e .0128566 .0086325 .0085033
B/P 164.1 132.7 256.5 518.2 506.1
Pooled Sample
Notes:t-statistics in parentheses. White's adjusted standard errors used for significance tests.
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Table 5C.2 
Regression Results
Small Business and Extensive sectors by FEWC
Small Business Extensive
FEWC MANYC FEWC MANYC
mana .6751 (10.44) .7606 (17.82) .7654 (16.03) .7136 (15.106)
prof .6974 (8.75) .7185 (14.22) .6804 (9.13) .6560 (11.907)
para .4118 (5.14) .4594 (9.68) .4844 (10.45) .5302 (9.403)
trad .2881 (6.08) .2790 (8.26) .2071 (5.49) .2689 (6.182)
cler .09270 (1-91) .1090 (3.65) .1008 (3.13) .1336 (3.507)
sale .1823 (2.75) .2216 (5.49) .2215 (4.99) .1874 (4.384)
plan .1742 (3.20) .1078 (2.85) .06443 (1.71) .1630 (2.812)
female -.0007828 (0.82) -.002403 (4.97) -.003471 (5.55) -.00260 (3.909)
teen 10 -.06277 (1.17) -.04742 (1-96) -.1634 (5.31) -.1627 (5.673)
ov5010 -.05165 (1.20) -.04255 (1.71) .02101 (0.93) .02509 (0.730)
nesblO -.008088 (0.21) .086997 (3.32) .04870 (1.69) .02123 (0.737)
Ovt .1352 (2.38) .006097 (0.16) -.02187 (0.38) -.02735 (0.936)
rshift .01141 (0.23) -.07900 (2.57) -.01420 (0.57) -.1378 (5.252)
TRNM .01122 (0.27) -.03095 (1.23) .05666 (2.36) -.009199 (0.348)
TRNH .09355 (1.63) .06391 (1.68) .03039 (0.77) .04402 (0.952)
TRNWP .004146 (0.10) -.03743 (1.59) -.007786 (0.33) .01938 (0.765)
UNWP -.0004139 (0.54) -.001090 (2.00) -.0003758(0.60) -.001311 (2.545)
UNOCCM -.004698 (0.09) -.01820 (0.63) .01570 (0.45) -.04183 (1.378)
UNOCCH .07168 (1.03) .06801 (1.54) .009935 (0.30) .05286 (1.368)
UNDEL .05076 (1.05) .03855 (1.32) -.05714 (1.63) .1249 (4.767)
const 5.8072 (86.64) 5.9553 (122.98) 6.06884 (71.11) 6.04544
( 104.769)
n 251 614 399 596
R2 .4772 .5063 .6042 .4954
se .2649 .2763 .2332 .2949
TRNM/H F(2; 1.34 3.27* 2.80 0.76
UNOCC* F(2 0.83 2.48 0.11 3.41*
ln(W) 6.216094 6.13465 6.208062 6.211422
Se .0236 .0161709 .0131827 .0137394
F()
Notes:
t-statistics in parentheses. White's adjusted standard errors used for significance tests.
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Table 5C.3 
Regression Results
Small Business and Extensive sectors by DC<5
Small Business Extensive
DC<5 DC=5,6 DC<5 DC=5,6
mana .6907 (10.83) .7515 (17.24) .7138 (14.716) .7509 (16.77)
prof .7851 (11.21) .6627 (13.34) .6052 (7.974) .7000 (13.44)
para .4268 (6.26) .4442 (8.69) .4785 (7.305) .5394 (11.76)
trad .2626 (5.72) .2752 (8.06) .2127 (4.454) .2508 (6.63)
cler .08978 (1-99) .1050 (3.39) .1267 (3.276) .1339 (4.09)
sale .1225 (2.09) .2337 (5.44) .2192 (3.984) .2035 (5.39)
plan .1422 (2.64) .1191 (3.02) .1061 (1.951) .1124 (2.47)
female -.0007169 (0.85) -.002337 (4.71) -.003520 (5.325) -.002333(4.24)
teen 10 -.01247 (0.23) -.06713 (2.84) -.2084 (5.736) -.1500 (5.79)
ov5010 -.03344 (0.87) -.04617 (1.79) .02324 (0.793) .03012 (1.07)
nesblO .03536 (1.01) .05989 (2.15) .02811 (0.700) .04193 (1.70)
Ovt .1443 (2.61) -.005819 (0.15) .01561 (0.298) -.02170 (0.72)
rshift .004140 (0.11) -.07134 (2.18) -.02669 (0.861) -.1206 (5.17)
TRNM -.03188 (0.87) -.0007017 (0.02) .07093 (2.157) -.006648(0.27)
TRNH -.004928 (0.09) .1263 (3.13) .03587 (0.720) .06781 (1.61)
TRNWP -.007516 (0.21) -.02840 (1.17) .002441 (0.080) .01607 (0.70)
UNWP .0004791 (0.70) -.001399 (2.54) .00002930 (0.041) -.001290(2.69)
UNOCCM -.06962 (1.54) .002331 (0.07) .04244 (0.989) -.03380 (1.25)
UNOCCH .06082 (0.94) .07939 (1.78) .02819 (0.723) .04048 (1.20)
UNDEL .01403 (0.32) .04319 (1.47) -.06801 (1.432) .1026 (4.50)
const 5.7980 (86.35) 5.9609 (125.02) 6.01498 (81.686) 6.02002(106.83)
n 255 610 310 685
R2 .5265 .4922 .5416 .5195
se .2620 .2763 .2559 .2818
TRNM/H F(2 0.39 5.61* 2.35 1.76
UNOCC* F(2 3.03* 2.10 0.54 2.45
ln(W) 6.215505 6.134962 6.19476 6.210302
s. .0239628 .016739 .0149096 .0115129
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. White's adjusted standard errors used for significance tests.
Table 5C.4 
Regression Results
Small Business and Extensive sectors by DC<6
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Small Business Extensive
DC<6 DC=6 DC<6 DC=6
mana .7276 (14.95) .7502 (13.97) .7524 (18.68) .7301 (12.76)
prof .6659 (12.71) .7754 (10.58) .6623 (10.29) .6875 (11.75)
para .3996 (8.45) .5121 (6.78) .4883 (11.41) .5567 (9.20)
trad .2341 (7.14) .3214 (6.93) .2098 (6.05) .2753 (5.43)
cler .08500 (2.58) .1260 (3.21) .1305 (4.38) .1190 (2.77)
sale .2142 (4.49) .2118 (4.09) .2258 (5.71) .1922 (3.94)
plan .1410 (3.89) .1180 (2.00) .1135 (2.80) .1020 (1.59)
female -.001502 (3.08) -.002126 (2.30) -.003456 (6.65) -.002020 (3.08)
teen 10 -.05160 (1.75) -.05819 (1.79) -.2056 (7.74) -.1090 (3.49)
ov5010 -.08969 (3.33) .01974 (0.50) .002116 (0.09) .03809 (1.17)
nesblO .02197 (0.91) .03319 (0.78) .04503 (1.62) .01773 (0.52)
Ovt .1291 (3.26) -.03482 (0.77) -.02529 (0.68) -.006823 (0.20)
rshift -.007142 (0.25) -.06040 (1.30) -.0001828 (0.00) -.2090 (7.29)
TRNM .004382 (0.16) -.009861 (0.29) .05492 (2.34) -.03034 (0.98)
TRNH .03817 (1.04) .1388 (2.36) .05212 (1.57) .04505 (0.74)
TRNWP .009290 (0.36) -.03102 (1.02) .003041 (0.13) .01987 (0.70)
UNWP -.00001910(0.03) -.001503 (2.10) -.0004373 (0.80) -.001406 (2.33)
UNOCCM -.02536 (0.82) .01915 (0.47) .009600 (0.32) -.06429 (1.79)
UNOCCH .06890 (1.61) .09536 (1.47) .03258 (1.08) .05208 (1.17)
UNDEL .001427 (0.04) .03792 (0.88) -.01955 (0.65) .1536 (5.13)
const 5.8433 (118.59) 5.9452 (98.73) 6.02201 (111.60) 6.02411 (84.07)
n 497 368 542 453
R2 .5176 .4820 .5639 .5111
se .2607 .2871 .2519 .2909
TRNM/H F(2 0.57 3.65* 2.93 1.14
UNOCC* F(2 3.30* 1.13 0.60 3.42*
ln(W) 6.195155 6.138566 6.187064 6.212923
s. .0154694 .0260065 .011482 .0139616
Notes:
t-statistics in parentheses. White's adjusted standard errors used for significance tests.
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Table 5C.5 
Regression Results
Intensive Sector and Pooled Sample by FEWC
Intensive Pooled Sample
FEWC MANYC FEWC MANYC
mana .8458 (20.86) .7334 (20.39) .7893 (26.63) .7381 (30.45)
prof .5875 (14.82) .6479 (17.72) .6329 (20.12) .6837 (26.22)
para .4074 (12.01) .4499 (12.43) .4356 (17.25) .4841 (18.39)
trad .2521 (8.89) .2415 (8.89) .2458 (11.96) .2533 (13.19)
cler .09198 (3.30) .1122 (4.66) .09401 (4.72) .1190 (6.92)
sale .2187 (5.41) .1996 (6.36) .2142 (7.75) .1971 (9.07)
plan .09519 (3.16) .09915 (3.02) .1048 (4.68) .1157 (4.80)
female -.003384 (7.22) -.003357 (9.23) -.002551 (7.34) -.002903(11.08)
teen 10 -.07740 (2.07) -.1444 (7.75) -.1240 (5.53) -.1355 (10.60)
ov5010 .01193 (0.70) -.01533 (0.88) .01778 (1.37) -.01541 (1.22)
nesblO .003423 (0.21) -.006326 (0.37) .01670 (1.28) .02136 (1.71)
Ovt -.1003 (2.42) -.01527 (0.60) .01187 (0.39) .0006955(0.04)
rshift .01585 (0.91) .02664 (1.69) .02205 (1.63) -.01774 (1.41)
TRNM .001787 (0.10) .01693 (0.99) .02666 (1.89) .005540 (0.44)
TRNH -.001389 (0.04) .09253 (3.26) .02646 (1.26) .07442 (3.65)
TRNWP .01121 (0.50) .03568 (1.98) .02179 (1.49) .02952 (2.39)
UNWP -.0009067 (1.93) -.0006830 (1.58) -.0005676 (1.69) -.0007745(2.90)
UNOCCM -.05746 (2.49) -.04977 (2.28) -.01789 (1.00) -.03261 (2.20)
UNOCCH .01654 (0.58) -.006785 (0.26) .01733 (0.81) .02740 (1.42)
UNDEL .05950 (1.95) .01316 (0.51) .04001 (2.06) .07463 (5.18)
const 6.1619 (101.32) 6.09049 (120.23) 5.9671 (150.96) 5.9902 (225.55)
n 686 1130 1336 2340
R2 .6491 .5646 .5950 .5180
se .2120 .2652 .2340 .2803
TRNM/H F(2 0.00 5.39* 1.97 7.08
UNOCC* F(2 5.67* 2.97 1.64 6.34
ln(W) 6.273871 6.249779
.0135461 .0111957
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. White's adjusted standard errors used for significance tests.
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Table 5C.6 
Regression Results
Intensive Sector and Pooled Sample by DC<5
Intensive Pooled Sample
DC<5 DC=5,6 DC<5 DC=5,6
mana .7748 (13.05) .7735 (24.98) .7309 (21.29) .7636 (33.82)
prof .6233 (10.59) .6196 (19.95) .6821 (17.50) .6586 (28.06)
para .4552 (8.77) .4197 (14.27) .4749 (13.81) .4619 (20.77)
trad .2052 (4.68) .2544 (11.46) .2303 (8.38) .2568 (15.36)
cler .09794 (2.33) .1065 (5.15) .1044 (4.21) .1140 (7.37)
sale .1643 (3.31) .2211 (7.87) .1722 (5.35) .2146 (10.66)
plan .07013 (1.41) .09995 (3.91) .1122 (3.56) .1096 (5.55)
female -.005122 (8.28) -.003232 (10.05) -.003149 (7.93) -.002673(11.31)
teen 10 -.06621 (1.41) -.1304 (7.47) -.1564 (6.54) -.1321 (11.06)
ov5010 .006827 (0.25) -.01008 (0.72) .01222 (0.68) -.004263 (0.39)
nesblO -.08181 (3.41) .01435 (1.03) .005290 (0.30) .02851 (2.63)
Ovt -.06716 (1-34) .004009 (0.15) -.004079 (0.14) .006526 (0.38)
rshift -.02096 (0.67) .02602 (1.97) .002253 (0.12) -.005441 (0.50)
TRNM -.01096 (0.34) .01146 (0.80) .02402 (1.26) .008791 (0.80)
TRNH -.03556 (0.79) .07248 (3.10) -.001930 (0.07) .08124 (4.50)
TRNWP .03511 (0.82) .03841 (2.58) .02062 (1.05) .03127 (2.82)
UNWP -.001214 (1.73) -.0007781 (2.12) -.0003058 (0.78) -.0008905(3.63)
UNOCCM -.01764 (0.52) -.05696 (3.24) .001940 (0.08) -.03512 (2.68)
UNOCCH .04384 (1.02) -.004353 (0.20) .03340 (1.27) .02192 (1.26)
UNDEL .1577 (3.96) -.005138 (0.22) .04458 (2.02) .06522 (4.85)
const 6.1721 (89.05) 6.07557 (125.37) 5.9990 (152.23) 5.9787 (231.64)
n 400 1416 965 2711
R2 .6176 .5920 .5502 .5415
se .2416 .2475 .2587 .2667
TRNM/H F(2] 0.32 4.94 0.96 10.51
UNOCC* F(2 1.14 6.72 0.95 8.03
ln(W) 6.26257 6.251488
s» .0162695 .0100284
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. White's adjusted standard errors used for significance tests.
Table 5C.7 
Regression Results
Intensive Sector and Pooled Sample by DC<6
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Intensive Pooled Sample
DC<6 DC=6 DC<6 DC=6
mana .8014 (20.81) .7451 (19.09) .7630 (30.60) .7497 (26.22)
prof .5950 (15.98) .6515 (15.99) .6375 (24.24) .7008 (22.69)
para .4393 (12.94) .4100 (10.63) .4527 (19.43) .4800 (15.72)
trad .2299 (8.32) .2656 (9.38) .2309 (12.58) .2749 (12.31)
cler .09518 (3.51) .1154 (4.52) .09949 (5.72) .1251 (6.33)
sale .2139 (6.01) .2054 (6.06) .2076 (8.89) .2033 (8.14)
plan .08978 (2.81) .1020 (3.22) .1118 (5.25) .1081 (3.95)
female -.003687 (9.02) -.003263 (7.68) -.002906 (11.22) -.002599(8.01)
teen 10 -.1293 (4.65) -.1222 (6.08) -.1468 (9.50) -.1222 (8.31)
ov5010 -.02567 (1.45) .01835 (1.04) -.01436 (1.18) .01865 (1.31)
nesblO -.02582 (1.50) .01575 (0.84) .01604 (1.32) .02912 (2.03)
Ovt -.06067 0.78) -.01283 (0.40) .009014 (0.42) -.005877 (0.28)
rshift .003492 (0.19) .02918 (1.69) .01903 (1.53) -.03186 (2.20)
TRNM .03032 (1.81) -.02195 (1.12) .03001 (2.40) -.009194 (0.63)
TRNH .06672 (2.02) .03913 (1.33) .03576 (1.84) .07959 (3.35)
TRNWP .03189 (1.50) .02707 (1.48) .03389 (2.70) .01726 (1.21)
UNWP -.001356 (2.83) -.0003778 (0.89) -.0004558 (1.58) -.001043 (3.44)
UNOCCM -.04936 (2.20) -.04989 (2.19) -.02152 (1-39) -.02537 (1.48)
UNOCCH .03904 (1.39) -.03261 (1.20) .03082 (1.66) .01910 (0.84)
UNDEL .08938 (3.20) -.04234 (1-51) .04332 (2.69) .07869 (4.72)
const 6.1446 (127.53) 6.1058 (93.45) 5.9751 (212.43) 5.9913(184.26)
n 963 853 2002 1674
R2 .5947 .5964 .5574 .5305
se .2468 .2455 .2567 .2728
TRNM/H F(2 2.82 2.84 3.46* 7.53*
UNOCC* F(2 6.10* 2.40 4.42* 2.70
ln(W) 6.26853 6.243516
s„ .0115488 .0127228
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. White's adjusted standard errors used for significance tests.
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Table 5C.7 
Regression Results
Small Business and Extensive Sectors Pooled by market Structure Variables
Small Workplaces (Smallb + Exten Pooled)
Pooled FEWC MANYC DC<5 DC>5,6 DC<6 D 0 6
mana .7371* .7389* .7403 .7143* .7499* .7408* .7401*
prof .7028* .7008* .6988 .7199* .6878* .6770* .7320*
para .5000* .4746* .5124 .4768* .5087* .4602* .5506*
trad .2550* .2339* .2742 .2446* .2646* .2271* .3015*
cler .1177* .1010* .1271 .1154* .1222* .1098* .1250*
sale .2046* .2124* .2047 .1910* .2143* .2153* .2049*
plan .1237* .1079* .1311 .1292* .1147* .1276* .1059*
female -.002495* -.002254* -.002686 -.002422* -.002339* -.002618* -.001789*
teen 10 -.1299* -.1339* -.1200 -.1565* -.1225* -.1433* -.1040*
ov5010 -.01125 -.005038 -.02138 -.001255 -.01294 -.03140 .02364
nesblO .03783* .02580 .04924 .05046* .04149* .04898* .03120
Ovt .007433 .04677 -.01278 .04837 -.01052 .03623 -.02044
rshift -.05638* .008284 -.1044 -.009657 -.09289* .002054 -.1465*
TRNM .01552 .05390* -.01038 .04392 .002650 .03625* -.01511
TRNH .06032* .06553* .06700 .004541 .09700* .03869 .09536*
TRNWP .003345 .001071 .0009113 .001016 .009744 .003799 .007886
UNWP -.0008597* -.0004021 -.0009507 .00006620 -.001128* -.0003585 -.001095*
UNOCCM -.007409 .02963 -.0276168 .01040 -.01793 .002317 -.02840
UNOCCH .04455* .02577 .0654823 .03474 .05460* .03653 .06287
UNDEL .06072* .002245 .0842917 -.02512 .08267* -.002510 .1213*
const 5.9675* 5.9151* 5.992483 5.9196* 5.9777* 5.9402* 5.9635*
n 1860 650 1210 565 1295 1039 821
R2 .5047 .5463 .4924 .5213 .5030 .5313 .4966
se .2762 .2484 .2883 .2622 .2808 .2590 .2907
TRNM/H 3.93* 4.14* 3.86* 1.75 6.50* 2.46 3.81*
UNOCC* 3.31* 0.65 5.85* 0.53 4.02* 1.31 3.29*
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. White's adjusted standard errors used for significance tests.
